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This Technical Paper provides an overview and analysis of
technologies and measures to limit and reduce greenhouse gas
(GHG) emissions and to enhance GHG sinks under the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC).
The paper focuses on technologies and measures for the coun-
tries listed in Annex I of the FCCC, while noting information
as appropriate for use by non-Annex I countries. Technologies
and measures are examined over three time periods—with a
focus on the short term (present to 2010) and the medium term
(2010–2020), but also including discussion of longer-term
(e.g., 2050) possibilities and opportunities. For this analysis,
the authors draw on materials used to prepare the IPCC Second
Assessment Report (SAR) and previous IPCC assessments and
reports.
The Technical Paper includes discussions of technologies and
measures that can be adopted in three energy end-use sectors
(commercial/residential/institutional buildings, transporta-
tion and industry), as well as in the energy supply sector and
the agriculture, forestry and waste management sectors.
Broader measures affecting national economies are discussed
in a final section on economic instruments. A range of poten-
tial measures are analyzed, including market-based programs;
voluntary agreements; regulatory measures; research, devel-
opment and demonstration (RD&D); taxes on GHG emis-
sions; and emissions permits/quotas. It should be noted that
the choice of instruments could have economic impacts on
other countries.
The paper identifies and evaluates different options on the basis
of three criteria. Because of the difficulty of estimating the eco-
nomic and market potential (see Box 1) of different technolo-
gies and the effectiveness of different measures in achieving
emission reduction objectives, and because of the danger of
double-counting the results achieved by measures that tap the
same technical potentials, the paper does not estimate total
global emissions reductions. Nor does the paper recommend
adoption of any particular approaches.
Residential, Commercial and Institutional Buildings Sector
Global carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions from residential, com-
mercial, and institutional buildings are projected to grow from
1.9 Gt C/yr in 1990 to 1.9–2.9 Gt C/yr in 2010, 1.9–3.3 Gt C/yr
in 2020, and 1.9–5.3 Gt C/yr in 2050. While 75% of the 1990
emissions are attributed to energy use in Annex I countries,
only slightly over 50% of global buildings-related emissions
are expected to be from Annex I countries by 2050.
Energy-efficiency technologies for building equipment with
paybacks to the consumer of five years or less have the eco-
nomic potential to reduce carbon emissions from both residen-
tial and commercial buildings on the order of 20% by 2010,
25% by 2020 and up to 40% by 2050, relative to IS92 baselines
in which energy efficiency improves.
Improvements in the building envelope (through reducing heat
transfer and use of proper building orientation, energy-efficient
windows and climate-appropriate building albedo) have the
economic potential to reduce heating and cooling energy in
residential buildings with a five-year payback or less by about
25% in 2010, 30% in 2020 and up to 40% in 2050, relative to
IS92 baselines in which the thermal integrity of buildings
improves through market forces.
The reductions can be realized through use of the following
four general measures: (i) market-based programmes in
which customers or manufacturers are provided technical
support and/or incentives; (ii) mandatory energy-efficiency
standards, applied at the point of manufacture or at the time
of construction; (iii) voluntary energy-efficiency standards;
and (iv) increased emphasis of private or public RD&D
programmes to develop more efficient products. Measures
need to be carefully tailored to address market barriers.
While all of the measures have some administrative and
transaction costs, the overall impact on the economy will be
favourable to the extent that the energy savings are cost-
effective.
Total achievable reductions (market potential), not including
reductions due to voluntary energy-efficiency standards, are
estimated to be about 10–15% in 2010, 15–20% in 2020 and
20–50% in 2050, relative to the IS92 scenarios. Thus, total
achievable global carbon emissions reductions for the build-
ings sector are estimated to range (based on IS92c, a and e)
from about 0.175–0.45 Gt C/yr by 2010, 0.25–0.70 Gt C/yr by
2020 and 0.35–2.5 Gt C/yr by 2050.
TECHNICAL SUMMARY
Box 1.  Technical, Economic and Market Potential
Technical Potential—The amount by which it is possi-
ble to reduce GHG emissions or improve energy effi-
ciency by using a technology or practice in all applica-
tions in which it could technically be adopted, without
consideration of its costs or practical feasibility.
Economic Potential—The portion of the technical
potential for GHG emissions reductions or energy effi-
ciency improvements that could be achieved cost-effec-
tively in the absence of market barriers. The achievement
of the economic potential requires additional policies
and measures to break down market barriers.
Market Potential—The portion of the economic poten-
tial for GHG emissions reductions or energy efficiency
improvements that currently can be achieved under
existing market conditions, assuming no new policies
and measures.
Transport Sector
Transport energy use resulted in emissions of 1.3 Gt C in 1990,
of which Annex I countries accounted for about three-quarters.
Roughly half of global emissions in 1990 came from light-duty
vehicles (LDVs), a third from heavy-duty vehicles (HDVs), and
most of the remainder from aircraft. In a range of scenarios of
traffic growth and energy-intensity reductions, CO2 emissions
increase to 1.3–2.1 Gt C by 2010, 1.4–2.7 Gt C by 2020, and
1.8–5.7 Gt C by 2050. The Annex I share decreases to about
60–70% by 2020 and further thereafter. Trucks and aircraft
increase their shares in most scenarios. The transport sector is
also a source of other GHGs, including nitrous oxide (N2O),
chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), and hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs).
Aircraft nitrogen oxide (NOx) emissions contribute to ozone for-
mation that may have as much radiative impact as aircraft CO2.
Energy-intensity reductions in LDVs that would give users a
payback in fuel savings within 3–4 years could reduce their
GHG emissions relative to projected levels in 2020 by 10–25%.
The economic potential for energy-intensity reductions in
HDVs and aircraft might achieve about 10% reductions in GHG
emissions where applied relative to projected levels in 2020.
Controls on air-conditioning refrigerant leaks have the techni-
cal potential to reduce life-cycle greenhouse forcing due to cars
by 10% in 2020. Development of catalytic converters that do
not produce N2O could provide a similar reduction in forcing
due to cars. Aircraft engines that produce 30–40% less NOx
than current models might be technically feasible and would
also reduce forcing due to air transport, although there might
be a trade-off with engine efficiency, hence CO2 emissions.
Diesel, natural gas and propane, where used in LDVs instead of
gasoline, have the technical potential to reduce full-fuel-cycle
emissions by 10–30%. Where alternative fuels from renewable
sources are used, they have the technical potential to reduce
full-fuel-cycle GHG emissions by 80% or more.
New measures would be needed to implement these technical
options. Standards, voluntary agreements and financial incen-
tives can help to introduce energy-efficiency improvements,
which might be cost-effective for vehicle users. RD&D would
be needed to find means of reducing HFC, N2O and aircraft
NOx emissions, which could then be controlled through stan-
dards, although the costs of these are currently unknown.
There are several social and environmental costs associated
with road transport at local, regional and global levels. Market
instruments such as road-user charges can be used to reflect
many of these costs, especially those at local and regional 
levels. These instruments can also contribute to GHG mitigation
by reducing traffic. Fuel taxes are an economically efficient
means of GHG mitigation, but may be less efficient for
addressing local objectives. Nevertheless, they are administra-
tively simple and can be applied at a national level. Increases
in fuel prices to reflect the full social and environmental costs
of transport to its users could reduce projected road transport
CO2 emissions by 10–25% by 2020 in most regions, with much
larger reductions in countries where prices are currently very
low. Alternative fuel incentives might deliver up to 5% reduc-
tion in projected LDV emissions in 2020, but the longer term
effect might be much greater.
Changes in urban and transport infrastructure, to reduce the
need for motorized transport and shift demand to less energy-
intensive transport modes, may be among the most important
elements of a long-term strategy for GHG mitigation in the
transport sector. Packages of measures to bring about such
changes would need to be developed on a local basis, in con-
sultation with stakeholders. In some circumstances, the result-
ing traffic reductions can result in GHG emission reductions of
10% or more by 2020, while obtaining broad social and envi-
ronmental benefits.
Industrial Sector
During the past two decades, the industrial sector fossil fuel CO2
emissions of most Annex I countries have declined or remained
constant as their economies have grown. The reasons are differ-
ent for Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment (OECD) Annex I economies which have been driven more
by efficiency gains and a shift towards the service sector, and
economies in transition which are undergoing large-scale restruc-
turing and reduction in their heavy industrial sub-sectors. Global
industrial emissions (including those related to manufacturing,
agriculture, mining and forestry) were 2.8 Gt C (47% of total), to
which Annex I countries contributed 75%. Global industrial
emissions are projected to grow to 3.2–4.9 Gt C by 2010, to
3.5–6.2 Gt C by 2020 and to 3.1–8.8 Gt C by 2050. Annex I
industrial CO2 emissions are projected to either remain constant
then decline by 33%, or increase by 76% by 2050 (see Tables
A1–A4 in Appendix A). There are clearly many opportunities for
gains in energy efficiency of industrial processes, the elimination
of process gases and the use of coordinated systems within and
among firms that make more efficient use of materials, combined
heat and power, and cascaded heat. Major opportunities also exist
for cooperative activities among Annex I countries, and between
Annex I countries and developing countries.
While standard setting and regulation have been the traditional
approaches to reduce unwanted emissions, the immense range
of sectors, firms and individuals affected suggests that these
need to be supplemented with market mechanisms, voluntary
agreements, tax policy and other non-traditional approaches. It
will be politically difficult to implement restrictions on many
GHGs, and the administrative enforcement burden and trans-
action costs need to be kept low. Since many firms have stated
their commitment to sustainable practices, developing cooper-
ative agreements might be a first line of approach (SAR II,
20.5; SAR III, Chapter 11).
It is estimated that Annex I countries could lower their indus-
trial sector CO2 emissions by 25% relative to 1990 levels, by
simply replacing existing facilities and processes with the most
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efficient technological options currently in use (assuming a
constant structure for the industrial sector). If this upgraded
replacement occurred at the time of normal capital stock
turnover, it would be cost-effective (SAR II, SPM 4.1.1).
Energy Supply Sector
Energy consumed in 1990 resulted in the release of 6 Gt C.
About 72% of this energy was delivered to end users, account-
ing for 3.7 Gt C; the remaining 28% was used in energy con-
version and distribution, releasing 2.3 Gt C. It is technically
possible to realize deep emission reductions in the energy 
supply sector in step with the normal timing of investments to
replace infrastructure and equipment as it wears out or
becomes obsolete (SAR II, SPM 4.1.3). Over the next 50–100
years, the entire energy supply system will be replaced at least
twice. Promising approaches to reduce future emissions (not
ordered according to priority) include more efficient conver-
sion of fossil fuels; switching to low-carbon fossil fuels; decar-
bonization of flue gases and fuels, and CO2 storage; switching
to nuclear energy; and switching to renewable sources of 
energy (SAR II, SPM 4.1.3).
The efficiency of electricity generation can be increased from the
present world average of about 30% to more than 60% sometime
between 2020 and 2050 (SAR II, SPM 4.1.3.1). Presently, the
best available coal and natural gas plants have efficiencies of 45
and 52%, respectively (SAR II, 19.2.1). Assuming a typical effi-
ciency of new coal-fired power generation (with de-SOx and de-
NOx scrubbing equipment) of 40% in Annex I countries, an
increase in efficiency of 1% would result in a 2.5% reduction in
CO2 emissions (SAR II, 19.2.1.1). While the cost associated
with these efficiencies will be influenced by numerous factors,
there are advanced technologies that are cost-effective, compa-
rable to some existing plants and equipment. Switching to low-
carbon fossil fuels (e.g., the substitution of coal by natural gas)
can achieve specific CO2 reductions of up to 50%.
Decarbonization of flue gases and fuels can yield higher CO2
emission reductions of up to 85% and more, with typical decar-
bonization costs ranging from $80–150 per tonne of carbon
avoided. Switching to nuclear and renewable sources of energy
can eliminate virtually all direct CO2 emissions as well as reduce
other emissions of CO2 that occur during the life-cycle of energy
systems (e.g., mining, plant construction, decommissioning),
with the costs of mitigation varying between negligible addi-
tional cost to hundreds of dollars per tonne of carbon avoided
(SAR II, Chapter 19). Approaches also exist to reduce emissions
of methane (CH4) from coal mining by 30–90%, from venting
and flaring of natural gas by more than 50%, and from natural
gas distribution systems by up to 80% (SAR II, 22.2.2). Some of
these reductions may be economically viable in many regions of
the world, providing a range of benefits, including the use of
CH4 as an energy source (SAR II, 19.2.2.1).
The extent to which the potential can be achieved will depend
on future cost reductions, the rate of development and imple-
mentation of new technologies, financing and technology
transfer, as well as measures to overcome a variety of non-tech-
nical barriers such as adverse environmental impacts, social
acceptability, and other regional, sectoral, and country-specific
conditions.
Historically, the energy intensity of the world economy has
improved, on average, by 1% per year largely due to tech-
nology performance improvements that accompany the natural
replacement of depreciated capital stock (SAR II, B.3.1).
Improvements beyond this rate are unlikely to occur in the
absence of measures. The measures discussed are grouped into
five categories (not ordered according to priority): (i) market-
based programmes; (ii) regulatory measures; (iii) voluntary
agreements; (iv) RD&D; and (v) infrastructural measures. No
single measure will be sufficient for the timely development,
adoption and diffusion of the mitigation options. Rather, a
combination of measures adapted to national, regional and
local conditions will be required. Appropriate measures, there-
fore, reflect the widely differing institutional, social, economic,
technical and natural resource endowments in individual coun-
tries and regions.
Agricultural Sector
Agriculture accounts for about one-fifth of the projected
anthropogenic greenhouse effect, producing about 50 and
70%, respectively, of overall anthropogenic CH4 and N2O
emissions; agricultural activities (not including forest conver-
sion) account for approximately 5% of anthropogenic emis-
sions of CO2 (SAR II, Figure 23.1). Estimates of the potential
global reduction in radiative forcing through the agricultural
sector range from 1.1–3.2 Gt C-equivalents per year. Of the
total global reductions, approximately 32% could result from
reduction in CO2 emissions, 42% from carbon offsets by bio-
fuel production on land currently under cultivation, 16% from
reduced CH4 emissions, and 10% from reduced emissions of
N2O.
Emissions reductions by the Annex I countries could make a
significant contribution to the global total. Of the total poten-
tial CO2 mitigation, Annex I countries could contribute 40% of
the reduction in CO2 emissions and 32% of the carbon offset
from biofuel production on croplands. Of the global total
reduction in CH4 emissions, Annex I countries could contribute
5% of the reduction attributed to improved technologies for
rice production and 21% of reductions attributed to improved
management of ruminant animals. These countries also could
contribute about 30% of the reductions in N2O emissions
attributed to reduced and more efficient use of nitrogen fertil-
izer, and 21% of the reductions stemming from improved uti-
lization of animal manures. Some technologies, such as no-till
farming and strategic fertilizer placement and timing, already
are being adopted for reasons other than concern for climate
change. Options for reducing emissions, such as improved
farm management and increased efficiency of nitrogen ferti-
lizer use, will maintain or increase agricultural production with
positive environmental effects.
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Forest Sector
High- and mid-latitude forests are currently estimated to be a
net carbon sink of about 0.7 ± 0.2 Gt C/yr. Low-latitude forests
are estimated to be a net carbon source of 1.6 ± 0.4 Gt C/yr,
caused mostly by clearing and degradation of forests (SAR II,
24.2.2). These sinks and sources may be compared with the
carbon release from fossil fuel combustion, which was esti-
mated to be 6 Gt C in 1990.
The potential land area available in forests for carbon conserva-
tion and sequestration is estimated to be 700 Mha. The total car-
bon that could be sequestered and conserved globally by 2050 on
this land is 60–87 Gt C. The tropics have the potential to conserve
and sequester by far the largest quantity of carbon (80%), fol-
lowed by the temperate zone (17%) and the boreal zone (3%).
Slowing deforestation and assisting regeneration, forestation
and agroforestry constitute the primary mitigation measures
for carbon conservation and sequestration. Among these,
slowing deforestation and assisting regeneration in the tropics
(about 22–50 Gt C) and forestation and agroforestry in the
tropics (23 Gt C) and temperate zones (13 Gt C) hold the most
technical potential of conserving and sequestering carbon. To
the extent that forestation schemes yield wood products,
which can substitute for fossil fuel-based material and energy,
their carbon benefit can be up to four times higher than the
carbon sequestered. Excluding the opportunity costs of land
and the indirect costs of forestation, the costs of carbon con-
servation and sequestration average between $3.7–4.6 per ton
of carbon, but can vary widely across projects.
Governments in a few developing countries, such as Brazil and
India, have instituted measures to halt deforestation. For these
to succeed over the long term, enforcement to halt deforesta-
tion has to be accompanied by the provision of economic
and/or other benefits to deforesters that equal or exceed their
current remuneration. National tree planting and reforestation
programmes, with varying success rates, exist in many indus-
trialized and developing countries. Here also, adequate provi-
sion of benefits to forest dwellers and farmers will be impor-
tant to ensure their sustainability. The private sector has played
an important role in tree planting for dedicated uses, such as
paper production. It is expanding its scope in developing coun-
tries through mobilizing resources for planting for dispersed
uses, such as the building and furniture industries.
Wood residues are used regularly to generate steam and/or
electricity in most paper mills and rubber plantations, and in
specific instances for utility electricity generation. Making
plantation wood a significant fuel for utility electricity genera-
tion will require higher biomass yields, as well as thermal effi-
ciency to match those of conventional power plants.
Governments can help by removing restrictions on wood 
supply and the purchase of electricity.
Ongoing jointly implemented projects address all three types
of mitigation options discussed above. The lessons learned
from these projects will serve as important precursors for
future mitigation projects. Without their emulation and replica-
tion on a national scale, however, the impact of these projects
by themselves on carbon conservation and sequestration is
likely to be small. For significant reduction of global carbon
emissions, national governments will need to institute mea-
sures that provide local and national, economic and other ben-
efits, while conserving and sequestering carbon.
Solid Waste and Wastewater Disposal
An estimated 50–80 Mt CH4 (290–460 Mt C) was emitted by
solid waste disposal facilities (landfills and open dumps) and
wastewater treatment facilities in 1990. Although there are
large uncertainties in emission estimates for a variety of 
reasons, overall emissions levels are projected to grow signifi-
cantly in the future.
Technical options to reduce CH4 emissions are available and, in
many cases, may be profitably implemented. Emissions may
be reduced by 30–50% through solid waste source reduction
(paper recycling, composting and incineration), and through
CH4 recovery from landfills and wastewater (SAR II, 22.4.4.2).
Recovered CH4 may be used as an energy source, reducing the
cost of waste disposal. In some cases, CH4 produced from land-
fills and from wastewater can be cost-competitive with other
energy alternatives (SAR II, 22.4.4.2). Using the range of emis-
sions estimates in the IS92 scenarios, this implies equivalent
carbon reductions of about 55–140 Mt in 2010; 85–170 Mt in
2020; and 110–230 Mt in 2050.
Controlling CH4 emissions requires a prior commitment to
waste management, and the barriers toward this goal may be
reduced through four general measures: (i) institution building
and technical assistance; (ii) voluntary agreements; (iii) regu-
latory measures; and (iv) market-based programmes. Of partic-
ular importance, in many cases the resulting CH4 reductions
will be viewed as a secondary benefit of these measures, which
often may be implemented in order to achieve other environ-
mental and public health benefits.
Economic Instruments
A variety of economic instruments is available to influence
emissions from more than one sector. At both the national and
international levels, economic instruments are likely to be more
cost-effective than other approaches to limit GHG emissions.
These instruments include subsidies, taxes and tradable per-
mits/quotas, as well as joint implementation. These instruments
will have varying effects depending on regional and national
circumstances, including existing policies, institutions, infra-
structure, experience and political conditions.
National-level instruments include: (i) changes in the current
structure of subsidies, either to reduce subsidies for GHG-
emitting activities or to offer subsidies for activities that limit
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GHG emissions or enhance sinks; (ii) domestic taxes on GHG
emissions; and (iii) tradable permits.
Economic instruments at the international level include: (i)
international taxes or harmonized domestic taxes; (ii) tradable
quotas; and (iii) joint implementation.
Economic instruments implemented at the national or interna-
tional level require approaches to addressing concerns related
to equity, international competitiveness, “free riding” (i.e., par-
ties sharing the benefits of abatement without bearing their
share of the costs) and “leakage” (i.e., abatement actions in
participating countries causing emissions in other countries to
increase).
With few exceptions, both taxes and tradable permits impose
costs on industry and consumers. Sources will experience
financial outlays, either through expenditures on emission con-
trols or through cash payments to buy permits or pay taxes.
Permits are more effective than a tax in achieving a specified
emission target, but a tax provides greater certainty about con-
trol costs than do permits. For a tradable permit system to work
well, competitive conditions must exist in the permit (and
product) markets. A competitive permit market could lead to
the creation of futures contracts which would reduce uncer-
tainty regarding future permit prices.
A system of harmonized domestic taxes on GHG emissions
would involve an agreement about compensatory international
financial transfers. To be effective, a system of harmonized
domestic taxes also requires that participants not be allowed to
implement policies that indirectly increase GHG emissions.
A tradable quota scheme allows each participant to decide what
domestic policy to use. The initial allocation of quota among
countries addresses distributional considerations, but the exact
distributional implications cannot be known beforehand, since
the quota price will be known only after trading begins, so pro-
tection against unfavorable price movements may need to be
provided.
In applying economic instruments to limit GHG emissions at
the international level, equity across countries is determined by
the quota allocations in the case of tradable quota systems, the
revenue-sharing agreement negotiated for an international tax,
or the transfer payments negotiated as part of harmonized
domestic taxes on GHG emissions.
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1.1 Purpose and Context
The purpose of this Technical Paper is to provide an overview
and analysis of technologies and measures to limit and reduce
GHG emissions and to enhance GHG sinks under the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. The
“Berlin Mandate,” which was agreed upon at the first
Conference of the Parties (COP) to the Convention (Berlin,
March/April 1995), provides the context for the paper. This
mandate establishes a process that aims to elaborate policies
and measures, and set quantified emission limitation and
reduction objectives.
1.2 Scope and Organization1
This Technical Paper provides a sectoral analysis of technolo-
gies and practices that will reduce growth in GHG emissions
and of measures that can stimulate and accelerate the use of
these technologies and practices, with separate consideration of
broad economic policy instruments. The paper focuses on tech-
nologies and measures for the countries listed in Annex I of the
FCCC, while noting information as appropriate for use by non-
Annex I countries. Analysis of these technologies and measures
is provided in terms of a framework of criteria, which was
authorized by IPCC-XII (Mexico City, 11–13 September 1996).
Technologies and measures are examined over three time peri-
ods, with a focus on the short term (present to 2010) and the
medium term (2010–2020), but also including discussion of
longer-term (e.g., 2050) possibilities and opportunities. Many
of the data in the SAR were summarized as global values; for
this report, data for the Annex I countries also are provided to
the extent possible, as a group or categorized into OECD 
countries and countries with economies in transition. All of the
information and conclusions contained in this report are consis-
tent with the SAR and with previously published IPCC reports.
The Technical Paper begins with a discussion of three energy
end-use sectors—commercial/residential/institutional buildings,
transportation and industry. These discussions are followed by a
section on the energy supply and transformation sector, which
produces and transforms primary energy to supply secondary
energy to the energy end-use sectors.2 Technologies and mea-
sures that can be adopted in the agriculture, forestry and waste
management sectors are then discussed. Measures that will
affect emissions mainly in individual sectors (e.g., fuel taxes in
the transportation sector) are covered in the sectoral discussions
listed above; broader measures affecting the national economy
(e.g., energy or carbon taxes) are discussed in a final section on
economic instruments.
The paper identifies and evaluates different options on the basis
of three criteria (see Box 2). Because of the difficulty of esti-
mating the economic and market potential of different technolo-
gies and the effectiveness of different measures in achieving
emission reduction objectives, and because of the danger of
double-counting the results achieved by measures that tap the
same technical potentials, the paper does not estimate total
global emissions reductions. Nor does the paper recommend
adoption of any particular approaches. Each Party to the
Convention will decide, based on its needs, obligations and
national priorities, what is appropriate for its own national
circumstances.
1.3 Sources of Information
The Technical Paper has been drafted in a manner consistent
with the rules of procedure for IPCC Technical Papers agreed
to at IPCC-XI (Rome, 11–15 December 1995) and further
interpreted at IPCC-XII. The contributors and participating
governments of the IPCC recognize that a simplification of the
review process is necessary to enable the Technical Papers to
be completed in a time frame that meets the needs of the Parties
of the FCCC. Therefore, materials agreed to be appropriate for
use in this Technical Paper are restricted to information derived
from IPCC reports and relevant portions of references cited in
these reports, and models and scenarios used to provide infor-
mation in IPCC reports. In accordance with these require-
ments, information and studies that were not referenced or
cited in any IPCC report are not included in the discussion.
Important information on potential reductions from energy
savings or as captured through particular measures is not
always available in the literature; in the absence of such infor-
mation, the authors of this report have in certain instances pre-
sented their own estimates and professional judgment in evalu-
ating the performance of these measures.
1.4 Measures Considered
The implementation of technologies and practices to mitigate
GHG emissions over and above the normal background rates of
improvement in technology and replacement of depreciated
capital stock is unlikely to occur in the absence of measures to
encourage their use. Because circumstances differ among coun-
tries and regions and a variety of barriers presently inhibit the
1.  INTRODUCTION
1 The scope of this paper was guided by several UNFCCC documents
prepared for the Ad Hoc Group on the Berlin Mandate (AGBM),
including FCCC/AGBM/1995/4 and FCCC/AGBM/1996/2.
2 Primary energy is the chemical energy embodied in fossil fuels
(coal, oil and natural gas) or biomass, the potential energy of a
water reservoir, the electromagnetic energy of solar radiation, and
the energy released in nuclear reactors. For the most part, primary
energy is transformed into electricity or fuels such as gasoline, jet
fuel, heating oil or charcoal—called secondary energy. The end-
use sectors of the energy system provide energy services such as
cooking, illumination, comfortable indoor climate, refrigerated
storage, transportation and consumer goods using primary and sec-
ondary energy forms, as appropriate.
development and deployment of these technologies and prac-
tices, no one measure will be sufficient for the timely develop-
ment, adoption and diffusion of mitigation options. Rather, a
combination of measures adapted to national, regional and local
conditions will be required. These measures must reflect the
widely differing institutional, social, cultural, economic,
technical and natural resource endowments in individual coun-
tries and regions, and the optimal mix will vary from country to
country. The combinations of measures should aim to reduce
barriers to the commercialization, diffusion and transfer of
GHG mitigation technologies; mobilize financial resources;
support capacity building in developing countries and countries
with economies in transition; and induce behavioral changes. A
number of relevant measures may be introduced for reasons
other than climate mitigation, such as raising efficiency or
addressing local/regional economic and environmental issues.
A range of potential measures are analyzed in this paper, including
market-based programmes (carbon or energy taxes, full-cost pric-
ing, use or phaseout of subsidies, tradable emissions permits/quo-
tas); voluntary agreements (energy use and carbon emissions stan-
dards, government procurement3, promotional programmes for
energy-efficient products); regulatory measures (mandatory equip-
ment or building standards, product and practices bans, non-trad-
able emissions permits/quotas); and RD&D. Some of these mea-
sures could be applied at the national or the international levels.
1.4.1 Provision of Information and Capacity Building
The provision of information and capacity building are consid-
ered to be necessary components of many of the measures and
policies discussed in the paper, and generally are not examined
as separate types of measures.
In order for successful GHG abatement techniques and tech-
nologies to be diffused to a wide range of users, there needs to
be a concerted effort to disseminate information about their
technical, managerial and economic aspects. In addition to
information availability, training programmes are needed to
ensure that successful programmes can be implemented. There
is relatively little international transfer of knowledge to non-
Annex I countries. Including information and training in loan
and foreign assistance packages by aid donors and lending
institutions could be an effective mechanism. International
agencies such as the United Nations Institute for Training and
Research (UNITAR) might take on major information and
training responsibilities for GHG-related technology transfer.
International and national trade organizations might also be
effective in providing information and training.
Information and education measures include efforts to provide
information to decision makers with the intention of altering
behavior. They can help overcome incomplete knowledge of
economic, environmental and other characteristics of promis-
ing technologies that are currently available or under develop-
ment. Information measures have aided the development and
commercialization of new energy demand-management and
supply technologies in national or regional markets. In addi-
tion, information and education may be instrumental in shap-
ing socio-economic practices as well as behavioral attitudes
toward the way energy services are provided and demanded.
The ability of information and education programmes to
induce changes in GHG emissions is difficult to quantify.
Training and capacity building may be prerequisites for deci-
sion-making related to climate change and for formulating
appropriate policies and measures to address this issue. Training
and capacity building can promote timely dissemination of
information at all levels of society, facilitating acceptance of
new regulations or voluntary agreements. Capacity building
also can help catalyze and accelerate the development and uti-
lization of sustainable energy supply and use technologies.
1.4.2 International Coordination and Institutions
Equity issues, as well as international economic competitive-
ness considerations, may require that certain measures be
anchored in regional or international agreements, while other
policies can be implemented unilaterally. As a result, a key
issue is the extent to which any particular measure might
require or benefit from “common action” and what form such
action might take. The level of common action could range
from a group of countries adopting common measures, coordi-
nating the implementation of similar measures or working to
achieve common aims, with flexibility in the technologies,
measures and policies used. Other forms of common action
could include the development of a common menu of useful
actions from which each country would select measures best
suited to its situation, or the development of coordination pro-
tocols for consistent monitoring and accounting of emissions
reductions or for the conduct and monitoring of international
tradable emissions initiatives.
This paper does not assess levels or types of international coor-
dination; rather, elements of the analysis illustrate potential
advantages and disadvantages of actions taken both at the level
of individual countries and internationally.
1.5 Criteria for Analysis
In order to provide a structure and basis for comparison of
options, the authors developed a framework of criteria for
analysing technologies and measures (see Box 2). These crite-
ria focus the discussion on some of the important benefits and
drawbacks of a large number of measures.
The authors focus their evaluations on the main criteria (i.e.,
GHG reductions and other environmental results; economic and
social effects; and administrative, institutional and political
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3 Because of its potential effects on market creation, government pro-
curement is counted as a market-based programme in some sections
of this paper.
issues), and include elements from all three categories in the
discussion of each technology and measure (see tables within
respective sections). Because of the limited length and broad
scope of the paper, every option cannot be evaluated using each
detailed criterion listed. In particular, it is difficult to judge pre-
cisely the effectiveness of various instruments in achieving
emissions reduction objectives, the economic costs at both the
project and macro-economic levels, and other factors, such as
other types of environmental effects resulting from the imple-
mentation of various options. In some instances, the authors
were unable to quantify the cost-effectiveness or fully evaluate
other cost considerations noted in the criteria for evaluation.
Such cost evaluation could not be completed because costs
depend on the specific technical option promoted and the
means of implementation; evaluation of the costs of measures
has not been well-documented by Annex I countries, and is not
available in the literature at this time. Assessing the perfor-
mance of any of the wide range of technologies and measures
is further complicated by the need to consider implementation
issues that can affect performance, and by the likelihood that
the performance of measures will vary when combined into
different packages.
The criteria used by governments for assessing technologies
and measures—and the priority placed on each criterion—may
differ from those listed here. The information provided about
the performance of the technologies and measures described in
the SAR with respect to these criteria is intended to inform the
choice of options by governments.
1.6 Baseline Projections of Energy Use
and Carbon Dioxide Emissions
Historically, global energy consumption has grown at an aver-
age annual rate of about 2% for almost two centuries, although
growth rates vary considerably over time and among regions.
The predominant GHG is CO2, which represents more than half
of the increase in radiative forcing from anthropogenic GHG
sources. The majority of CO2 arises from the use of fossil fuels,
which in turn account for about 75% of total global energy use. 
Energy consumed in 1990 resulted in the release of 6 Gt C as
CO2. About 72% of this energy was delivered to end users,
accounting for 3.7 Gt C in CO2 emissions; the remaining 28%
was used in energy conversion and distribution, releasing 2.3 
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Box 2.  Criteria for Evaluation of Technologies and Measures
1. GHG and Other Environmental Considerations
• GHG reduction potential
– Tons of carbon equivalent4
– per cent of IS92a baseline and range (IS92c-e)
• Other environmental considerations
– Percentage change in emissions of other gases/particulates
– Biodiversity, soil conservation, watershed management, indoor air quality, etc.
2. Economic and Social Considerations
• Cost-effectiveness
– Average and marginal costs
• Project-level considerations
– Capital and operating costs, opportunity costs, incremental costs
• Macro-economic considerations
– GDP, jobs created or lost, effects on inflation or interest rates, implications for long-term development, foreign
exchange and trade, other economic benefits or drawbacks
• Equity considerations
– Differential impacts on countries, income groups or future generations
3. Administrative, Institutional and Political Considerations
• Administrative burden
– Institutional capabilities to undertake necessary information collection, monitoring, enforcement, permitting, etc.
• Political considerations
– Capacity to pass through political and bureaucratic processes and sustain political support
– Consistency with other public policies
• Replicability
– Adaptability to different geographical and socio-economic-cultural settings
4 Carbon equivalents of non-CO2 GHGs are calculated from the
CO2-equivalents, using the 100-year global warming potentials
(GWPs): CH4 = 21, N2O = 310 (SAR I, 2.5, Table 2.9).
Gt C as CO2 (see Figure 1). In 1990, the three energy end-use
sectors accounting for the largest CO2 releases from direct fuel
use were industry (45% of total CO2 releases), transportation
(21%) and residential/commercial/institutional buildings
(29%). Transport sector energy use and related CO2 emissions
have grown most rapidly over the past two decades.
As shown in Tables A3 and A4 in Appendix A, Annex I coun-
tries are major energy users and fossil fuel CO2 emitters,
although their share of global fossil fuel carbon emissions has
been declining. Non-Annex I countries account for a smaller
portion of total global CO2 emissions than Annex I countries,
but projections indicate that the share of the non-Annex I coun-
tries will increase significantly in all scenarios by 2050.
The mitigation potential of many of the technologies and mea-
sures is estimated using a range of baseline projections provided
by the IPCC IS92 “a,” “c,” and “e” scenarios for 2010, 2020
and 2050 (see Tables A1–A4 in Appendix A). The IS92 
scenarios (IPCC 1992, 1994) provide a current picture of 
global energy use and GHG emissions, as well as a range of
future projections without mitigation policies, based on
assumptions and trend information available in late 1991. By
providing common and consistent baselines against which the
authors compare percentage reductions in energy use and 
related GHG emissions, the scenarios make possible rough
estimates of the potential emission reduction contributions of
different technologies and measures. The rapid changes in
national economic trends during the early 1990s for several of
the Annex I countries with economies in transition were not
captured in these scenarios, hence are not accounted for in
quantitative elements of these analyses.
Across the IS92 scenarios, global energy needs are projected to
continue to grow, at least through the first half of the next cen-
tury. Without policy intervention, CO2 emissions will grow,
although this growth will be slower than the expected increase
in energy consumption, because of the assumed “normal” rate
of decarbonization of energy supply. However, the global
decarbonization rate of energy will not fully offset the average
annual 2% growth rate of global energy needs.
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Figure 1: Major energy and carbon flows through the global energy
system in 1990, EJ and Gt C (billion tons) elemental carbon. Carbon

































In 1990, the residential, commercial and institutional buildings
sector was responsible for roughly one-third of global energy
use and associated carbon emissions both in the Annex I coun-
tries and globally. In that year, buildings in Annex I countries
used 86 EJ of primary energy and emitted 1.4 Gt C, accounting
for about 75% of global buildings energy use (112 EJ, with
associated emissions of 1.9 Gt C).6 However, the share of pri-
mary energy use and associated emissions attributable to Annex
I countries is projected to drop; the IS92a scenario projects that
global buildings-related emissions from Annex I countries will
be about 70% in 2020 and slightly over 50% in 2050.
Greater use of available, cost-effective technologies to increase
energy efficiency in buildings can lead to sharp reductions in
emissions of CO2 and other GHGs resulting from the produc-
tion, distribution and use of fossil fuels and electricity needed
for all energy-using activities that take place within residential,
commercial and institutional buildings. The buildings sector is
characterized by a diverse array of energy end uses and varying
sizes and types of building shells that are constructed in all cli-
matic regimes. Numerous technologies and measures have been
developed and implemented to reduce energy use in buildings,
especially during the past two decades in Annex I countries.
Table 1 outlines measures and technical options to mitigate GHG
emissions in the buildings sector, and provides a brief description
of the climate and environmental benefits as well as economic
and social effects (including costs associated with implementa-
tion of measures), and administrative, institutional and political
issues associated with each measure. Tables 2 and 3 provide esti-
mates of global and Annex I, respectively, emissions reductions
associated with both energy-efficient technologies and the 
energy-efficiency measures.7 The estimates for the reductions
from energy-efficient technologies are based on studies described
in the SAR, using expert judgment to extrapolate to the global sit-
uation and to estimate reductions in 2020 and 2050, because most
of the studies in the SAR estimate energy savings only for 2010.
The estimates for the reductions from energy-efficient technolo-
gies captured through measures are based on expert judgment
regarding policy effectiveness. These two categories of reduc-
tions—“potential reductions from energy-efficient technologies”
and “potential reductions from energy-efficient technologies cap-
tured through measures”—are not additive; rather, the second cat-
egory represents an estimate of that portion of the first that can be
captured by the listed measures.
2.2 Technologies for Reducing
GHG Emissions in the Residential,
Commercial and Institutional Buildings Sector
A significant means of reducing GHG emissions in the buildings
sector involves more rapid deployment of technologies aimed at
reducing energy use in building equipment (appliances, heating
and cooling systems, lighting and all plug loads, including office
equipment) and reducing heating and cooling energy losses
through improvements in building thermal integrity (SAR II,
22.4.1, 22.4.2). Other effective methods to reduce emissions
include urban design and land-use planning that facilitate lower
energy-use patterns and reduce urban heat islands (SAR II,
22.4.3); fuel switching (SAR II, 22.4.1.1, Table 22-1); improv-
ing the efficiency of district heating and cooling systems (SAR
II, 22.4.1.1.2, 22.4.2.1.2); using more sustainable building tech-
niques (SAR II, 22.4.1.1); ensuring correct installation, opera-
tion and equipment sizing; and using building energy manage-
ment systems (SAR II, 22.4.2.1.2). Improving the combustion of
solid biofuels or replacing them with a liquid or gaseous fuel are
important means for reducing non-CO2 GHG emissions. The use
of biomass is estimated (with considerable uncertainty) to pro-
duce emissions of 100 Mt C/yr in CO2-equivalent, mainly from
products of incomplete combustion that have greenhouse warm-
ing potential (SAR II, Executive Summary).
The potential for cost-effective improvement in energy efficien-
cy in the buildings sector is high in all regions and for all major
end uses. Projected energy demand growth is generally consid-
erably higher in non-Annex I countries than in Annex I coun-
tries due to higher population growth and expected greater
increases in energy services per capita (SAR II, 22.3.2.2).
Although development patterns vary significantly among coun-
tries and regions, general trends in Annex I countries with
economies in transition and non-Annex I countries include
increasing urbanization (SAR II, 22.3.2.2), increased housing
area and per capita energy use (SAR II, 22.3.2.2, 22.3.2.3),
increasing electrification (SAR II, 22.3.2.2), transition from
biomass fuels to fossil fuels for cooking (SAR II, 22.4.1.4),
increased penetration of appliances (SAR II, 22.3.2.3), and ris-
ing use of air conditioning (SAR II, 22.4.1.1). For simplifica-
tion, the authors assume that by 2020 urban areas in non-Annex I
countries will have end-use distributions similar to those now
found in Annex I countries, so that energy-saving options and
measures for most appliances, lighting, air conditioning and
office equipment will be similar for urban areas in both sets of
countries. The exception is heating which is likely to be a large
energy user only in a few of the non-Annex I countries, such as
China (SAR II, 22.2.1, 22.4.1.1.1). In addition, it is assumed
that the range of cost-effective energy-savings options will be
similar for Annex I and non-Annex I countries by 2020.
2.  RESIDENTIAL, COMMERCIAL AND INSTITUTIONAL BUILDINGS SECTOR5
5 This section is based on SAR II, Chapter 22, Mitigation Options
for Human Settlements (Lead Authors: M. Levine, H. Akbari,
J. Busch, G. Dutt, K. Hogan, P. Komor, S. Meyers, H. Tsuchiya,
G. Henderson, L. Price, K. Smith and Lang Siwei).
6 Global energy use and emissions values are based on IS92 scenarios.
7 Tables 2 and 3 include only carbon emissions resulting from the
use of fuels sold commercially. They do not include the large
quantities of biomass fuels used in developing countries for cook-
ing. Fuel switching from biomass fuels for cooking to sustainable,
renewable fuels such as biogas or alcohol in developing countries
can reduce these emissions (SAR II, 22.4.1.4).
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Table 1: Selected examples of measures and technical options to mitigate GHG emissions in the buildings sector.
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– Increased clothes washer spin 
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–Building energy management 
systems
–Advanced energy management 
systems
Climate Benefits
– Reductions of 2.5–4%
of emissions due to
buildings by 2010
– Reductions of 3–5%
of emissions due to
buildings by 2020
– Reductions of 5–13%








– Reductions of 4–7%
of emissions due to
buildings by 2010
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of emissions due to
buildings by 2020
– Reductions of 10–25%
of emissions due to
buildings by 2050
Other Effects
– Reduced impacts on
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– Carbon reductions are
cost-effective with a
presumed payback
period of <5 years
Macro-economic Issues
– Savings beneficial to
the economy
Project-level Effects
– Need for trained
personnel
– Costs for analysis,
testing and training
– Equipment costs for
testing laboratories
– Initial production costs
– Need for new
institutional structures
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ing integrated sys-
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to address all options











– National, regional or
international agree-
ment on test proce-
dures and on 
standard levels
– Raising capital for 
testing
















The largest potential energy savings are for building equipment.
Cost-effective energy savings for these end uses vary by product
and energy prices, but savings in the range of 10–70% (most typ-
ically 30–40%) are available by replacing existing technology
with such energy-efficient technologies as condensing furnaces,
electric air-source heat pumps, ground-source heat pumps, effi-
cient air conditioners, air-source or exhaust air heat pump water
heaters, efficient refrigerators, horizontal axis clothes washers,
heat pump clothes dryers, kerosene stoves, compact fluorescent
lamps, efficient fluorescent lamps, electronic ballasts, lighting
control systems, efficient computers, variable speed drives and
efficient motors (SAR II, 22.4) (see Table 1).
Residential buildings are expected to account for about 60% of
global buildings energy use in 2010, falling to 55% by 2050.
Based on this ratio, IS92a scenarios indicate that residential
buildings will use energy that produces 1.5 Gt C in 2010, 1.6
Gt C in 2020, and 2.1 Gt C in 2050, while commercial build-
ings will be responsible for emissions of 1.0 Gt C in 2010, 1.1
Gt C in 2020, and 1.7 Gt C in 2050. Based on information pre-
sented in the SAR, the authors estimate that efficiency mea-
sures with paybacks to the consumer of five years or less have
the potential to reduce global residential and commercial build-
ings carbon emissions on the order of 20% by 2010, 25% by
2020 and up to 40% by 2050, relative to a baseline in which
energy efficiency improves (see section of Table 2 entitled
“Potential Reductions from Energy-efficient Technologies”).
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Table 1 (continued)
Administrative,
Climate and Other Economic and Institutional and
Technical Options Measures Environmental Effectsa Social Effects Political Considerations
Building Thermal Integrity
– Improved duct sealing
–Proper orientation
– Insulation and sealing
–Energy-efficient windows
Climate Benefits





from buildings by 2020









– Reductions of 1.5–2%
of emissions from
buildings by 2010
– Reductions of 1.5–2%
of emissions from
buildings by 2020
























ment, except do not
have equipment costs
for testing laborato-










costs may be higher
Administrative/
Institutional Factors
– Difficulty in improv-
ing integrated systems





to address all options






– Difficult to enforce







– Responding to envi-
ronmental and con-
sumer concerns
Note: Percentage values in this table correspond to absolute values in the section of Table 2 entitled “Potential Reductions from Energy-
efficient Technologies Captured through Measures.” To match the values, add the emissions reduction percentages for market-based pro-
grammes and for mandatory energy-efficiency standards for both buildings equipment and building thermal integrity (e.g., 2010 reductions
of 2.5–4% from market-based programmes for building equipment plus reductions of 1.5–2% from market-based programmes for building
thermal integrity equals 4–6%, which corresponds to 95–160 Mt C reductions from market-based programmes in Table 2).
2.2.2 Building Thermal Integrity
Heating and cooling of residential buildings is largely needed
to make up for heat transfer through the building envelope
(walls, roofs and windows). Energy savings of 30–35%
between 1990 and 2010 have been estimated for retrofits to
U.S. buildings built before 1975, but only half of these are cost-
effective. Adoption of Swedish-type building practices in west-
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Annual Global Buildings Sector
Carbon Emissions (Mt C)
1990 2010 2020 2050
Source of Emissions—Base Casea
Residential Buildings 1 200 1 500 1 600 2 100
Commercial Buildings 700 1 000 1 100 1 700
TOTAL 1 900 2 500 2 700 3 800
Annual Global Buildings Sector
Carbon Emissions Reductions (Mt C)
Potential Reductions from Energy-efficient Technologies
Assuming Significant RD&D Activitiesb (from SAR)
Residential Equipmentc 300 400 840
Residential Thermal Integrityd 150 190 335
Commercial Equipmentc 200 275 680
Commercial Thermal Integrityd 65 85 170
TOTAL POTENTIAL REDUCTIONS 715 950 2 025
Potential Reductions from Energy-efficient Technologies
Captured through Measurese (Based on Expert Judgment)
Mandatory Energy-efficiency Standardsf 135–225 210–350 450–1,125
Voluntary Energy-efficiency Standards g g g
Market-based Programmesh 95–160 125–210 275–685
TOTAL ACHIEVABLE REDUCTIONS 230–385 335–560 725–1 810
Note: “Potential Reductions from Energy-efficient Technologies” and “Potential Reductions from Energy-efficient Technologies Captured through Measures”
are not additive; rather, the second category represents that portion of the first that can be captured by the listed measures.
a The breakdown between residential and commercial buildings in 2010, 2020 and 2050 is estimated based on 1990 breakdown of 65% residential and 35%
commercial (SAR II, 22.2.1), and on the expectation that the commercial sector will grow in significance over this period to 45% in 2050.
b Without significant RD&D activities, some of the reductions in 2010, an important part of the reductions in 2020 and most of the 2050 reductions are
impossible. RD&D reductions have not been shown separately, because they are assumed to be captured in the “Potential Reductions from Energy-efficient
Technologies.” 2050 values include the possibility of major RD&D breakthroughs.
c Equipment includes appliances, heating and cooling systems, lighting and all plug loads (including office equipment). Potential carbon reductions for resi-
dential and commercial equipment are calculated as 20% of residential and commercial emissions in 2010, 25% in 2020 and 40% in 2050, respectively.
d Potential carbon reductions for residential thermal integrity are calculated as 25% of the emissions attributed to heating and cooling energy used in the sec-
tor (40% of total residential energy use) in 2010, 30% in 2020 and 40% in 2050. Potential savings for commercial thermal integrity are calculated as 25%
of the emissions attributed to heating and cooling energy used in the sector (25% of total commercial energy use) in 2010, 30% in 2020 and 40% in 2050.
e Potential carbon reductions from mandatory energy-efficiency standards and from market-based programmes can be added, because estimates are conserv-
ative and account for potential interactions and possible double-counting. Potential carbon reductions are presented as a range of 60 to 100% of reductions
calculated as explained in footnotes f and h for 2010 and 2020, and a range of 60 to 150% of reductions calculated for 2050. The 60% assumes partial
implementation of measures. The 150% in 2050 assumes RD&D breakthroughs.
f Potential carbon reductions captured through mandatory energy-efficiency standards are calculated as the sum of 40% of residential equipment reductions,
25% of commercial equipment reductions, and 25% of residential and commercial thermal integrity reductions in 2010, as described in footnotes c and d
and shown in this table under “Potential Savings from Energy-efficient Technologies.” For 2020 and 2050, reductions are calculated as 50% of residential
equipment reductions, 30% of commercial equipment reductions and 25% of residential and commercial thermal integrity reductions.
g Carbon reductions range from 10 to 50% of reductions from mandatory standards, depending upon the way in which voluntary standards are carried out
and on the participation by manufacturers. Due to the uncertainty, this value is not included in the total achievable savings.
h Potential carbon reductions captured through market-based programmes are calculated as the sum of 15% of residential equipment reductions, 30% of
commercial equipment reductions and 25% of residential and commercial thermal integrity reductions in 2010. For 2020 and 2050, savings are calculated
as 15% of residential equipment, 30% of commercial equipment and 25% of residential and commercial thermal integrity reductions.
Table 2: Annual global buildings sector carbon emissions and potential reductions in emissions from technologies and measures
to reduce energy use in buildings (Mt C) based on IPCC scenario IS92a.
ern Europe and North America could reduce space heating
requirements by an estimated 25% in new buildings relative to
those built in the late 1980s (SAR II, 22.4.1.1.1). Although
large commercial buildings tend to be internal load-dominated,
important energy savings opportunities also exist in the design
of the building envelope (SAR II, 22.4.2.1.1). Considerably
larger cost-effective savings are possible for new buildings than
for existing ones (SAR II, 22.5.1). Since most of the growth in
building energy demand is expected to be in non-Annex I
countries and a large percentage of this will be new buildings,
there are significant opportunities to capture these larger sav-
ings if buildings are designed and built to be energy-efficient in
these countries (SAR II, 22.4.1).
Overall, based on information presented in the SAR and on expert
judgment, the authors estimate that improvements in the building
envelope (through reducing heat transfer and using proper build-
ing orientation, energy-efficient windows, and climate-appropri-
ate building albedo) have the potential to reduce carbon emissions
from heating and cooling energy use in residential buildings with
a five-year payback (or less) by about 25% in 2010, 30% in 2020
and up to 40% in 2050, relative to a baseline in which the thermal
integrity of buildings improves. Heating and cooling are about
40% of global residential energy use and are expected to decline
somewhat as a proportion of total residential energy. For com-
mercial buildings, improvement in the thermal integrity of win-
dows and walls with paybacks of five years or less have lower
potential to reduce global carbon emissions, because only about
25% of energy use is due to heating and cooling, and reductions
in these loads are more difficult in commercial than residential
buildings (see section of Table 2 entitled “Potential Reductions
from Energy-efficient Technologies”). Most of these reductions
will occur only in new commercial buildings, as retrofits to the
walls and windows of existing buildings are costly.
2.3 Measures for Reducing
GHG Emissions in the Residential,
Commercial and Institutional Buildings Sector
A myriad of measures has been implemented over the past two
decades with the goal of increasing energy efficiency in the 
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Annual Annex I Buildings Sector
Carbon Emissions (Mt C)
1990 2010 2020 2050
Source of Emissions—Base Casea
Residential Buildings 900 1 000 1 050 1 100
Commercial Buildings 500 700 750 900
TOTAL 1 400 1 700 1 800 2 000
Annual Global Buildings Sector
Carbon Emissions Reductions (Mt C)
Potential Reductions from Energy-efficient Technologies
Assuming Significant RD&D Activitiesb (from SAR)
Residential Equipmentc 200 260 440
Residential Thermal Integrityd 125 160 220
Commercial Equipmentc 140 190 360
Commercial Thermal Integrityd 45 55 90
TOTAL POTENTIAL REDUCTIONS 510 665 1 110
Potential Reductions from Energy-efficient Technologies
Captured through Measurese (Based on Expert Judgment)
Mandatory Energy-efficiency Standardsf 95–160 145–240 245–610
Voluntary Energy-efficiency Standards g g g
Market-based Programmesh 70–115 90–150 150–380
TOTAL ACHIEVABLE REDUCTIONS 165–275 235–390 395–990
Note: “Potential Reductions from Energy-efficient Technologies” and “Potential Reductions from Energy-efficient Technologies Captured through
Measures” are not additive; rather, the second category represents that portion of the first that can be captured by the listed measures.
Footnotes are the same as those for Table 2, except for:
d Potential carbon reductions for residential thermal integrity are calculated as 25% of the emissions attributed to heating and cooling energy used in the sec-
tor (50% of total residential energy use) in 2010, 30% in 2020 and 40% in 2050. Potential savings for commercial thermal integrity are calculated as 25%
of the emissions attributed to heating and cooling energy used in the sector (25% of total commercial energy use) in 2010, 30% in 2020 and 40% in 2050.
Table 3: Annual Annex I buildings sector carbon emissions and potential reductions in emissions from technologies and measures
to reduce energy use in buildings (Mt C) based on IPCC scenario IS92a.
buildings sector. This discussion focuses on four general policy
areas: (i) market-based programmes in which customers or 
manufacturers are provided technical support and/or incentives;
(ii) mandatory energy-efficiency standards, applied at the point of
manufacture or at the time of construction; (iii) voluntary energy-
efficiency standards; and (iv) increased emphasis of private or
public research, development and demonstration programmes for
the development of more efficient products. Information and
training programmes are a necessary prerequisite for most of
these measures, but it is difficult to directly estimate savings
attributable to such programmes (SAR II, 22.5.1.6). Direct 
government subsidies and loans will not be covered as a separate 
policy category but rather treated in the context of other measures
as a means to reduce private investment costs.8
The measures discussed herein often work best in combination.
Mutually reinforcing regulatory, information, incentive and
other programmes offer the best means for achieving significant
portions of the cost-effective energy-efficiency potential (SAR
II, 22.5.1.8). Demand-side projects can be “bundled” in order to
provide a larger energy “resource” and attract capital, especially
in non-Annex I countries (SAR II, 22.5.1.7). Measures need to
be carefully tailored to address specific issues and barriers 
associated with various building characteristics, including com-
mercial versus residential buildings, new construction versus
existing retrofits, and owner- versus renter-occupied buildings
(SAR II, 22.5.1).
For all of the measures, environmental benefits associated with
the use of more energy-efficient equipment and buildings include
reduction of other power plant emissions (especially sulfur
oxides, nitrogen oxides and particulates), reduced impacts on
land and water resulting from coal mining, reduction of air toxics
from fossil fuel combustion, and the whole range of environmen-
tal benefits resulting from reduced extraction, transport and trans-
mission, conversion and use of energy (Levine et al., 1994).
2.3.1 Market-based Programmes
Market-based programmes, which provide some sort of incen-
tive to promote increased use of energy-efficient technologies
and practices, can be divided into the following five types:
• Government or utility programmes that obtain voluntary
agreements from customers (typically industries or owners/
operators of large commercial buildings) that they will
implement cost-effective energy-efficiency measures in
exchange for technical support and/or marketing assistance
(e.g., U.S. Department of Energy and Environmental
Protection Agency programmes such as Green Lights, Motor
Challenge and Energy Star Computers) (SAR II, 22.5.1.6).
• Procurement programmes in which very large purchasers
(typically governments) commission large numbers of
high-efficiency units (SAR II, 22.5.1.1). Examples include
the Swedish NUTEK technology procurement programme
and the International Energy Agency’s Cooperative
Procurement of Innovative Technologies.
• Manufacturer incentive programmes in which a competition
is held and a substantial reward provided for the develop-
ment/commercialization of a high-efficiency product [e.g.,
the U.S. Super Efficient Refrigerator Program (SERP)]
(SAR II, 22.5.1.1).
• Utility demand-side management (DSM) programmes in
which incentives are provided to customers for the pur-
chase of energy-efficient products (SAR II, 22.5.1.4).
• Creation of energy service companies, often encouraged
by government and utility programmes, that pay the full
cost of energy-efficient products in exchange for a portion
of future energy cost savings (SAR II, 22.5.1.4).
Market-based programmes can be used in place of, or in addi-
tion to, standards. In combination with standards, market-
based programmes can be designed to induce the acceptance
of new and innovative technologies in the marketplace in
advance of when they would otherwise be adopted. When
combined with active, ongoing RD&D programmes, such
efforts are likely to have significant long-term impacts on the
availability and performance of advanced, more efficient tech-
nologies. For appliances, lighting and office equipment, such
programmes can influence a very large number of purchasers,
many of whom have little knowledge of or interest in the energy
efficiency of the product. Combining market-based pro-
grammes and mandatory standards can help overcome some
of the difficulties of imposing standards, and could have an
impact greater than standards alone.
Importantly, market-based programmes can be directed toward
building systems (as opposed to individual pieces of equip-
ment) to reduce energy consumption resulting from inadequate
design, installation, maintenance and operation of heating and
cooling systems. There are numerous examples of systems
problems, such as mismatches between air-handling systems
and chillers, absence or inadequate performance of building
control systems, simultaneous heating and cooling of different
parts of the same building, and so on.
Based on expert judgment, the authors estimate that market-
based programmes will result in global carbon emission
reductions of about 5% of projected (IS92 scenarios) build-
ings-related emissions by 2010, about 5–10% by 2020 and
about 10–20% by 2050 (see section of Table 2 entitled
“Potential Reductions from Energy-efficient Technologies
Captured through Measures”), after allowing for an estimate
of the portion of savings that is “taken back” in increased ser-
vices (usage).
Surveys of the costs and benefits of these programmes as they
have been applied in the United States generally indicate that
they are cost-effective (SAR II, 22.5.1.4). However, it is not
possible to generalize, since there have been limited analyses
and the costs and savings depend both on the specific tech-
nologies that are promoted and the method of implementation
of the programme.
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8 Also see Section 9, Economic Instruments.
The major administrative, institutional and political issues in
implementing market-based programmes for residential and
commercial building equipment follow:
• Difficulties in improving integrated systems
• The need for, and shortage of, skilled persons capable of
diagnosing and rectifying systems problems
• The fact that energy users are often not those responsible
for paying energy bills, creating a barrier to increased effi-
ciency (SAR II, 22.5.1)
• The need to structure incentives so that intervention in
buildings aims at achieving all cost-effective energy effi-
ciency measures
• The need to create institutional structures for the market-
based programmes to work effectively
• Perception (or reality) of cross subsidies and related
unfairness of expenditures.
2.3.2 Regulatory Measures
Mandatory energy-efficiency standards—through which the
government enacts specific requirements that all products (or an
average of all products) manufactured and buildings constructed
meet defined energy use criteria—are an important regulatory
option for residential and commercial buildings; such standards
have the potential to yield the largest savings in this sector (SAR
II, 22.5.1.2, 22.5.1.3). Appliances typically have lifetimes of
10–20 years (SAR II, 22.4.1.5), while heating and cooling equip-
ment is replaced over a slightly longer time period. These rapid
turnover rates mean that inefficient stock can be relatively 
rapidly replaced with more efficient stock that meets established
standards. Residential and commercial buildings, however, more
typically last between 50 and 100 years.
Depending on the stringency of the standard levels, the authors
estimate (based on expert judgment) that mandatory standards
applied to appliances, other energy-using equipment in the build-
ing, and the building envelope could result in global carbon emis-
sion reductions of about 5–10% of projected (IS92 scenarios)
buildings-related emissions by 2010, about 10–15% by 2020 and
about 10–30% by 2050 (see section of Table 2 entitled “Potential
Reductions from Energy-efficient Technologies Captured
through Measures”), after allowing for an estimate of the portion
of savings that is “taken back” in increased services (usage).
Mandatory energy-efficiency standards are typically set at 
levels that are cost-effective such that the benefits in terms of
energy savings outweigh any additional costs associated with
the more efficient product or building. Thus, such standards
yield reductions in carbon emissions at a net negative cost on
average. Using the impact of U.S. National Appliance Energy
and Conservation Act (NAECA) residential appliance stan-
dards during the period 1990–2015 as an example, the cumula-
tive net present costs of appliance standards that have already
been implemented in the United States are projected to be
$32 000 million and the net present savings are estimated to be
$78 000 million (in US$ 1987) (Levine et al., 1994).
Project-level costs associated with mandatory standards include
programme costs for analysis, testing and rating of the products.
Testing laboratories and equipment to certify the performance
of the appliances will be needed for a country or group of coun-
tries without such facilities but with a growing demand for
appliances. Other major costs are the investment costs for initial
production of the more efficient products, the need for trained
personnel and the need for new institutional structures.
Administrative, institutional and political issues associated
with implementing mandatory energy-efficiency standards
include the following:
• Opposition from industry for a variety of reasons (per-
ceived loss of profitability, government requirements for
increased investments, potential for putting companies out
of business and reducing competition)
• Opposition from other groups that could be adversely
affected (e.g., electric utilities for some standards)
• Difficulty in obtaining agreement among different coun-
tries for uniform test procedures and comparable standards,
where this proves desirable
• Difficulty in raising investment money for testing laborato-
ries and for the costs of performing the required tests (espe-
cially acute in non-Annex I countries in spite of the fact
that the net benefits are much greater than these costs).
Overcoming these difficulties will require substantial effort.
Because many appliances are designed, licensed, manufactured
and sold in different countries with varying energy costs and
consumer use patterns, regional initiatives coupled with financ-
ing to set up standards and testing laboratories, especially in
Annex I countries with economies in transition and non-Annex
I countries, may be needed to overcome many institutional bar-
riers.
There also are administrative, institutional and political bene-
fits associated with mandatory energy-efficiency standards,
including responding to consumer and environmental con-
cerns, reducing future generating capacity requirements, and
providing credibility to manufacturers that take the lead in
introducing energy-efficient products through uniform test pro-
cedures. Harmonization of test procedures and standards could
reduce manufacturing costs associated with meeting various
requirements.
2.3.3 Voluntary Standards
Voluntary energy-efficiency standards, where manufacturers
and builders agree (without government-mandated legislation)
to generate products or construct buildings that meet defined
energy use criteria, can serve as a precursor or alternative to
mandatory standards (SAR II, 22.5.1.2). For products covered
by these standards, there must be agreement on test procedures,
adequate testing equipment and laboratories to certify equip-
ment and product labeling—thus satisfying the prerequisites 
of mandatory standards. Voluntary standards have been more
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successful in the commercial sector than in the residential 
sector, presumably because commercial customers are more
knowledgeable about energy use and efficiency of equipment
than residential consumers.
Energy use and carbon emissions reductions for voluntary stan-
dards vary greatly, depending upon the way in which they are
carried out and the participation by manufacturers. Based on
expert judgment, the authors estimate that global carbon emis-
sions reductions from these standards could range from
10–50% (or even more if combined with strong incentives) of
the reductions from mandatory standards.
Project-level costs associated with voluntary standards (costs
of testing equipment and laboratories, and the initial invest-
ment costs) are the same as those for mandatory standards. 
The increased investment for more efficient products, how-
ever, will be lower than that for mandatory standards, as vol-
untary standards are expected to affect the market less.
The administrative, institutional and political issues surround-
ing the achievement of voluntary standards are similar to those
for mandatory standards but of smaller magnitude, proportion-
ate to their ability to affect energy efficiency gains in appli-
ances, other equipment and buildings.
2.3.4 Research, Development and Demonstration
RD&D programmes foster the creation of new technologies that
enable measures to have impacts over the longer term. In gen-
eral, only large industries and governments have the resources
and interest to conduct RD&D. The building industry, in con-
trast, is highly fragmented, which makes it difficult for the
industry to pool its resources to conduct RD&D. Government-
supported RD&D has played a key role in developing and com-
mercializing a number of energy-efficient technologies, such
as low-emissivity windows, electronic ballasts and high-effi-
ciency refrigerator compressors. While Annex I RD&D results
can often be transferred to non-Annex I countries, there are
conditions specific to these countries that require special atten-
tion, such as building design and construction for hot, humid
climates. For this reason, it is essential to develop a collabora-
tive RD&D infrastructure between researchers based in non-
Annex I countries and both Annex I and non-Annex I country
RD&D specialists (SAR II, 22.5.1.5).
A specific carbon emissions reduction estimate is not assigned
to RD&D in Table 2; rather, it is noted that vigorous RD&D on
measures to use energy more efficiently in buildings—encom-
passing improvements in equipment, insulation, windows, exte-
rior surfaces and especially building systems—is essential if
substantial energy savings are to be achieved in the period after
2010. It is essential to note that the emissions reductions poten-
tials for the residential, commercial and institutional buildings
sector will not be realized without significant RD&D activities.
2.4 Global Carbon Emissions Reductions through
Technologies and Measures in the Residential,
Commercial and Institutional Buildings Sector
A range of total achievable emissions reductions for global res-
idential, commercial and institutional buildings is provided in
Tables 1 and 2. These reductions are estimated to be about
10–15% of projected emissions in 2010, 15–20% in 2020 and
20–50% in 2050, based on IS92 scenarios. Thus, total achiev-
able carbon emissions reductions for the buildings sector are
estimated to range (based on IS92 scenarios) from about
0.175–0.45 Gt C/yr by 2010, 0.25–0.70 Gt C/yr by 2020 and
0.35–2.5 Gt C/yr by 2050.
The measures described can be differentiated based on their
potential for carbon emissions reductions, cost-effectiveness
and difficulty of implementation. All of the measures will have
favorable impacts on an overall economy, to the extent that the
energy savings are cost-effective. Environmental benefits are
approximately proportional to the reductions in energy
demand, thus to carbon savings. The administrative and trans-
action costs of the different measures can vary markedly. While
building codes and standards can be difficult to administer,
many countries now require some minimum level of energy
efficiency in new construction. Many of the market pro-
grammes introduce some complexity, but they often can be
designed to obtain savings that are otherwise very difficult to
capture. The appliance standards programmes are, in principle,
the least difficult to administer, but political consensus on these
programmes can be difficult to achieve.
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3.1 Introduction
In 1990, CO2 emissions from transport sector energy use
amounted to about 1.25 Gt C—one-fifth of CO2 emissions
from fossil fuel use (SAR II, 21.2.1). Other important GHG
emissions from the sector include N2O from tailpipe emissions
from cars with catalytic converters; CFCs and HFCs, which are
leaked and vented from air-conditioning systems; and NOx
emitted by aircraft near the tropopause (at this height, the
ozone generated by NOx is a very potent GHG). World trans-
port energy use grew faster than that in any other sector, at an
average of 2.4% per year, between 1973 and 1990 (SAR II,
21.2.1).
GHG mitigation in the transport sector presents a particular
challenge because of the unique role that travel and goods
movement play in enabling people to meet personal, social,
economic and developmental needs (SAR II, 21.2.3). The
sector may also offer a particular opportunity because of the
commonality of vehicle design and fuel characteristics.
Transport has many stakeholders, including private and com-
mercial transport users, manufacturers of vehicles, suppliers
of fuels, builders of roads, planners and transport service
providers. Measures to reduce transport GHG emissions often
challenge the interests of one or another of these stakehold-
ers. Mitigation strategies in this sector run the risk of failure
unless they take account of stakeholder concerns and offer
better means of meeting the needs that transport addresses.
The choice of strategy will depend on the economic and tech-
nical capabilities of the country or region under consideration
(SAR II, 21.4.7).
3.2 Global Carbon Emission Trends and Projections
Table 4 shows energy use by different transport modes in 1990,
and two possible scenarios of CO2 emissions to 2050 (SAR II,
21.2). These two scenarios are used in this section as the basis
for evaluating the effects of measures on GHG emissions.
Energy intensity fell by 0.5–1% per year in road transport
between 1970 and 1990, and by 3–3.5% per year in air trans-
port between 1976 and 1990. Ranges of future traffic growth
and energy-intensity reduction shown in the table are expected
to be slower than in the past (SAR II, 21.2.5). Most scenarios in
the literature foresee a continuing reduction in growth rates for
energy use whereas these two scenarios are based on constant
growth rates; thus, the HIGH estimates in this table are much
higher than IS92e for 2050. The LOW scenario in 2050 is
about 10% below IS92c, and would be unlikely to occur with-
out some change in market conditions (such as a sharp rise in
oil prices) or new policies, for example to reduce air pollution
and traffic congestion in cities.
The largest transport sector sources of GHG through to 2050
are likely to be cars and other light-duty vehicles (LDVs),
heavy-duty vehicles (HDVs) and aircraft. Current annual per-
centage growth in all of these is particularly high in southeast
Asia, while some central and eastern European countries are
seeing a very rapid increase in car ownership. Two-wheelers,
3.  TRANSPORT SECTOR9
9 This section is based on SAR II, Chapter 21, Mitigation Options in
the Transportation Sector (Lead Authors: L. Michaelis, D. Bleviss,
J.-P. Orfeuil, R. Pischinger, J. Crayston, O. Davidson, T. Kram, N.
Nakicenovic and L. Schipper).
Table 4: Global transport energy use to 2050—LOW and HIGH scenarios.a
1990 1990 CO2 Traffic Energy CO2 Emissions (Mt C)
Energyb Emittedc Growthd Intensitye 2010 2020 2050
Transport Mode (EJ) (Mt C) (%) (%) LOW HIGH LOW HIGH LOW HIGH
Car, Other Personal and 30–35 555–648 1.4–2.1 –1.0–0.0 592 989 612 1 223 674 2 310
Light Goods Vehicles
Heavy Goods 20–23 370–426 1.9–2.7 –0.6–0.0 470 718 530 933 758 2 047
Vehicles and Buses
Air 8 148 3.2–4.0 –2.0– -0.6 187 308 210 444 297 1 330
Other (rail, inland waterway) 4 74 0 –0.3–0.3 70 78 68 80 62 87
TOTAL RANGE 63–71 1 166–1 314 1 318 2 094 1 418 2 680 1 791 5 774
a Based on SAR II, 21.2.5 and 21.3.1, unless otherwise noted.
bBased on SAR II, 21.2.1.
c CO2 emissions in this table are calculated from energy consumption using a constant emission factor for all modes of 18.5 Mt C/EJ.
dBased on SAR II, 21.2.4.
e Energy use per vehicle kilometre in the case of cars; energy use per ton kilometre for goods vehicles and rail, marine and air freight; and energy per passen-
ger kilometre for buses, air and rail transport.
especially mopeds with two-stroke engines, are one of the
fastest growing means of personal transport in parts of south
and east Asia and Latin America, but account for only 2–3% of
global transport energy use (SAR II, 21.2.4). These vehicles
have very high emissions of local pollutants.
Annex I countries accounted for about three-quarters of global
transport sector CO2 emissions in 1990. This share is likely to
decline to about 60–70% by 2020 (SAR II, 21.2.2) and further
by 2050, assuming continuing rapid growth in non-Annex I
countries.
3.3 Technologies for Reducing
GHG Emissions in the Transport Sector
Transport systems and technology are evolving rapidly.
Although in the past this evolution has included reductions in
energy intensity for most vehicle types, relatively little reduc-
tion occurred during the decade prior to 1996. Instead, recent
technical advances mainly have been used to enhance perfor-
mance, safety and accessories (SAR II, 21.2.5). There is little
or no evidence for any saturation of transport energy demand
as marginal income continues to be used for a more transport-
intensive lifestyle, while increasing value-added in production
involves more movement of intermediate goods and faster,
more flexible freight transport systems.
A number of technological and infrastructural mitigation
options are discussed in the SAR (II, 21.3). Several are already
cost-effective in some circumstances (i.e., their use reduces pri-
vate transport costs, taking into account energy savings,
improvements in performance, etc.). These options include
energy-efficiency improvements; alternative energy sources;
and infrastructure changes, modal shifts and fleet management.
The cost-effectiveness of these technical options varies widely
among individual users and among countries, depending on
availability of resources, know-how, institutional capacity and
technology, as well as on local market conditions.
3.3.1 Energy-efficiency Improvements
Some energy-intensity reductions are cost-effective for vehicle
operators, because fuel savings will compensate for the addi-
tional cost of more energy-efficient vehicles (SAR II, 21.3.1).
Several studies have indicated that these potential savings are
not achieved for a variety of reasons, in particular their low
importance for vehicle manufacturers and purchasers relative
to other priorities, such as reliability, safety and performance.
Many vehicle users also budget for vehicle operation separately
from vehicle purchase, especially where the latter depends on
obtaining a loan, so that they do not trade off the vehicle price
directly against operating costs. Although fuel savings may not
justify the time, effort and risk involved for the individual or
corporate vehicle purchaser, they could be achieved through
measures that minimize or bypass these barriers. In cars and
other personal vehicles, savings that are cost-effective for users
in 2020 might amount to 10–25% of projected energy use,
with vehicle price increases in the range $500–1 500. Larger 
savings in energy are possible at higher cost, but these would
not be cost-effective (NRC, 1992; ETSU, 1994; DeCicco and
Ross, 1993; Greene and Duleep, 1993).
The potential for cost-effective energy savings in commercial
vehicles has been studied less than that in cars, and is estimat-
ed to be smaller—perhaps 10% for buses, trains, medium and
heavy trucks and aircraft—because commercial operators
already have stronger incentives to use cost-effective technolo-
gy (SAR II, 21.3.1.5).
Energy-intensity reductions are possible beyond the level that
is cost-effective for users; however, vehicle design changes that
offer large reductions in energy intensity also are likely to
affect various aspects of vehicle performance (SAR II,
21.3.1.5). Achieving these changes would thus depend either
on a shift in the priorities of vehicle manufacturers and pur-
chasers, or on breakthroughs in technology performance and
cost.
Where energy-intensity reductions result from improved vehicle
body design, GHG mitigation may be accompanied by a 
reduction in emissions of other air pollutants, where these are
not controlled by standards that effectively require the use of
catalytic converters. On the other hand, some energy-efficient
engine designs (e.g., direct fuel injection and lean-burn
engines) have relatively high emissions of NOx or particulate
matter (SAR II, 21.3.1.1).
Changes in vehicle technology can require very large invest-
ments in new designs, techniques and production lines. These
short-term costs can be minimized if energy-efficiency
improvements are integrated into the normal product cycle of
vehicle manufacturers. For cars and trucks, this means that
there might be a ten-year delay between a shift in priorities or
incentives in the vehicle market, and the full results of that
shift being seen in all the vehicles being produced. For air-
craft, the delay is longer because of the long service life of air-
craft, and because new technology is only approved for gener-
al use after its safe performance has been demonstrated
through years of testing.
3.3.2 Alternative Energy Sources
On a full-fuel-cycle basis, alternative fuels from renewable
energy sources have the potential to reduce GHG emissions
from vehicle operation (i.e., excluding those from vehicle
manufacture) by 80% or more (SAR II, 21.3.3.1). At present,
these fuels are more expensive than petroleum products under
most circumstances, although vehicles operating on liquid
biofuels can perform as well as conventional vehicles and
manufacturing costs need be no higher in mass production.
Widespread use of these fuels depends on overcoming various
barriers, including the costs of transition to new vehicle types,
fuel production and distribution technology, concerns about
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safety and toxicity, and possible performance problems in
some climates. The widespread use of hydrogen and electricity
in road vehicles poses technical and cost challenges that
remain to be overcome.
Fossil fuel alternatives to gasoline [e.g., diesel, liquefied
petroleum gas (LPG), compressed natural gas (CNG)] can
offer 10–30% emission reductions per kilometre, and are
already cost-effective for niche markets such as high-mileage
and fleet vehicles, including small urban buses and delivery
vans (SAR II, 21.3.3.1). Several governments are encourag-
ing the use of LPG and CNG because they have lower emis-
sions of conventional pollutants than gasoline or diesel, but
switching from gasoline to diesel can result in higher emis-
sions of particulates and NOx. The use of hybrid and flexible-
fuel vehicles may allow alternative fuels and electric vehicles
to meet the mobility needs of a larger segment of vehicle
users, but at a higher cost and with smaller GHG reductions
than single-fuel vehicles (SAR II, 21.3.4). Alternatives to
diesel are unlikely to be cost-effective for users of heavy-duty
vehicles, and many will result in increased GHG emissions
(SAR II, 21.3.3.2). Nevertheless, a small but increasing num-
ber of urban buses and delivery vehicles are being fueled with
CNG, LPG, or liquid natural gas (LNG) to reduce urban
emissions of NOx and particulates. Alternatives to kerosene in
aircraft are being tested, but are unlikely to be cost-effec-
tive in the near term (SAR II, 21.3.3.3). Much of the political
impetus for the use of alternative fuels has objectives other
than GHG mitigation, such as improving urban air 
quality, maintaining agricultural employment, and ensuring
energy security.
3.3.3 Infrastructure and System Changes
Urban density, urban and transport infrastructure, and the
design of transport systems can all affect the distance people
travel to meet their needs and their choice of transport modes
(SAR II, 21.4.2). These factors also influence the volume of
freight transport and the modes used. The extent of these vari-
ous effects is controversial, and it should be noted that urban
and transport infrastructure is usually designed predominantly
for objectives other than GHG mitigation.
Traffic and fleet management systems have the potential to
achieve energy savings on the order of 10% or more in urban
areas (SAR II, 21.4.2). Energy use for freight transport might
be reduced substantially through changes in the management
of truck fleets. Modal shifts from road to rail may result in
energy savings of 0–50%, often resulting in commensurate or
greater GHG emission reductions, especially where trains are
powered by electricity from non-fossil fuel sources (SAR II,
21.3.4, 21.4.2). The cost-effectiveness and practicality of
freight transport by rail varies widely among regions and com-
modities (SAR II, 21.2.5). The long-term potential for rail
freight may depend on the development of rail and intermodal
technologies that can cope with a growing emphasis on flexi-
bility and responsiveness.
3.4 Measures for Reducing
GHG Emissions in the Transport Sector
A first step toward meeting climate objectives in the transport
sector is to introduce GHG mitigation measures that are fully
justified by other policy objectives. Such measures may
increase the competitiveness of industry, promote energy secu-
rity, improve citizens’ quality of life, or protect the environ-
ment (SAR II, 21.4). In principle, the most economically 
efficient way to address all of these issues is by removing the
subsidies that exist in some countries for road transport, and by
introducing pricing mechanisms that reflect the full social and
environmental cost of transport (SAR II, 21.4.5).
In practice, economically efficient measures such as road-user
charges may be difficult to implement for technical and politi-
cal reasons. Local circumstances demand local solutions, and
the success of strategies may depend on their being designed:
• With an understanding of the current system and its evolution
• Including consideration of a wide range of measures
• In consultation with stakeholders
• Including monitoring and adjustment mechanisms (SAR II,
21.4.7).
This analysis cannot provide a global assessment, but considers
ranges of possible effects of measures. It focuses on the three
vehicle groups expected to be the largest sources of GHGs in
2020 (i.e., LDVs, HDVs and aircraft).
Annex I countries account for the vast majority of the world’s
vehicle fleets; developing countries in 1990 accounted for about
a tenth of the world’s cars. Meanwhile, almost all of the vehicles
produced worldwide are either manufactured in Annex I coun-
tries or made to designs originating in those countries (SAR II,
21.2.4). Policies introduced in Annex I countries that affect 
vehicle technology are thus likely to have worldwide effects.
3.4.1 Measures Affecting Light-duty Road Vehicles
and Urban Traffic
Long-term management of GHG emissions from light-duty
vehicles is likely to depend on implementing wide-ranging
strategies involving several areas of policymaking and levels of
government (SAR II, 21.4.1). These strategies might involve a
variety of measures, including fuel economy standards (SAR
II, 21.4.3), fuel taxes (SAR II, 21.4.5.2), incentives for alterna-
tive fuel use (SAR II, 21.3.3), measures to reduce vehicle use
(SAR II, 21.4.2), and RD&D into vehicle and transport system
technology (SAR II, 21.3.6), some of which are evaluated in
Table 5. The relative effectiveness of policies depends on national
circumstances, including existing institutions and policies, and
on underlying technology trends. Measures to reduce GHG
emissions from cars are normally appropriate for other light-
duty vehicles such as light trucks, vans, minibuses and sports
utility vehicles. These vehicle types increasingly are being
used as personal vehicles, leading to higher GHG emissions.
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Table 5: Selected examples of measures to mitigate GHG emissions from light-duty vehicles.a
Administrative,
Climate and Other Economic and Institutional and
Technical Options Measures Environmental Effects Social Effects Political Considerations
Reduce Vehicle
Energy Intensity






–Changes in fuel/air 
mixing
–Computer technology to 






on SAR II, 21.4.3; SAR II,
21.4.5.1; NRC, 1992;
DeCicco and Ross, 1993;
OTA, 1991; ETSU, 1994;
Goodwin, 1992]
Climate Benefits in 2020
– 10–20% of LDV CO2
for all scenarios
Other Effects
– Up to 6% increase
in traffic and its envi-
ronmental effects,
unless reduced by other
measures
Climate Benefits in 2020
– 3–5% of LDV CO2
relative to LOW
– 22–28% of LDV CO2
relative to HIGH
Other Effects
– 3–10% traffic increase
with  local environmen-
tal effects in HIGH,




– Feebates: New car taxes
increase US$400 for
every L/100 km






30% reduction in new
LDV energy intensity





– Average new car cost
increase of 1–9% paid
back in fuel savings
Macro-economic Issues
– Implementation costs
may decrease car sales
in short run




– For consumers, positive
for owners of small
cars; negative for non-
car-owners and owners
of large cars
– Can change manufac-
turing industry competi-




– Average new car cost
increase of <0.5% in
LOW and 5–15% in
HIGH paid back in fuel
savings
– Possible high short-run
costs for car industry,
but reduces life-cycle
cost of car use
Macro-economic Issues
– Reduced oil imports
and car running cost
may increase car sales




– Effects on consumers
as feebates













– Opposition from 
vehicle manufacturers








tion costs for govern-
ment
Political Factors
– Opposition from 
vehicle manufacturers
– Concern about safety
effects
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Table 5 (continued)
Administrative,
Climate and Other Economic and Institutional and
Technical Options Measures Environmental Effects Social Effects Political Considerations
Reduce Vehicle Energy
Intensity (see above);














– Diesel, CNG, LPG as
alternatives to gasoline
– Synthetic fuels from
biomass sources
– Hydrogen or electricity
from renewable power
sources
– Hybrid vehicle drive-
trains










Climate Benefits in 2020
– 10–25%b of LDV CO2
in countries where taxes
are already high
– 40–60%b of LDV CO2
in countries where taxes
are very low
Other Effects





Climate Benefits in 2020
– 10-30% where CNG or
LPG used; cost-effec-
tive potential up to 5%
of overall LDV
emissions
– 80% or more with bio-




– Local air pollution







Climate Benefits in 2020
– Reduce HFC emissions
by 70–80% (equivalent
to 7–8% of LDV life-
cycle emissions
Climate Benefits
– Equivalent to about
























limit HFC leaks to 5%
of total charge per year
R&D




– Higher cost for road-users
Macro-economic Issues
– Reduced car sales;




– Gasoline taxes found
by some studies to be
regressive in North
America and progres-




lower than gasoline for
LPG, CNG and diesel
in some applications
– User costs higher for
biofuel, EV and hydro-
gen; costs can be very
high (up to $1 000 per
ton of CO2 avoided)
Macro-economic Issues
– Replacing oil with domes-
tically produced fuels can
boost employment
Equity Issues








– Difficult to assess
social and environ-
mental cost






















– Support from 
producers of alterna-
tive fuels, including













This increasing use could be encouraged if such vehicles are
not subject to the same measures as cars.
Many of the measures in Table 5 might be justified wholly or
partly by objectives other than GHG mitigation. Fuel economy
standards and feebates may be justified as means of overcom-
ing market barriers that inhibit the uptake of cost-effective,
energy-efficient technology. Increased fuel taxes also can have
a range of social and environmental benefits, while generating
revenue that can be recycled to meet priority needs in the trans-
port sector or elsewhere, although they may also impose a wel-
fare loss on some transport users.
Governments are most likely to adopt some combination of
measures. For example, fuel economy standards and incentives
can result in a lower cost of driving—hence more traffic, unless
implemented in conjunction with fuel taxes, road pricing, or
other measures to discourage driving. Renewable energy sup-
plies are more likely to be able to meet future transport energy
needs if energy intensity and traffic levels are kept low. Thus,
the effectiveness of incentives to purchase alternative- fuel
vehicles may be enhanced by taxes on conventional fuels,
which provide incentives both to use alternative fuels and to
reduce energy use.
Policies developed at a local level, aimed at efficiently address-
ing the full range of local economic, social and environmental
priorities, may be among the most important elements of a
long-term strategy for GHG mitigation in the transport sector
(SAR II, 21.4.2). Measures include computerized traffic control;
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Table 5 (continued)
Administrative,
Climate and Other Economic and Institutional and
Technical Options Measures Environmental Effects Social Effects Political Considerations


















[SAR II, 21.3.6, 21.3.1.5,
21.3.3.1]
Climate Benefits in 2020
– 10% or more of LDV





– Potentially very large
benefits
Climate Benefits
– More than 20% of
LDV GHGs by 2020,
but can be 80% or more
in long term (2050+)
Other Effects














– Measures are usually
adopted mainly for rea-
sons other than GHG
mitigation, so GHG
mitigation has small or
negative cost
Macro-economic Issues





– Positive or negative





































a GHG effects calculated for 2020 relative to two scenarios: “LOW” (rapid energy intensity reduction, slow traffic growth) and “HIGH”
(slow energy intensity reduction, rapid traffic growth), in which emissions roughly correspond to those in IS92c and IS92e, respectively
(see Table 4). Ranges in costs and effects of measures reflect differences among literature sources and ranges of uncertainty; scenarios
and national differences are explicitly mentioned.
b Based on a fuel own-price elasticity of –0.7. Goodwin (1992) suggests a range of –0.7 to –1.0, so effects could be larger than shown
here.
parking restrictions and charges; use of tolls, road pricing and
vehicle access restrictions; changing road layouts to reduce
traffic speed; and improved facilities and priority in traffic for
pedestrians, cyclists, and public transport.
Infrastructure development is very expensive, and this cost is
likely to be committed for a broad range of economic, social,
environmental and other reasons. There may be institutional
barriers to integration of GHG mitigation objectives into deci-
sion-making processes, but doing so could have a range of ben-
efits, perhaps leading to lower costs where non-motorized trans-
port receives a higher priority than before, relative to motorized
transport. Designing cities for non-motorized and public trans-
port can lead to long-term economic benefits as the improved
urban environment stimulates local business (SAR II, 21.4.2).
Some of the best-known examples of strategies that have suc-
ceeded in reducing traffic and its environmental effects,
including GHG emissions, have been implemented by the
city-state of Singapore, the city of Curitiba in Brazil and a
number of European cities (SAR II, 21.4.6). These cities illus-
trate the importance of local initiative and integrated planning
and market-based approaches in developing appropriate com-
binations of measures.
A wide range of environmental and social benefits may come
from local transport strategies to reduce traffic and improve
non-motorized access (SAR II, 21.4.6), although such strate-
gies may also result in welfare losses for some transport users.
In the long term, changes in travel culture and lifestyle, com-
bined with changes in urban layout, might lead to substantial
reductions in motorized travel in North American and
Australian cities. The potential reduction in west European
cities is smaller (SAR II, 21.4.2). Some of the most important
short-term opportunities for urban planning to affect long-term
transport energy use is in countries with economies in transi-
tion and fast-developing countries, where the car is still a
minority transport mode but is rapidly increasing in importance
(SAR II, 21.4.2).
3.4.2 Measures Affecting Heavy-duty Vehicles
and Freight Traffic
Table 6 summarizes some possible effects of measures to
reduce heavy-duty vehicle GHG emissions. Measures differ
from those for light-duty vehicles because trucks vary more
than cars in design and purpose, making it harder to design
energy-intensity standards for them, although compulsory fit-
ting of speed limiters and power-to-weight ratios can reduce
energy use (SAR II, 21.2.4.3). Meanwhile, commercial vehicle
operators are relatively responsive to fuel prices in both their
management of existing vehicles and their choice of new vehicles.
A combination of fuel taxes and voluntary agreements,
publicity and incentives (e.g., in license fees) for the purchase
of energy-efficient vehicles may be sufficient to encourage the
uptake of technology improvements (SAR II, 21.2.4.3).
Studies in some countries have found that HDVs are subsidized
more than LDVs, considering the high share of road repair costs
allocable to HDVs. Efficient measures to reflect these costs to
freight operators could increase the costs of road freight by
10–30% (SAR II, 21.4.5) and would achieve 10–30% reduc-
tions in freight traffic and associated GHG emissions (based on
price elasticities in Oum et al., 1990).
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Table 6: Selected examples of measures to mitigate GHG emissions from heavy-duty vehicles.
Administrative,
Climate and Other Economic and Institutional and
Technical Options Measures Environmental Effects Social Effects Political Considerations
Reduce Vehicle Energy
Intensity (see Table 4);











Oum et al., 1990]
Climate Benefits
– 10–40% reduction in
HDV emissionsa
Other Effects





– Diesel Tax Increase:
Locally defined to
include social and envi-
ronmental costs in fuel
price
– 50% to 200% fuel price
increase
Cost-effectiveness
























– Haulage industry 
likely to oppose
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Table 6 (continued)
Administrative,
Climate and Other Economic and Institutional and
Technical Options Measures Environmental Effects Social Effects Political Considerations
Reduce Vehicle Energy




– Synthetic fuels from
biomass sources
– Hydrogen or electricity
from renewable power
sources
– Hybrid vehicle drive-
trains
[SAR II, 21.3.3.2; IEA,








[SAR II, 21.3.6, 21.3.1.5,
21.3.3.2]
Climate Benefits
– Up to 10% of HDV
emissions
Other Effects
– Possible lower emission
of NOx and particulates
– Reduced operating




– More than 80% reduc-








– Reduced local air
pollution








– Transfer to rail could
reduce energy use by
80%, but only for long
hauls and low speeds
Other Effects




– More than 10% of
HDV GHGs by 2020,
but can be 80% or more























– Intermodal freight sys-
tems with disincentives




– Increased vehicle cost
may be paid back in
fuel savings within 3
years
Macro-economic Issues
– Reduced haulage costs
likely to boost economy
Cost-effectiveness
– Cost of subsidies and fore-
gone tax revenue can be
very high (up to $1 000
per ton of CO2 avoided),
but may be justified by
agricultural or other policy
– Administrative costs low
Macro-economic Issues
– Replacing oil with domes-
tically produced fuels can
boost employment
Equity Issues
– Biomass use can increase
rural employment
Cost-effectiveness











– Requires high level of
government expertise








– Supported by alterna-
tive fuel producers






























– Supported by industry
a Based on a fuel own-price elasticity of –0.2. Oum et al. (1990) give a wide range of freight own-price elasticities, depending on commodity,
type of haul and other factors.
Other policies, such as the development of intermodal facilities to
encourage the use of rail, often are advocated. Enhancing rail
infrastructure may indeed be able to contribute to GHG mitiga-
tion, when combined with constraints on the use of road freight,
and disincentives such as tolls (SAR II, 21.4.3). High use of rail is
most practical for long hauls, so that such policies would be most
effective in large countries or when internationally coordinated in
regions with large numbers of small countries (SAR II, 21.2.4).
3.4.3 Measures Affecting Aircraft10
Table 7 summarizes the effects of a range of policies to
reduce GHG emissions from aircraft. Large reductions in
NOx emissions might be more politically feasible through air-
craft engine standards (SAR II, 21.3.1.6) and RD&D funding,
although the radiative impact of aircraft NOx is short-lived
and highly uncertain and there could be tradeoffs between
reduced NOx and fuel efficiency (SAR II, 21.3.1.6).
The Council of the International Civil Aviation Organization
(ICAO) recommends that fuel used for international aviation
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Table 7: Selected examples of measures to mitigate GHG emissions from aircraft.
Administrative,
Climate and Other Economic and Institutional and





– Change airframe design
– Change engine design
– Improve flight 
management






– Optimize flight patterns
Reduce Energy Intensity





– Larger percentage long-




reduction in NOx emis-
sion factor during cruise
– Longer-term target
might be 80% reduction
Other Effects





– 3–5% reduction in
GHG emissions
Other Effects
– Reduced noise and air
pollution
Climate Benefits
– 10% by 2020, but can
be 80% GHG mitiga-






– Aviation Fuel Taxes:









– Improve air traffic
control










– Depend on revenue use
Cost-effectiveness
– Economic benefits for
industry
Macro-economic Issues









– Need regional or inter-
national agreement
Political Factors




– Could be based on
existing international
standards
– Need broad interna-
tional agreement
Political Factors





– Need regional or inter-
national cooperation
Political Factors






– Supported by airlines
and aircraft
manufacturers
10In cooperation with ICAO and the international ozone assessment
process under the Montreal Protocol, the IPCC has agreed to con-
duct an assessment of the global atmospheric effects of aircraft
emissions, including evaluation of technologies and measures for
reducing emissions. This assessment will be available in 1998.
should be tax-exempt (SAR II, 21.4.5.2), but does not preclude
“charges” for environmental purposes. Some airports have land-
ing fees related to aircraft noise levels, and environmental charges
could extend to cover aircraft GHG emissions (e.g., through a fuel
surcharge). International cooperation, at least at a regional level,
could discourage airlines from selecting airports for refueling or
as long-haul hubs on the basis of relative fuel prices.
In the long term, substantial reductions in CO2 and NOx emis-
sions from aircraft may depend on RD&D along with market
incentives to develop and introduce technologies and practices
with lower energy intensity (SAR II, 21.3.1.3) and fuels based
on renewable sources (SAR II, 21.3.3.3). At present, there are
substantial institutional and technical barriers, including safety
concerns, to the introduction of such technologies.
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4.1 Introduction
In 1990, the global industrial sector12 directly consumed an
estimated 91 EJ of end-use energy (including biomass) to pro-
duce $6.7 x 1012 of added economic value, which resulted in
emissions of an estimated 1.80 Gt C. When industrial uses of
electricity are added, primary energy attributable to the indus-
trial sector was 161 EJ and 2.8 Gt C, or 47% of global CO2
releases (SAR II, 20.1; Tables A1–A4). In addition to energy-
related GHG emissions, the industrial sector is responsible for
a number of process-related GHG emissions, although esti-
mates vary in their reliability. Industrial process-related gases
include the following (SAR II, 20.2.2):
• CO2 from the production of lime and cement (calcination
process), steel (coke and pig-iron production), aluminum
(oxidation of electrodes), hydrogen (refineries and the
chemical industry) and ammonia (fertilizers and chemicals)
• CFCs, HFCs and hydrochlorofluorocarbons (HCFCs) 
produced as solvents, aerosol propellants, refrigerants and
foam expanders
• CH4 from miscellaneous industrial processes (iron and
steel, oil refining, ammonia and hydrogen)
• N2O from nitric acid and adipic acid (nylon) production;
perfluorocarbons (PFCs) such as carbon tetrafluoride (CF4)
and hexafluoroethylene (C2F6) from aluminum production
(electrolysis), and used in manufacturing processes of the
semiconductor industry; and sulfur hexafluoride (SF6)
from magnesium production.
The industrial sector typically represents 25–30% of total 
energy use for OECD Annex I countries. The industrial share of
total energy use for the non-Annex I countries averaged
35–45%, but was as high as 60% in China in 1988. The Annex I
countries with economies in transition have experienced declines
in industrial energy use, which are not expected to reverse until
the latter half of the 1990s. It is clear that different countries have
followed very different fossil-fuel trajectories to arrive at their
present economic status. The variation in industry’s energy share
among countries reflects not only differences in energy intensity
but also the more rapid growth of the industrial sectors of non-
Annex I countries, the transition of OECD Annex I country
economies away from manufacturing and toward services,
improved energy efficiency in manufacturing, and the transfer of
some energy-intensive industries from OECD Annex I countries
to non-Annex I countries (SAR II, 20.2.1).
During the first half of the 1990s, industrial sector carbon
emissions from the European Union and the United States
remained below their peak levels of 10–15 years earlier, while
Japan’s emissions remained relatively constant. The CO2
emissions of the industrial sector of non-Annex I countries
continue to grow as the sector expands, even though energy
intensity is dropping in some countries such as China. If energy-
intensity improvements continue in non-Annex I countries,
and if decarbonization of energy use follows the pattern of
OECD Annex I countries, total GHG emissions from the devel-
oping world could grow more slowly than projected in the
IPCC IS92 scenarios. Figure 2 shows industrial sector CO2
emissions relative to per capita gross domestic product (GDP),
illustrating that, for some countries, industrial sector emissions
have fallen or remain constant even with substantial economic
growth as a result of energy-intensity improvements, decarbon-
ization of energy, or industrial structural changes.
4.2 Technologies for Reducing
GHG Emissions in the Industrial Sector
Future reductions in CO2 emissions of 25% are technically pos-
sible for the industrial sector of OECD Annex I countries if
technologies comparable to present-generation, efficient man-
ufacturing facilities are adopted during natural capital stock
turnover (SAR II, SPM 4.1.1). For Annex I countries with
economies in transition, GHG reducing industrial options are
intimately tied to economic redevelopment choices and the
form that industrial restructuring will take.
4.2.1 Introducing New Technologies and Processes 
Although the efficiency of industrial processes has increased
greatly during the past two decades, energy-efficiency
improvements remain the major opportunity for reducing CO2
emissions. The greatest potential lies in Annex I countries with
economies in transition and non-Annex I countries, where
industrial energy intensity (either as EJ/ton of product or
EJ/economic value) is typically two to four times greater than
in OECD Annex I countries. Even so, many opportunities
remain for additional gains in OECD Annex I countries. For
example, the most efficient industrial processes today utilize
three or four times the thermodynamic energy requirement for
processes in the chemical and primary metals industry (SAR II,
20.3). The greatest gains in efficiency for OECD Annex I coun-
tries have occurred in chemicals, steel, aluminum, paper and
petroleum refining, suggesting that it should be relatively easy
to achieve even larger gains in these industries in non-Annex I
and transitional economies.
4.2.2 Fuel Switching
Switching to less carbon-intensive industrial fuels such as nat-
ural gas can reduce GHG emissions in a cost-effective manner,
and such transitions are already underway in many regions.
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11 This section is based on SAR II, Chapter 20, Industry
(Lead Authors: T. Kashiwagi, J. Bruggink, P.-N. Giraud, P. Khanna
and W. Moomaw).
12In the IS92 scenarios, hence in this paper, the global industrial sector
includes industrial activities related to manufacturing, agriculture,
mining and forestry.
However, care must be exercised to ensure that increased
emissions from natural gas leakage do not offset these gains.
The efficient use of biomass in steam and gas turbine cogen-
eration systems also can contribute to emissions reductions,
as has been demonstrated in the pulp and paper, forest prod-
ucts and some agricultural industries (such as sugar cane)
(SAR II, 20.4).
4.2.3 Cogeneration and Thermal Cascading
Increasing industrial cogeneration and thermal cascading of
waste heat have significant GHG reduction potential for fos-
sil and biofuels. In many cases, combined heat and power or
thermal cascading is economically cost-effective, as has
been demonstrated in several Annex I countries. For exam-
ple, coal-intensive industry has the potential to reduce its
CO2 emissions by half, without switching fuels, through
cogeneration. Thermal cascading, which involves the
sequential capture and reuse of lower temperature heat for
appropriate purposes, requires an industrial ecology
approach that links several industrial processes and space
and water conditioning needs, and may require inter-company
cooperation and joint capital investment to realize the great-
est gains (SAR II, 20.4).
4.2.4 Process Improvements
Industrial feedstocks account for an estimated 16% of industrial
sector energy, most of which eventually ends up as CO2.
Replacing natural gas as the source of industrial hydrogen with
biomass hydrogen or with water electrolysis using carbon-free
energy sources would reduce carbon emissions in the manu-
facture of ammonia and other chemicals, and, if inexpensive
enough, might ultimately replace coking coal in the production
of iron. Efforts to produce cheap hydrogen for feedstocks need
to be coordinated with efforts to produce hydrogen as a trans-
portation fuel (SAR II, 20.4; SAR III, 9.4).
Industrial process alterations can reduce all process-related
GHGs significantly or even eliminate them entirely. Cost-
effective reductions of 50% of PFC emissions from aluminum
production, and over 90% of NOx from nylon production have
been achieved in the United States and Germany through vol-
untary programmes (SAR II, 20.3).
4.2.5 Material Substitution
Replacing materials associated with high GHG emissions with
alternatives that perform the same function can have signifi-
cant benefits. For example, cement produces 0.34 t C per ton
of cement (60% from energy used in production and 40% as a
process gas). Shifting away from coal to natural gas or oil
would lower the energy-related CO2 emissions for cement pro-
duction, and additional CO2 reductions from other techniques
(e.g., the fly-ash substitution and the use of waste fuels) are
possible. Shifting to other construction materials could yield
even greater improvements. A concrete floor has 21 times the
embedded energy of a comparable wooden one, and generates
CO2 emissions in the calcination process as well. Denser mate-
rials also extract a GHG penalty when they are transported.
The use of plants as a source of chemical feedstock can also
reduce CO2 emissions. Many large wood-products companies
already produce chemicals in association with their primary
timber or pulp and paper production. In India, a major effort
to develop a “phytochemical” feedstock base has been under-
way. Lightweight packaging, for example, will cause lower
transport-related emissions than heavier materials. Material
substitution is not always straightforward, however, and
depends on identifying substitutes with the qualities needed to
critical specifications (SAR II, 20.3.4).
4.2.6 Material Recycling
When goods are made of materials whose manufacture con-
sumes a considerable amount of energy, the recycling and






























Figure 2: Fossil fuel CO2 development path for the industrial manufacturing sectors of the United States of America, the 15 nations that now
comprise the European Union (except the former East Germany), Japan, China, India and the former Soviet Union (USSR). The industrial 
sector is as defined by OECD, plus CO2 associated with refineries and the fraction of electricity that is used by industry (SAR II, 20.2.3,
Figure 20-1). The manufacturing sector is a subsector of all industrial activities described in this paper.
reuse of these goods can save not only energy but GHGs
released to the atmosphere. Primary materials release about
four times the CO2 of secondary (recycled) materials in steel,
copper, glass and paper production. For aluminum, this fig-
ure is substantially higher. Carbon savings of 29 Mt are esti-
mated for a 10% increase in OECD recycling of these mate-
rials. Recycling can involve restoring the material to its orig-
inal use or “cascading” the material by successively down-
grading its use into applications requiring lower quality
materials. Emphasis is needed on technological innovation to
upgrade the quality of recycled materials (SAR II, 20.4.2.4).
4.3 Measures for Reducing
GHG Emissions in the Industrial Sector
A variety of potential sector-specific measures, discussed
briefly below and in Table 8, could encourage improvements in
energy efficiency and reductions in process-related emissions
(SAR II, 20.5; SAR III, 11). In addition, economy-wide instru-
ments (e.g., phaseout of energy subsidies and adoption of car-
bon taxes) could affect emissions in the sector by encouraging
processes that are less energy- or fossil fuel-intensive. These
economy-wide instruments are not discussed here, because
they are covered in Section 9, Economic Instruments.
4.3.1 Market-based Programmes
4.3.1.1 Incentives
Tax incentives could be designed for OECD Annex I country
firms to encourage continued innovation in energy-efficient
and low GHG-emitting processes. Most industrial processes
have a relatively short lifetime, on the order of a decade or less,
while facilities are used for several decades. Hence, there are
large opportunities to rapidly introduce low-emitting technology
into the manufacturing process as part of normal capital-stock
turnover. Under present circumstances, where GHGs are
uncosted externalities, there are no compelling reasons beyond
profit maximization for companies to choose a lower GHG-
emission strategy over a higher one when they are planning
new processes or products. Even when it is cost-effective to
introduce low GHG-emitting technologies, there may be barriers
to doing so. Hence, there is a need for additional incentives to
encourage firms in OECD Annex I countries to utilize the nat-
ural cycle of capital stock replacement to introduce less GHG-
intensive technology and production facilities to achieve fur-
ther reductions. Perhaps accelerating depreciation taxes might
encourage such a shift.
In addition, financial incentives that encourage industry to
adopt combined heat and power facilities, use more renewables,
or use more secondary materials could accelerate a further low-
ering of emissions. Even if incentives are not provided, remov-
ing impediments to industrial cogeneration of electricity and
heat would be effective.
4.3.1.2 Government Procurement Programmes
Governments could establish procurement requirements for
products that minimize GHG emissions in their manufacture
and use. If drawn flexibly, government purchasing criteria
would stimulate suppliers to develop low GHG-emitting prod-
ucts that met both governmental and larger market needs.
4.3.2 Regulatory Programmes
4.3.2.1 Emissions Standards and Offsets
Setting industry- and product-specific GHG emission stan-
dards, like the energy-efficiency standards for appliances or
vehicles, can bring about more certain compliance. Efficiency
or performance standards can help to overcome a variety of
barriers and shift production to lower GHG-emitting industrial
practices. These barriers can include lack of information about
high-efficiency products, financial analyses or investment cri-
teria that overemphasize investment costs and de-emphasize
operating costs, or difficulty in obtaining more efficient prod-
ucts through suppliers. However, reaching agreement about the
appropriate standards for different types of equipment in dif-
ferent applications can be difficult, while monitoring and
enforcement costs may be high and may raise the price to con-
sumers. Moreover, use of regulations could run counter to the
recent emphasis on use of flexible approaches.
A government might encourage the manufacture of more effi-
cient products by allowing companies to receive some credit
for reducing emissions during product use as an offset to man-
ufacturing emissions standards. Many manufactured products,
including computers, automobiles and light bulbs, consume far
more energy and release more GHGs during their use than in
their manufacture. For automobiles, the ratio may be more than
10 to 1.
4.3.3 Voluntary Agreements
Voluntary agreements in the United States and Europe have been
effective in achieving energy and GHG reductions in industries
that have been encouraged to manufacture or install efficient
lighting, computers, office equipment and building shells. These
include negotiated but voluntary targets for achieving emissions
reductions, voluntary adoption of high-efficiency products or
processes, cooperative RD&D efforts, and agreements to moni-
tor and report emissions reductions based on voluntary actions.
Voluntary agreements with industry groups to improve general
environmental quality could be expanded to include GHG reduc-
tion (e.g., expansion of government-industry environmental
covenants in The Netherlands), as could the ISO 14000
process.13 Domestic and international supplier requirements that
specify low GHG content also could be developed. These private
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13ISO 14000 is an independently certifiable environmental manage-
ment system established by the non-governmental International
Standards Organization.
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Table 8: Selected examples of measures to mitigate GHG emissions in the industrial sector.
Administrative,
Climate and Other Economic and Institutional and
Technical Options Measures Environmental Effectsa Social Effects Political Considerations
New Technologies 
and Processes 









– More efficient lights,
motors and pumps
– Improved heat capture
– Thermal cascading
(i.e., match lower
temperature waste heat to
appropriate task)
Fuel Switching
– To natural gas
– To biomass (especially
for forest, paper and
agricultural products)
– To renewables (solar 
drying)
– To electricity substitution
when it reduces GHG
emissions
Cogeneration
– Combined heat and
power (new industrial






– Savings of 4% CO2/yr
by 2050
Other Effects
– Reduction in air
pollution from coke
Climate Benefits
– Savings of 25% CO2/yr
for industrial sector of
Annex I countries




– Reduction in air
pollution
Climate Benefits
– Reductions in CO2 in
Eastern Europe (AIJ),








– Savings of 20% CO2/yr
by 2020 for industrial
sector
Other Effects
– Reduction in air
pollution
Climate Benefits
– Savings of 15% CO2/yr
by 2020 for industrial
sector
Other Effects














– Phase out subsidies for
GHG-releasing products
and fuels











– Technology sharing and
transfer
Regulatory Measures





trade and treaty 
impediments
Regulatory Measures












– Restructure tax system
to lower tax on income
and capital
Equity Issues




– Higher consumer prices





– Internalizing costs of all
fuels will hasten shift
Equity Issues



















effort to change tax
codes













– Current institutions are
adequate
Political Factors













– Modest; most effort
comes from industry
Political Factors
– May be difficult to site
district heating system
agreements could be modeled on the no-CFC specifications of
many electronics firms prior to the 1995 phaseout. The potential
for emissions reductions has been estimated with reasonable cer-
tainty by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency for HFC-
and aluminum-related GHGs, and for the “Green Lights” and
Energy Star Programs. Public relations or other economic bene-
fits (such as potential for manufacture and sale of new products)
accrue to participating companies and are essential in promoting
voluntary actions by firms.
4.3.4 Research, Development and Demonstration
RD&D is needed in the near term in order to create and com-
mercialize new industrial technology and to reach future emis-
sions goals in the 2020 to 2050 time frame. For example, if
hydrogen is to become a zero-carbon feedstock and fuel, work
needs to begin now to ensure that the technology to produce it,
and the infrastructure to deliver it, are available and affordable
in the future. Systematic evaluation of the effectiveness of poli-
cies that are either already in use in different countries or that
have been proposed is also needed to determine which will
encourage the greatest GHG reductions at the lowest cost.
4.3.5 International Initiatives
4.3.5.1 Special Opportunities for Annex I Countries with
Economies in Transition and Non-Annex I Countries
The reindustrialization process in countries with economies in
transition provides major opportunities to replace inefficient,
high-carbon industries with efficient low-carbon manufacturing
processes. Much of this change will involve restructuring these
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Table 8 (continued)
Administrative,
Climate and Other Economic and Institutional and
Technical Options Measures Environmental Effectsa Social Effects Political Considerations
Process Improvements
– N2O reduction for nylon
production




– Replace metals with 
plastic
– Replace concrete with
wood or plastic
– Lighter materials lower
transport-related CO2
– Use chemicals made
from plant materials
Material Recycling/Reuse
– Design for disassembly
– Design materials for
reuse
– Material quality 
cascading
Climate Benefits
– Savings of 2–5% CO2-
equivalent/yr by 2010
Other Effects




– Has not been determined
Other Effects
– Reduction in air
pollution
Climate Benefits
– Savings of 29 Mt C/yr
by OECD countries for
a 10% increase in
recycling
Other Effects






– Treaty and domestic
law requirements
Voluntary Agreements
– GHG reduction goals
– GHG sink
enhancement
– Energy efficiency goals 
Market Mechanisms
















– Has not been determined
Macro-economic Issues
– Dislocations in existing
industries
Equity Issues




– Decreased use of
primary materials
Equity Issues




– Modest; most effort
comes from industry
Political Factors





– Modest; most effort
comes from industry
Political Factors




– Modest; most effort
comes from industry
Political Factors
– Directly engages pub-
lic in problem solving
– Objection to regula-
tions by industry
a Estimated reductions assume a 1990 industry manufacturing sector structure. Reductions by different technical options may not be additive.
economies, as heavy industry is replaced by alternative manu-
facturing. In addition, since most of the growth in industrial
energy use is likely to be in the non-Annex I countries in the
coming decades, the greatest reductions in the growth rate of
future GHG emissions can be achieved by introducing new
technology and industrial processes early in these emerging
industrial economies.
Tradable permits and joint implementation14 could be useful
mechanisms to achieve GHG reductions within the industrial
sector by providing investment capital in energy-efficient man-
ufacturing and process technology. These measures are dis-
cussed more fully in Section 9.
Opportunities also exist for companies in OECD Annex I coun-
tries to create GHG reducing joint ventures with companies
and governments in Annex I countries with economies in tran-
sition, as well as in non-Annex I countries.
4.3.5.2 Barriers to International Initiatives
Technology transfer of modern industrial capacity to non-
Annex I countries and Annex I countries with economies in
transition is being impeded by disagreements over intellectual
property rights and a lack of available capital and hard 
currency. Other barriers include a lack of capacity and basic
environmental legislation, and institutional factors in the host
countries. There are currently legal and treaty impediments to
implementing cooperative actions among firms to reduce
greenhouse gases. Many countries have anti-trust laws to pre-
vent price collusion and monopolistic behavior by firms.
Within the World Trade Organization, there is concern about
environmental protection as a potential restraint on free trade.
These restrictions need to be examined to determine how envi-
ronmental benefits, like GHG reductions, can be achieved by
firms without compromising the intended goals of these rules.
As the private sector takes on a larger role in addressing GHG
emissions from industry, there will need to be greater trans-
parency of these actions through reporting and verification
mechanisms involving third parties such as non-governmental
organizations, and governmental and international agencies.
4.4 Global Carbon Emissions Reductions through
Technologies and Measures in the Industrial Sector
The IPCC IS92 scenarios indicate that total energy and CO2 for
the industrial sector of Annex I countries are projected to rise
from approximately 122 EJ and 2.1 Gt C in 1990 to 165 EJ
(141–181 EJ) and 2.7 Gt C (2.1–3.1 Gt C) in 2010, and to 186
EJ (154–211 EJ) and 2.9 Gt C (2.1–3.5 Gt C) in 2020, reach-
ing 196 EJ (140–242 EJ) and 2.6 Gt C (1.4–3.7 Gt C) by 2050.
Projected average annual growth in both energy use and emis-
sions is close to 1% per year greater for the world as a whole,
indicating the growing importance of the industrial sector in
non-Annex I countries.
Annex I countries could lower their industrial sector CO2 emis-
sions by 25% relative to 1990 levels, by simply replacing exist-
ing facilities and processes with the most efficient technologi-
cal options currently in use (assuming a constant structure for
the industrial sector). This upgraded replacement would be
cost-effective if it occurred at the time of normal capital stock
replacement. This seems within the realm of both technologi-
cal and economic feasibility (SAR II, SPM 4.1.1). It is difficult
to estimate potential emissions reductions compared to the
IS92 scenarios for Annex I countries with economies in transi-
tion and non-Annex I countries; however, such reductions are
likely to be significant due to the existing energy-intensive
facilities and the potential to implement more efficient prac-
tices and technologies as growth occurs in these regions.
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14Chapter 11 of SAR III uses the term “joint implementation” to
include “activities implemented jointly” and that usage is continued
here.
5.1 Introduction
The energy supply sector consists of a sequence of elaborate
and complex processes for extracting energy resources, con-
verting these into more desirable and suitable forms of energy,
and delivering energy to places where the demand exists.
Global energy consumption has grown at an average annual rate
of approximately 2% for almost two centuries, although energy
growth varies considerably over time and among regions (SAR
II, SPM 4.1). If past trends continue, energy-related GHG emis-
sions are likely to grow more slowly than energy consumption
in general and energy sector requirements in particular, due to
a gradual trend toward the decarbonization of energy supply.
Across the range of the IPCC IS92 scenarios, energy-related
CO2 emissions are projected to increase from 6 Gt C in 1990 to
7–12 Gt C by 2020 and to 6–19 Gt C by 2050, of which the
energy sector accounts for 2.3–4.1 Gt C (1.4–2.9 Gt C in
Annex I) by 2020 and 1.6–6.4 Gt C (1.0–3.1 Gt C in Annex I)
by 2050, respectively.
The availability of fossil reserves and resources as well as
renewable potentials is unlikely to pose a major constraint to
long-term energy supply (SAR II, B.3.3). Similarly, the avail-
ability of uranium and thorium is unlikely to place a major con-
straint on the future development of nuclear power. There is
also a large long-term potential for renewable energy
resources, although the costs of achieving a significant portion
of this potential are uncertain and depend on many factors
ranging from RD&D activities and early technology adoption
in niche markets to suitable geographic locations (SAR II,
B.5.3.1). Table 9 summarizes global energy reserves and
resources in terms of both their energy and carbon content as
well as renewable potentials (SAR II, B.3.3.1).
Energy supply technologies and energy infrastructures have
inherently long economic lifetimes, and fundamental transi-
tions in the energy supply sector take many decades. This
means that technical measures and policies will take consider-
able time to implement. However, within a period of 50–100
years, the entire energy supply system will be replaced at least
twice. It is technically possible to realize deep emission reduc-
tions in the energy supply sector in step with the normal timing
of investments to replace infrastructure and equipment as it
wears out or becomes obsolete (SAR II, SPM 4.1.3).
The mitigation potentials of the individual options identified in
this assessment are not additive, because the realization of
some options is mutually exclusive or may involve double-
counting. Thus, a systematic approach is required to assess the
potential impacts and feasibility of combinations of individual
mitigation measures and policies at the energy system level,
while ensuring regional and global balance between demands
and supplies. To assess the long-term technical potential of
combinations of measures at the energy systems level, in con-
trast to the level of individual technologies, numerous scenar-
ios of potential energy system futures have been constructed. In
one such exercise, variants of a Low CO2-Emitting Energy
Supply System (LESS) were analyzed in the SAR (SAR II,
SPM 4.1.4). The LESS constructions are “thought experi-
ments” exploring many combinations of technical possibilities
of reducing global CO2 emissions to about 4 Gt C by 2050 and
to about 2 Gt C by 2100 (SAR Syn.Rpt., 5.8). The literature
provides strong support for the feasibility of achieving the per-
formance and cost characteristics assumed for energy tech-
nologies in the LESS constructions, although uncertainties will
exist until more RD&D has been carried out and the technolo-
gies have been tested in the market (SAR II, SPM 4.1.4; SAR
Syn.Rpt., 5.9). In another scenario exercise conducted in 1993,
the World Energy Council presented an “ecologically driven”
scenario, in which similar emissions reductions were obtained
(SAR II, 19.3.1.4). These exercises are, by their nature, specu-
lative and involve assumptions about mitigation potentials,
short- and long-term costs of technologies, and their full socio-
economic and environmental consequences. Additional sce-
nario development and analysis are required to establish the
internal consistency of various assumptions over time, includ-
ing possible interactions between such assumptions as those
that might relate the evolution of systems for energy use, eco-
nomic growth, land use and population (IPCC 1994, II, SPM).
5.2 Technologies for Reducing
GHG Emissions in the Energy Supply Sector
Promising approaches to reduce future emissions, not ordered
according to priority, include more efficient conversion of fossil
fuels; switching to low-carbon fossil fuels; decarbonization of
flue gases and fuels and CO2 storage; switching to nuclear ener-
gy; and switching to renewable sources of energy (SAR II,
SPM 4.1.3). Each of these options has its unique characteristics
that determine cost-effectiveness, as well as social and political
acceptability. Both the costs and the environmental impacts
should be evaluated on the basis of full life-cycle analyses. The
technical potential for CO2 emission reductions of selected mit-
igation technologies is explored in Box 3.
5.2.1 More Efficient Conversion of Fossil Fuels
Generally, new technologies promise higher conversion effi-
ciencies from fossil fuels. For example, the efficiency of power
5.  ENERGY SUPPLY SECTOR15
15This section is based primarily on SAR II, Chapter 19, Energy
Supply Mitigation Options (Lead Authors: H. Ishitani, T. Johansson,
S. Al-Khouli, H. Audus, E. Bertel, E. Bravo, J. Edmonds, S.
Frandsen, D. Hall, K. Heinloth, M. Jefferson, P. de Laquil III, J.R.
Moreira, N. Nakicenovic, Y. Ogawa, R. Pachauri, A. Riedacker, H.-
H. Rogner, K. Saviharju, B. Sorensen, G. Stevens, W.C. Turkenburg,
R.H.Williams and F. Zhou); SAR II, Chapter B, Energy Primer
(Lead Authors: N. Nakicenovic, A. Grubler, H. Ishitani, T.
Johansson, G. Marland, J.R. Moreira and H-H. Rogner); and SAR
III, Chapter 11, An Economic Assessment of Policy Instruments for
Combatting Climate Change. It also draws to a lesser extent on the
SAR II and III SPMs.
production can be increased from the present world average of
about 30% to more than 60% in the longer term. Also, the use of
combined heat and power production where it is applicable—
whether for process heat or space heating or cooling—offers a
significant increase in fuel utilization efficiencies (SAR II,
SPM 4.1.3.1). Integration of energy conversion from very high to
very low temperatures—sometimes called energy cascading—
offers additional efficiency improvements (SAR II, 20.4.2.3).
While the cost associated with these efficiency improvements
will be influenced by numerous factors—including the rate of
capital replacement, the discount rate, and the effect of
research and development—there are advanced technologies
that are cost-effective compared to some existing plants and
equipment that are less efficient or emit larger amounts of
GHGs. Some technology options (e.g., combined-cycle power
generation) can penetrate the current marketplace. To realize
other options, governments would have to take integrated
action which may include eliminating permanent subsidies for
energy, internalizing external costs, providing funding for addi-
tional RD&D of low- and zero-CO2 emission technologies, and
providing temporary incentives for early market introduction
of these technologies as they approach commercialization
(SAR II, Chapter 19, Executive Summary). Therefore, while
the efficiency of power production can be improved globally,
this could incur additional costs and may not occur in the
absence of appropriate GHG policies.
The theoretical potential for efficiency improvements is very
large and current energy systems are nowhere near the maxi-
mum theoretical (ideal) levels suggested by the second law of
thermodynamics. Many studies indicate low current values for
most conversion processes based on second law (or exergy) effi-
ciencies. Much inertia must be overcome before even a fraction
of this potential can be realized, along with numerous barriers,
such as social behavior, vintage structures, costs, lack of infor-
mation and know-how, and insufficient policy incentives. For
fossil fuels, the magnitude of the efficiency improvement poten-
tials suggests, irrespective of costs, the areas that have the high-
est emission mitigation potentials (SAR II, B.2.2).
In general, the introduction of new vintages of efficient tech-
nologies is governed by the energy system’s natural capacity
retirement process and future demand growth prospects. In the
short term, the efficiency improvement rate based on the natur-
al turnover of capital may be largest in countries with rapid
economic growth (SAR II, 19.1). Therefore, those Annex I
countries that are undergoing the process of transition to a mar-
ket economy and presently have inefficient energy conversion
systems have high potentials for efficiency improvements.
The global average efficiency of fossil-fueled power generation
is about 30%; the average efficiency in the OECD countries is
about 35%. Assuming a typical efficiency of new coal-fired
power generation (with de-SOx and de-NOx equipment) of 40%
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Consumption Consumption Reserves Identified/ Resource Base/
(1860–1990) (1990) Potentials by 2020–2025 Maximum Potentials
EJ Gt C EJ Gt C EJ Gt C EJ Gt C
Oil
Conventional 3 343 61 128 2.3 6 000 110 8 500 156
Unconventional – – – – 7 100 130 16 100 296
Gas
Conventional 1 703 26 71 1.1 4 800 72 9 200 138
Unconventional – – – – 6 900 103 26 900 403
Coal 5 203 131 91 2.3 25 200 638 125 500 3 173
TOTAL FOSSIL 10 249 218 290 5.7 50 000 1 053 >186 200 4 166
Nuclearb 212 – 19 – 1 800 – >14 200 –
EJ/yr EJ/yr
Hydro 560 – 21 – 35–55 – >130 –
Geothermal – – <1 – 4 – >20 –
Wind – – – – 7–10 – >130 –
Ocean – – – – 2 – >20 –
Solar – – – – 16–22 – >2 600 –
Biomass 1 150 – 55 – 72–137 – >1 300 –
TOTAL RENEWABLES 1 710 – 76 – 130–230 – >4 200 –
aTable based on SAR II, B.3.3.1, Tables B-3 and B-4.
bNatural uranium reserves and resources are effectively 60 times larger if fast breeder reactors are used.
– = negligible or not applicable
Table 9: Global energy reserves and resources, their carbon content, energy potentials by 2020–2025, and maximum technical potential.a
in Annex I countries, an increase of 1% in efficiency would
result in a 2.5% reduction in CO2 emissions (SAR II, 19.2.1.1).
In the longer run, new electricity generation technologies based
on coal with higher efficiencies include supercritical steam
cycles, pressurized fluidized bed combustion and integrated
gasification combined cycles. Some of these technologies are
commercial, while others require further RD&D.
Natural gas in combined-cycle power plants has the highest
conversion efficiencies of all fossil fuels—presently 45% in the
short term and 55% and more in the longer term. Combined-
cycle plants have approximately 30% lower investment costs
than a conventional gas steam counterpart, although specific
electricity costs will depend on the usually higher fuel costs of
natural gas compared to coal. On the other hand, combined-
cycle plants are more costly than simple combustion turbines,
which are less efficient but have shorter installation times
(SAR II, 19.2.1.1).
GHG reduction potential is approximately proportional to
realized efficiency improvements. For improved technologies
that use the same fossil fuel, the efficiency gains translate to
lower fuel costs, which often can offset the somewhat higher
capital needs. The technology improvements can result in 
significant secondary benefits, such as reductions of other 
pollutants [e.g., sulfur dioxide (SO2), NOx and particulates].
Additional costs are often negligible because efficiency
improvements do not require radical technology changes.
Energy-efficiency improvements also have the advantage of
being replicable.
Combined heat and power production (CHP) offers a signifi-
cant rise in fuel utilization, of up to 80–90%, which is much
higher than separate electricity and heat production (SAR II,
19.2.1.4). The economics of CHP are closely linked to the
availability or development of district heating and cooling net-
works and sufficient demand densities.
5.2.2 Switching to Low-carbon Fossil Fuels
Switching to fuels with a lower carbon-to-hydrogen ratio, such
as from coal to oil or natural gas, and from oil to natural gas,
can reduce emissions. Natural gas has the lowest CO2 emis-
sions per unit of energy of all fossil fuels, at about 15 kg C/GJ,
compared to oil with about 20 kg C/GJ and coal with about 25
kg C/GJ (all based on low heating values). The lower carbon-
containing fuels can, in general, be converted with higher effi-
ciency than coal. Large resources of natural gas exist in many
areas (SAR II, SPM 4.1.3.1). New, low capital cost, highly effi-
cient combined-cycle technology can reduce electricity costs
considerably in some areas where natural gas prices are rela-
tively low compared to coal.
Switching from coal to natural gas while maintaining the same
fuel-to-electricity conversion efficiency would reduce emis-
sions by 40%. Accounting for the conversion efficiency of nat-
ural gas, which is generally higher than that of coal (SAR II,
19.2.1), the overall emissions reduction per unit of electricity
generated might be in the range of 50%.
Although natural gas is abundant, it is not available as a domes-
tic energy source in some parts of the world. Thus, a wider shift
to natural gas would lead to changes in energy import depen-
dencies, which raises a number of policy issues. Initial invest-
ment and administrative costs may be substantial, due to the
need to develop new transport, distribution and end-use infra-
structures. Hence, the actually achievable reduction potentials
may differ significantly among regions, depending on local con-
ditions such as relative fuel prices or gas availability.
A wider use of natural gas could lead to additional leakages of
CH4, the main component of natural gas. Approaches exist to
reduce emissions of CH4 from coal mining by 30–90%, from
venting and flaring of natural gas by more than 50%, and from
natural gas distribution systems by up to 80% (SAR II,
22.2.2). Some of these reductions may be economically viable
in many regions of the world, providing a range of benefits,
including the use of CH4 as an energy source (SAR II,
19.2.2.1).
5.2.3 Decarbonization of Flue Gases and Fuels,
and CO2 Storage and Sequestering
The removal and storage of CO2 from fossil fuel power-station
stack gases is feasible, but reduces the conversion efficiency
and significantly increases the production cost of electricity.
Another approach to decarbonization uses fossil fuel as a feed-
stock to make hydrogen-rich fuels—for example, hydrogen
itself, methanol, ethanol or CH4 converted from coal. Both
approaches generate a stream of CO2 that could be stored, for
example, in depleted natural gas fields or in the oceans (SAR
II, SPM 4.1.3.1). Because of its costs and the need to develop
the technology, this option has only limited opportunities for
near- and medium-term application (e.g., as a source of CO2 to
be used in enhanced oil recovery) (SAR II, 19.2.3.1). For some
longer term CO2 storage options (e.g., in the oceans), the costs,
environmental effects, and efficacy remain largely unknown
(SAR II, SPM 4.1.3.1).
For a conventional coal power plant with 40% efficiency,
removing 87% of CO2 emissions from flue gases (from 230 to
30 g C/kWhe) would reduce the efficiency to 30% and increase
electricity costs by about 80%, which is equivalent to $150/t C
avoided (SAR II, 19.2.3.1).
For a natural gas combined-cycle plant with 52% efficiency,
reducing CO2 emissions by about 82% (from 110 to 20 g
C/kWhe) would reduce the efficiency to 45% and increase elec-
tricity costs by about 50%, which is equivalent to $210/t C
avoided (SAR II, 19.2.3.1). Although the specific abatement
costs per tonne of carbon avoided are higher for natural gas
than for coal, this translates into lower incremental cost per
kilowatt-hour of electricity because of the lower specific car-
bon content of natural gas.
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Another process for decarbonization of fuels is the gasification
of coal and CO2 removal by reforming synthesis gas. For an
original integrated gasification combined cycle (IGCC) coal
power plant with 44% efficiency, reducing CO2 emissions by
about 85% (from 200 to 25 g C/kWhe) would reduce the effi-
ciency to about 37% and increase electricity costs by 30–40%,
which is equivalent to less than $80/t C avoided (SAR II,
19.2.3.2).
One future option to reduce costs that is under investigation is
the use of oxygen rather than air for combustion to obtain a flue
gas that is essentially CO2 and water vapor.
Another related option would be to produce hydrogen-rich
gases for electricity generation and other applications. For the
recovery of CO2 by steam reforming natural gas, the costs of
capture and storage in a nearby natural gas field are estimated
to be less than $30/t C avoided (SAR II, 19.2.3.2). The future
availability of conversion technologies, such as fuel cells that
can efficiently use hydrogen, would increase this option’s rela-
tive attractiveness. Delivery of electricity and hydrogen as final
energy would practically eliminate emissions at the point of
end use, and allow carbon removal and storage from the ener-
gy sector itself.
Storage of recovered CO2 in exhausted oil and gas wells is 
another option (SAR II, 19.2.3.3). The estimated global storage
capacity of oil and gas fields is in the range of 130–500 Gt C,
which translates into a large mitigation potential. Storage costs in
onshore natural gas fields are estimated to be less than $11/t C,
while transport costs are about $8/t C for a 250-km pipeline with
a capacity of 5.5 Mt C/yr (SAR II, 19.2.3.3). Another option is
CO2 storage in saline aquifers, which can be found at different
depths around the world.
The deep ocean is the largest potential repository for CO2 (SAR
II, 19.2.3.3). CO2 could be directly transferred to the oceans,
ideally at depths of 3 000 m or perhaps more; the deposited CO2
would be isolated from the atmosphere for at least several cen-
turies. Concerns over potential environmental impacts as well
as the development of appropriate disposal technologies and the
assessment of their costs require further research.
5.2.4 Switching to Nuclear Energy
Nuclear energy could replace baseload fossil fuel electricity gen-
eration in many parts of the world if generally acceptable
responses can be found to concerns such as reactor safety,
radioactive-waste transport and disposal, and nuclear proliferation
(SAR II, SPM 4.1.3.2). A review of opinion surveys concludes
that public concerns about nuclear energy focus on doubt about
economic necessity, fear of large-scale catastrophes, storage of
nuclear waste and the misuse of fissile material (SAR II, 19.2.4).
Nuclear electricity generation costs vary across a number of
countries from 2.5–6¢/kWhe; costs for new plants, including
waste disposal and decommissioning plants, range from
2.9–5.4¢/kWhe using a 5% discount rate, and 4.0–7.7¢/kWhe
using a 10% discount rate (SAR II, 19.2.4). Projected levelized
costs of baseload electricity by the turn of the century indicate
that nuclear power will remain an option in several countries
with plants in operation and under construction. Since these
nuclear generating costs are comparable to those of coal, the spe-
cific mitigation costs would range from $120/t C avoided to neg-
ligible additional costs (assuming conventional coal electricity
costs of 5¢/kWhe, nuclear costs between 5.0 and 7.7¢/kWhe and
emissions avoided of 230 g C/kWhe) (SAR II, 19.2.1.1).
New designs, such as modular high-temperature gas-cooled
reactors are being developed to provide increased safety and
improved economic performance through reduced construction
lead times and reduced operation and maintenance costs. Interest
in liquid metal-cooled reactors and other new designs, such as
high-energy accelerator devices, has been revived in view of
their potential use in management and disposal of fissile materials.
Other concepts are being developed with the objective of
enhancing the use of nuclear power for non-electrical applica-
tions, such as process and district heat, and, in the longer term,
nuclear energy could be deployed for hydrogen production
(SAR II, 19.2.4).
5.2.5 Switching to Renewable Sources of Energy
Technological advances offer new opportunities and declining
costs for energy from renewable sources. In the longer term,
renewables can meet a major part of the world’s demand for
energy. Power systems, with the addition of fast-responding
backup and storage units, can accommodate increasing
amounts of intermittent generation (SAR II, SPM 4.1.3.2).
Renewable sources of energy used sustainably have low or no
GHG emissions. There are some emissions associated with the
unsustainable use of biomass—for example, from reducing the
amount of standing biomass and from decomposition of bio-
mass associated with flooded reservoirs (SAR II, 19.2.5). If the
development of biomass energy can be carried out in ways that
effectively address concerns about other environmental issues
(e.g., impacts on biodiversity) and competition with other land
uses, biomass could make major contributions in both the elec-
tricity and fuels markets (SAR II, SPM 4.1.3.2). By and large,
renewable sources of energy could offer substantial reductions
of GHG emissions compared to the use of fossil fuels (SAR II,
19.2.5), provided their economic performance continues to
improve and no siting problems arise.
5.2.5.1 Hydropower
The technical potential has been estimated at 14 000 TWhe/yr,
of which 6 000–9 000 TWhe/yr are economically exploitable in
the long run after considering social, environmental, geological
and cost factors (SAR II, 19.2.5.1). The market potential for
reducing GHG emissions depends on which fossil fuel
hydropower replaces. The long-term economic potential for
replacing coal is 0.9–1.7 Gt C avoided annually (depending on
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technology and efficiency); for natural gas, the potential is
0.4–0.9 Gt C avoided annually.
The investment costs for hydro projects in 70 developing coun-
tries for the 1990s suggest that, on average, the cost of new
hydroelectricity delivered to final use is 7.8¢/kWhe. The actual
investment cost can be high, with financing likely to become a
barrier due to the long amortization horizons involved (SAR II,
19.2.5.1). Replacing modern coal-fired electricity as presented
in the SAR II (19.2.1.1) would result in average CO2 reduction
costs of $120/t C avoided (assuming conventional coal electric-
ity costs of 5¢/kWhe and emissions avoided of 230 g C/kWhe)
(SAR II, 19.2.1.1).
Small-scale hydro can be regionally important especially where
cost-effective. On the other hand, the construction phase of 
larger hydroelectric plants has social consequences and direct
and indirect environmental impacts, such as water diversion,
slope alteration, reservoir preparation, creation of infrastructure
for the large workforce, or disturbing aquatic ecosystems, with
adverse human health impacts. The social consequences include
the relocation of people as well as a boom and bust effect on the
local economy. The associated infrastructure stimulates regional
economic development and also provides additional benefits for
agriculture as a water reservoir (SAR II, 19.2.5.1).
5.2.5.2 Biomass
Potential biomass energy supplies include municipal solid
waste, industrial and agricultural residues, existing forests, and
energy plantations (SAR II, 19.2.5.2.1).
Yields and costs of biomass energy depend on local conditions,
such as land and biomass waste availability and production
technology. Typically, the energy output-input ratio for high-
quality food crops is low compared to the ratio for energy crops,
which often exceeds the former ratio by a factor of 10. Biomass
production cost estimates vary over a large range. On the basis
of commercial experience in Brazil, an estimated 13 EJ/yr of
biomass could be produced at an average cost for delivered
woodchips of $1.7/GJ. Costs are higher in Annex I countries.
For electricity generation in the Annex I countries, future bio-
mass inputs are expected to cost around $2/GJ (SAR II,
19.2.5.2.1).
The mitigation cost range for biomass-derived energy forms
such as electricity, heat, biogas or transportation fuels not only
depends on the biomass production cost but also on the eco-
nomics of the specific fuel conversion technologies. Assuming
biomass costs of $2/GJ and small-scale production, electricity
can be generated for 10–15 ¢/kWhe. For lower cost biomass
($0.85/GJ), electricity can be generated for less than 10 ¢/kWh
(SAR II, 19.2.5.2.2). On the basis of replacing coal with bio-
mass, the mitigation costs would range between $200–400/t C
avoided. A future biomass-integrated gasifier/gas turbine cycle
with an expected efficiency of 40–45% and biomass costs of
$2/GJ could produce electricity at costs comparable to coal
and/or coal prices in the range of $1.4–1.7/GJ (SAR II,
19.2.5.2.2). In this case, the specific mitigation costs could
well become negligible.
Advanced biofuels from woody feedstocks offer the potential of
higher energy yields at lower costs and lower environmental
impacts than most traditional biofuels. In addition to ethanol,
methanol and hydrogen are promising biofuel candidates.
Modern biomass energy also offers the potential for generating
income in rural areas. This income could allow developing-
country farmers to modernize their farming techniques and
reduce the need to expand output by bringing more marginal
lands into production. In industrialized countries, biomass pro-
duction on excess agricultural lands could allow governments
eventually to phase out agricultural subsidies (SAR II, 19.2.5.2).
At present, advanced biomass conversion technologies as well
as biomass plantations are in their infancy and require further
RD&D to become technically mature and economically viable.
Concerns about future food supplies have raised the issue that
land will not be available for biomass production for energy in
Africa and other non-Annex I countries (SAR II, 19.2.5.2.1).
The potential competition for land use will depend on the
degree to which agriculture can be modernized in these coun-
tries to achieve yields equivalent to those obtained in the Annex
I countries, and whether intensified agricultural production will
occur in an environmentally and economically acceptable way.
5.2.5.3 Wind
Intermittent wind power on a large grid can contribute an esti-
mated 15–20% of annual electricity production without special
arrangements for storage, backup and load management (SAR
II, 19.2.5.3.2, 19.2.6.1). In a fossil-dominated utility system,
the mitigation effect of wind technologies corresponds to the
reduction in fossil fuel use. The wind potential by 2020 is pro-
jected to range from 700–1 000 TWhe (SAR II, B.3.3.2); if uti-
lized to replace fossil fuels and irrespective of costs, this trans-
lates into CO2 emission reductions of 0.1–0.2 Gt C/yr.
The present stock average cost of energy from wind power is
approximately 10¢/kWh, although the range is wide. By 2005
to 2010, wind power may be competitive with fossil and
nuclear power in more than small niche markets. For average
new technology, investment costs of $1 200/kW and electricity
production costs of 6¢/kWh have been estimated. Costs could
be significantly lower for large wind farms. In the future, costs
as low as 3.2¢/kWh have been calculated for favorable loca-
tions at a discount rate of 6% (SAR II, 19.2.5.3.3). In this case,
the specific CO2 mitigation costs are negligible, if not zero or
negative, where electricity from coal is more expensive.
Countries with large numbers of operating wind turbines some-
times experience public resistance to such factors as the noise
of turbines, the visual impact on the landscape and the distur-
bance of wildlife (SAR II, 19.2.5.3.5).
5.2.5.4 Solar Energy
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Direct conversion of sunlight to electricity and heat can be
achieved by photovoltaic (PV) and solar thermal electric
technologies. PV is already competitive as a stand-alone
power source remote from electric utility grids. However, it
has not been competitive in bulk electric grid-connected
applications. Although module capital costs have decreased
drastically over recent years, system capital costs are
Technologies, Policies and Measures for Mitigating Climate Change42
Box 3.  Technical Potential of CO2 Emission Reductions based on the IPCC IS92 Scenarios
for Different Mitigation Technologies by the Year 2020
In preparing these calculations of technical potential, it is assumed that 50% of the new installed energy conversion
capacities in Annex I countries between 1990 and 2020 would employ the mitigation technologies described in this
paper, irrespective of costs which would vary for different technologies. Six different mitigation technologies are con-
sidered: replacing coal with natural gas, flue gas decarbonization for coal and natural gas, CO2 removal from coal, and
replacement of coal and natural gas with nuclear power, or with biomass, respectively. This calculation does not attempt
to present a comprehensive assessment of mitigation options in the energy sector. Only six examples are presented due to
the limitations imposed by the IS92 scenarios. The mitigation potential of each individual technology option is based on
a sensitivity analysis of the IS92a scenario and the range between IS92e and IS92c. Some of these mitigation options
may be mutually exclusive and are not additive.
Each calculation includes a number of steps. First, new capacity additions between 1990 and 2020 in the IS92 scenarios
are inferred; second, the profiles of new capacities that are to be partially replaced in Annex I countries by mitigation
technologies are also inferred with the assumption that 50% of these capacities would consist of new technologies; third,
the implied CO2 emissions reductions are determined for all three IS92 scenarios using technology characteristics from
SAR II, Chapter 19, and emissions coefficients from SAR II, Chapter B; and finally, percentage emissions reductions are
evaluated for each of the three scenarios.
The extent  to which the technical potential can be achieved will depend on future cost reductions, the rate of develop-
ment and implementation of new technologies, financing and technology transfer, as well as measures to overcome a
variety of non-technical barriers such as adverse environmental impacts, social acceptability, and other regional, sectoral
and country-specific conditions.
Technical CO2 Reduction Potential Based on
IS92a Scenario (and Range for IS92e to IS92c)
Mitigation Technology Gt C % of Annex I % of World
Replacing Coal with Natural Gas for 0.25 4.0 2.5
Electricity Generation in Annex I Countries (0.01–0.4) (2.0–6.0) (1.0–4.0)
Flue Gas Decarbonization (with de-NOx and de-SOx) 0.35 6.0 3.5
for Coal in Electricity Generation in Annex I Countries (0.1–0.6) (3.0–8.0) (1.5–5.0)
Flue Gas Decarbonization (with de-NOx) for 0.015 0.5 0.15
Natural Gas Electricity Generation in Annex I Countries (0.0–0.05) (0.0–0.5) (0.0–0.45)
CO2 Removal from Coal Before Combustion for 0.35 6.0 3.5
Electricity Generation in Annex I Countries (0.1–0.6) (3.0–8.0) (1.5–5.0)
Replacing Natural Gas and Coal with Nuclear Power 0.4 7.0 4.0
for Electricity Generation in Annex I Countries (0.15–0.65) (3.0–9.5) (2.0–5.5)
Replacing Coal with Biomass (in Electricity Generation, 0.55 9.5 5.5
Synfuel Production and Direct End Use) in Annex I Countriesa (0.25–0.85) (5.5–12.0) (3.0–7.0)
a The biomass requirements would amount to 9–34 EJ/yr, which is less than the range of 72–187 EJ for the biomass potential by 2020 to
2025 (SAR II, B.3.3.2). These figures are higher than those assessed in the SAR chapter on agriculture (SAR II, 23), and can be
achieved only through actions which go beyond agricultural measures.
$7 000–10 000/kW; the corresponding electricity cost is
23–33¢/kWh, even in areas of high insulation (2 400
kWh/m2/yr). However, the cost of PV systems is expected to
improve significantly through RD&D, as well as with
economies of scale. Because of its modularity, PV technology
is a good candidate for cost-cutting through learning-by-doing,
as well as technological innovation (SAR II, 19.2.5.4.1).
Although PV devices emit no pollution in normal operation,
some systems involve the use of toxic materials, which can
pose risks in manufacture, use and disposal.
By 2020 to 2025, the annual economic potential of solar
energy in well-defined niche markets is assessed to be
16–22 EJ (SAR II, B.3.3.2). Realization of this potential
will depend on the cost and performance improvements of
solar electric technologies. If fully realized, irrespective of
costs, the CO2 reduction could amount to 0.3–0.4 Gt C
annually. A 50-MW power plant based on 1995 technology
with installed costs of $2 300/kW would have generating
costs of about 8–9¢/kWhe in areas with good insulation
(SAR II, 19.2.5.4.1). The mitigation cost versus coal-fired
electricity generation of approximately 5¢/kWh then would
range from $130–170/t C avoided; compared to gas-fired
electricity with similar costs, the range would be from
$270–350/t C avoided. These costs do not account for 
energy system considerations such as storage requirements,
or benefits of replacing more expensive peak electricity
where the PV output is well-correlated with peak electrical
demand.
Optimistic assessments of future PV costs indicate values as
low as $700–800/kW by 2020–2030 and electricity costs of
2.2–4.4¢/kWh, depending on the level of insulation (SAR II,
19.2.5.4.1; Table 19-6). Ignoring energy system considera-
tions, use of PV generation at these costs would reduce both
generation costs and emissions relative to conventional coal
technologies at today’s costs. Other estimates of PV genera-
tion costs in 2030 are between 50 and 100% higher than these
values, depending on whether or not there is accelerated
RD&D.
Solar thermal-electric systems have the long-term potential to
provide a significant fraction of the world’s electricity and
energy needs. This technology generates high-temperature
heat, thus may realize conversion efficiencies of about 30%
(SAR II, 19.2.5.4.2). Parabolic-trough technology has achieved
significant cost reductions and current plants have energy costs
of 9–13¢/kWh in the hybrid mode. Power towers have signifi-
cantly lower projected energy costs of 4–6¢/kWh (SAR II,
19.2.5.4.2).
In addition to electricity production, solar thermal systems can
provide high-temperature process heat, and central receivers
can be used to process advanced fuels such as hydrogen and
chemicals (SAR II, 19.2.5.4.2). Local solar thermal systems
can provide heating and hot water for domestic, commercial or
industrial uses (SAR II, 19.2.5.5).
5.2.5.5 Geothermal and Ocean Energy
Electricity is generated from geothermal energy in 21 coun-
tries. The cost of electric generation from this source is esti-
mated to be around 4¢/kWhe and heat is generated at 2¢/kWhth.
Direct use of geothermal water occurs in about 40 countries; 
14 countries have an installed capacity of more than 100 MWth
(SAR II, 19.2.5.6.1).
Various emissions are associated with geothermal energy,
including CO2, hydrogen sulfide and mercury. Advanced tech-
nologies are almost closed-loop and have very low emissions
(SAR II, 19.2.5.6.1). The geothermal energy potential by
2020–2025 is estimated to be 4 EJ (SAR II, B.3.3.2). Hot dry
rock and other non-hydrothermal reservoirs offer new supply
resources. Despite its importance at the level of the local econ-
omy, the carbon reduction potential is small.
Although the total energy flux of tides, waves, and thermal and
salinity gradients of the world’s oceans is large, only a small
fraction is likely to be exploited in the next 100 years (SAR II,
19.2.5.6.2).
5.3 Measures for Reducing
GHG Emissions in the Energy Supply Sector
Refer to Table 10 for examples of measures and technical
options to mitigate GHG emissions in electricity generation.
5.3.1 Market-based Programmes
Market-based programmes directly change the relative price of
energy-related activities. In a perfectly competitive market-
place, under an emission tax or tradable quota scheme, emitters
would reduce emissions up to the point where the marginal cost
of control equals the emission tax rate or the equilibrium price
of an emission quota. Both instruments would promote dynamic
efficiency (cost minimization over the long term, when factors
of production are variable and technological change may be
stimulated), as each provides a continuous incentive for RD&D
in emission abatement technologies to avoid the tax or quota
purchases (SAR III, 11.5). As such, the costs of emission taxes
are known, but the magnitude of emission reductions is uncer-
tain. This situation reverses for emission quotas.
5.3.1.1 Phasing Out Permanent Subsidies
Permanent energy sector subsidies provide incorrect market
signals to producers and consumers alike, and may lead to
energy prices below actual cost; resource allocation is thus dis-
torted and inherently suboptimal. Subsidies to established tech-
nologies create artificial market barriers to the entry of new
technologies. For this reason, the adoption of marginal cost
pricing and the minimization, if not elimination, of long-term,
permanent subsidies that increase GHG emissions have been
proposed as means for improving market entry opportunities
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Table 10: Selected examples of measures and technical options to mitigate GHG emissions in electricity generation.
Administrative,
Climate and Other Economic and Institutional and
Technical Options Measures Environmental Effects Social Effects Political Considerations
Efficiency Improvements
– Power generation thermal
efficiency improvement
potential from present
average of 30% to 60%







– From coal to natural gas
– From oil to natural gas
Decarbonization
of Flue Gases
– CO2 abatement (scrubbing)
– Coal gasification and
reforming of synthesis
gas
– Production of  hydrogen-
rich gases
Climate Effects
– Reduction of all GHG
and other pollutants; an
increase in thermal con-
version efficiency from
35 to 40% reduces CO2
emissions by 12.5%








– Reduction of  CO2 and
other pollutants, ceteris
paribus by 40% (from
coal and 20% from oil)
– In addition. natural gas




– Potential disbenefit of
higher CH4 emissions
Other Effects




– Specific CO2 reduction

































– Mandatory fuel use
Voluntary Agreements








– Regulation of under-
ground storage sites
– International conven-
tions on ocean storage
Voluntary Agreements




can be achievable at no
or low additional costs
Macro-economic Issues
– Energy import reduction
Equity Issues




gas available, but high
gas infrastructure costs
– Uncertain gas prices in
the longer run
Macro-economic Issues
– In the short- to medium-
term, potential for low-
cost electricity supply






for low-cost natural gas
Cost-effectiveness
– Involves least changes
in energy sector
– High scrubbing costs
between $80–150/t C
and more
– Additional storage costs
– Loss of efficiency in
electricity generation
Macro-economic Issues
– No major energy sector
restructuring








– A fair share of the
improvement potential
may be realized even


























– RD&D on disposal
and ocean storage
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Table 10 (continued)
Administrative,
Climate and Other Economic and Institutional and
Technical Options Measures Environmental Effects Social Effects Political Considerations
Nuclear
– Increased use of nuclear
energy
Biomass
– Energy plantation and
forestry
– Biomass conversion for
electricity and heat
generation
– Biomass gasification and
liquid fuel production
– Hydrogen from biomass
Wind (an example of
intermittent renewables)
– Utilization of wind tur-
bines at favorable sites
– Remote from grid
– Integrated with grid
Climate Effects
– Reduction of all GHG
and other pollutants,
such as SOx, NOx and
particulates
Other Effects






– Can result in no net
carbon emissions
– Could be a
sequestration option
Other Effects






– Reduction of all GHG
and other pollutants,
such as SOx, NOx and
particulates
Other Effects






– Tradable emission permits
Regulatory Measures





tors and the concerned
public
RD&D




– Change structure of
subsidies to agriculture
– Carbon taxes





– Utilize marginal lands
for energy plantation
– Support of local biofuel or
bio-conversion initiatives
RD&D
– RD&D support to





– Tradable emission permits
Regulatory Measures
– Emission regulation
– Zoning appropriate sites
Voluntary Agreements
– Early adopters with
utilities
RD&D
– RD&D support to
reduce costs
Cost-effectiveness
– Under special condi-
tions, cost-effective
mitigation option
– High up-front, large and
increasing cost range
– Limited to baseload
operation
Macro-economic Issues
– Lower expenditures for
fuel imports; uncertainty
about economic feasibility
– Lack of public acceptance
Equity Issues
– Limited technology








– Restructure of agricul-















– Lack of public support




































– Zoning for wind
farms
– Access to utility grids
Political Factors
– Stable energy policy
for modern technologies with lower GHG emissions (SAR II,
SPM 4.4). These subsidies absorb large amounts of capital,
reducing the financing possibilities of investments in energy
efficiency, RD&D in low CO2-emitting technologies or other
economic activities. Conventional energy technologies benefit
from direct subsidies of more than $300 billion per year world-
wide (SAR II, 19.4).
The argument for eliminating permanent subsidies, however,
does not mean that some temporary, short-term subsidies could
not be used as measures to support the market entry of GHG mit-
igating options such as renewables, nuclear power or clean coal
technologies. For example, price guarantees for independent
producers utilizing low-carbon technologies would help reduce
the economic risk of technologies that are not fully matured.
5.3.1.2 Full-cost Pricing of Energy Services
The literature on full-cost pricing is controversial. No consen-
sus exists on how to monetize the external (true social) costs of
energy production and use (SAR III, SPM 6). If consensus
were possible to attain, then the practice of full-cost pricing
would contribute to a level playing field for all energy tech-
nologies. External costs include those costs usually not reflected
in market prices in the absence of policies. Examples in the 
literature include morbidity, mortality, environmental damage,
or the potential adverse consequences of the impacts of climate
change, job opportunities, competitiveness and other opportu-
nity costs.
The inclusion of energy externalities would improve the com-
petitiveness of low-emission energy uses (SAR II, 19.4).
Because the external costs of existing and new technologies are
unknown but are expected to vary greatly among countries and
regions, unilateral national adoption of full-cost pricing may, in
the short run, adversely affect international economic compet-
itiveness. International agreements may be needed to overcome
this competitiveness concern.
5.3.1.3 Tradable Emission Quotas and Permits
Other possible measures include setting emission quotas and
issuing tradable emission permits. At the international level, ful-
filment of quotas can enhance activities implemented jointly,
which could simultaneously bring technology and finance to
non-Annex I countries and to some Annex I countries under-
going economic transition, and help implement least-cost strate-
gies internationally.16
5.3.1.4 Financing Assistance
Capital shortage, especially in the developing world and some
Annex I countries undergoing economic transition, is a major
barrier to the implementation of GHG mitigation options. If a
project has lower life-cycle costs and emissions but higher cap-
ital requirements than its alternative, it may not attract the nec-
essary finance. In addition, energy supply technologies com-
pete with other development needs for limited capital.
However, many mitigation and other energy options could
involve indigenous technology production, creating new local
infrastructure and employment. Especially in rural areas,
decentralized technologies may aid development goals (SAR
II, 19.Executive Summary).
Even in the industrialized countries, the capital required for
financing energy supply system-related GHG reduction may
yield lower returns than other investment opportunities.
Measures that make supply and conversion technologies more
attractive in the marketplace would help resolve some of the
financing difficulties by reducing risk, uncertainty and upfront
capital requirements. Other measures include accelerated
depreciation, start-up loans and concessional grants (SAR II,
SPM 4.4).
5.3.2 Regulatory Measures
The conventional approach to environmental policy in many
countries has used uniform standards (based on technology or
performance) and direct government expenditures on projects
that are designed to improve the environment. Like market-
based incentives, the first of these strategies requires that pol-
luters undertake pollution abatement activities; under the sec-
ond strategy, the government itself expends resources on envi-
ronmental quality. Both of these strategies figure prominently
in current and proposed measures to address global climate
change (SAR III, 11.4).
Standards and codes have the advantage that the effect on GHG
emissions can, in general, be assessed a priori. The disadvan-
tage, however, is that the costs incurred are often unknown and
can be higher than market-based instruments. Under some cir-
cumstances, however, a performance standard may provide
greater incentives but under other circumstances also lower
incentives for technological adoption than a marketable permit
system (SAR III, 11.4.1).
An example of a regulatory measure in the United States is the
Public Utilities Regulatory Policy Act (PURPA), enacted in
1978, which required electric utilities to buy power from inde-
pendent producers at the long-term avoided cost and led to the
creation of a competitive, decentralized market. Small- to
medium-scale cogeneration fueled by natural gas and biomass
became a popular technology approach. PURPA is largely
responsible for the introduction of more than 10 000 MWe of
renewable electric capacity (SAR II, 19.4). According to some
assessments, such regulatory measures could lead to higher
electricity costs.
5.3.3 Voluntary Agreements
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16Chapter 11 of SAR III uses the term “joint implementation” to
include “activities implemented jointly” and that usage is continued
here.
Voluntary agreements generally refer to actions undertaken in
the participants’ self-interest and endorsed by a government with
the objective of reducing GHG emissions. Such agreements are
considered in many Annex I countries to constitute a flexible
measure. The agreements can take on many different forms at
both national and international levels, and can include target-
and performance-based agreements, cooperative RD&D, gener-
al information exchange, and activities implemented jointly.
Forward-looking firms may take steps to control GHG emis-
sions if they fear more costly mandatory controls in the
absence of voluntary reductions. This could explain why some
voluntary agreements for domestic energy management have
arisen. The vast majority of GHG reductions from the actions
announced or expanded through the U.S. Climate Change
Action Plan, for example, come from voluntary initiatives
aimed at increasing energy efficiency (SAR III, 11.4.3).
5.3.4 Research, Development and Demonstration
High rates of innovation in the energy sector are a prerequisite
for meeting the most ambitious GHG mitigation objectives and
significantly lowering the costs of many technology options
below present levels. The trend in recent years, however, has
been one of declining investment in energy RD&D on the part
of both the private sector and the public sector (see Table 11;
SAR II, 19.4). Over the last decade, public-sector support for
energy RD&D has declined absolutely by one-third, and by
half a percentage of GDP (SAR II, 19.4). In the past, over half
of government-supported RD&D in the International Energy
Agency (IEA) member countries was allocated to nuclear 
energy and less than 10% was allocated for renewables.
Together with energy conservation, more than 80% of RD&D
is devoted to low- or zero-GHG emitting measures.
Although many energy sector mitigation options require further
RD&D support, it is important to have a government strategy
that does not attempt to pick individual technology winners.
Fortunately, many of the promising technologies for reducing
emissions, such as many renewable and other low- or zero-GHG
emitting energy technologies, require relatively modest invest-
ments in RD&D. This is a reflection largely of the small scale
and the modularity of these technologies (SAR II, 19.4). As a
result, it should be feasible to support a diversified portfolio of
options, even with limited resources for RD&D. It has been esti-
mated that research and development of a range of renewable
energy technologies would require on the order of $15–20 
billion distributed over a couple of decades (SAR II, 19.4).
RD&D programmes are necessary but not sufficient to estab-
lish new technologies in the marketplace. Commercial demon-
stration projects and programmes located in realistic econom-
ic and organizational contexts to stimulate markets for new
technologies also are needed. For a wide range of small-scale,
modular technologies, such as most renewable energy tech-
nologies and fuel cells, energy production costs can be expected
to decline with the cumulative volume of production, as a
result of learning by doing.
5.3.5 Infrastructural Measures
5.3.5.1 Removal of Institutional Barriers
In some circumstances, the removal of institutional barriers can
attract private-sector interest in advanced renewable technolo-
gies. Regulatory reform and deregulation (breaking-up of pro-
ducer monopolies, transmission and distribution networks)
have allowed small and independent power producers access to
the grid and improved their competitiveness. Standardization
of equipment to facilitate connection to the grid also would
improve technology adoption. In the case of adoption of
advanced renewable technologies, these measures can reduce
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Fossil Nuclear Nuclear Energy Renewable % of
Year Energy Fission Fusion Conservation Energy Other Total GDP GDP
1983 1.70 6.38 1.43 0.79 1.05 1.08 12.40 10.68 0.12
1984 1.60 6.12 1.44 0.70 1.02 0.99 11.88 11.20 0.11
1985 1.51 6.26 1.42 0.70 0.85 1.04 11.77 11.58 0.10
1986 1.51 5.72 1.31 0.59 0.66 0.94 10.74 11.90 0.09
1987 1.37 4.36 1.23 0.65 0.62 1.04 9.27 12.29 0.08
1988 1.46 3.64 1.13 0.53 0.62 1.19 8.58 12.82 0.07
1989 1.30 4.42 1.07 0.45 0.57 1.33 9.13 13.23 0.07
1990 1.75 4.48 1.09 0.55 0.61 1.15 9.62 13.52 0.07
1991 1.52 4.45 0.99 0.59 0.64 1.39 9.57 13.58 0.07
1992 1.07 3.90 0.96 0.56 0.70 1.28 8.48 13.82 0.06
1993 1.07 3.81 1.05 0.65 0.71 1.38 8.66
1994 0.98 3.74 1.05 0.94 0.70 1.30 8.72
Table 11: Total reported IEA government R&D budgets (columns 1–7; US$ billion at 1994 prices and exchange rates) and
GDP (column 8; US$ trillion at 1993 prices).
GHG emissions.
5.3.5.2 Energy System Planning
Traditionally, the domain of energy sector industries has been
the production and sale of kWhe, litres of gasoline, or tonnes of
coal. The focus was on growth of demand for energy supplies
and the efficient expansion of capital to meet that demand, not
on the most efficient way to meet the growing and widening
demand for energy services.
Some regulatory commissions are requiring energy sector indus-
tries to adopt a wider business concept, which extends to include
the provision of energy services rather than the sale of energy units.
Most importantly, end-use efficiency and technologies become an
integral part of the energy industry capital allocation process.
Energy planning would extend beyond the traditional energy sector
boundaries and adopt a full energy system perspective.
However, the energy utility sectors in Annex I countries cur-
rently are undergoing privatization and deregulation. These
changes may also provide opportunities for GHG mitigation,
such as independent power production and CHP. These
changes also mean that governments may have to modify the
policy levers used to achieve environmental objectives. For
example, demand-side management and integrated resource
planning may need to be reexamined.
5.3.5.3 Local and Regional Environment Measures
Energy supply and end use lead to a number of local and
regional environmental impacts. Local impacts include indoor
and urban pollution. Regional impacts include acidification
and possible land-use conflicts. Policies and measures for mit-
igating local and regional environmental impacts can affect and
interact with policies for mitigating climate change. For exam-
ple, more efficient conversion and end use of energy brings
multiple benefits as it reduces environmental impacts on all
scales. In contrast, other policies might involve complex trade-
offs. Some measures that improve regional environmental con-
ditions may lead to higher GHG emissions; for example, flue
gas scrubbers for the abatement of sulfur emissions from coal-
fired power plants decrease the overall conversion efficiency,
resulting in higher carbon emissions. Additionally, some GHGs
may have adverse effects on local and regional air quality (e.g.,
small CHP might not include full de-SOx and de-NOx abate-
ment equipment). Because the adverse regional impacts are
more certain than the impacts of global climate change, action
to combat this type of pollution is likely to occur in many parts
of the world in the short to medium term.
Thus, integration of policies and measures is needed to reduce
the overall environmental impacts at the national, regional and
local levels. In particular, policies and measures addressing
local and regional environmental impacts should be assessed
for their potential conflict with goals and policies for reduction
of GHG emission.
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6.1 Introduction
Agriculture accounts for about one-fifth of the projected
anthropogenic greenhouse effect, producing about 50 and 70%,
respectively, of overall anthropogenic CH4 and N2O emissions;
agricultural activities (not including forest conversion) account
for approximately 5% of anthropogenic emissions of CO2
(SAR II, Figure 23.1). Total global land under cultivation is
estimated to be approximately 1 700 Mha (SAR II, 23.2.2,
Table 23-3).
The agriculture sector is characterized by large regional differ-
ences in both management practices and the rate at which it
would be possible to implement mitigation measures. The
effectiveness of various mitigation measures needs to be
gauged against the base emission levels and changes in differ-
ent regions. In non-Annex I countries where rapid increases in
fertilizer use and crop production are occurring, substantial
increases in emissions of N2O and CH4 are projected. Even full
implementation of mitigation measures will not balance these
increases. Comprehensive analyses of land use, cropping sys-
tems and management practices are needed at regional and
global levels to evaluate changes in emissions and mitigation
requirements.
6.2 Technologies for Reducing
GHG Emissions in the Agriculture Sector
Technologies for mitigation of GHGs in agriculture and the
potential decreases in emissions of CO2, CH4 and N2O are
shown in Table 12. Also shown in Table 12 are the equivalent
carbon emission reductions for CH4 and N2O based on their
respective ratios of global warming potential (SAR I, Table
2.9). Of the total possible reduction in radiation forcing (shown
as C-equivalents), approximately 32% could result from reduc-
tion in CO2 emissions, 42% from carbon offsets by biofuel 
production on existing croplands, 16% from reduced CH4
emissions and 10% from reduced emissions of N2O.
Emissions reductions by the Annex I countries could make a
significant contribution to the global total. Of the total poten-
tial CO2 mitigation, Annex I countries could contribute 40% of
the reduction in CO2 emissions, and 32% of the carbon offset
from biofuel production on croplands. Of the global total
reduction in CH4 emissions, Annex I countries could contribute
5% of the reduction attributed to improved technologies for
rice production, and 21% of reductions attributed to improved
management of ruminant animals. These countries also could
contribute about 30% of the reductions in N2O emissions
attributed to reduced and more efficient use of nitrogen fertil-
izer, and 21% of the reductions stemming from improved 
utilization of animal manures.18
Estimates of potential reductions range widely, reflecting uncer-
tainty in the effectiveness of recommended technologies and the
degree of future implementation globally. To satisfy global food
requirements and acceptability by farmers, technologies and
practices should meet the following general guidelines: (i) sus-
tainable agricultural production will be achieved or enhanced;
(ii) additional benefits will accrue to the farmer; and (iii) agri-
cultural products will be accepted by consumers. Farmers have
no incentive to adopt GHG mitigation techniques unless they
improve profitability. Some technologies, such as no-till agri-
culture or strategic fertilizer placement and timing, already are
being adopted for reasons other than concern for climate
change. Options for reducing emissions, such as improved farm
management and increased efficiency of nitrogen fertilizer use,
will maintain or increase agricultural production with positive
environmental effects.
These multiple benefits will result in high cost-effectiveness of
available technologies. Practices that recover investment cost
and generate a profit in the short term are preferred over prac-
tices that require a long term to recover investment costs; prac-
tices that have a high probability associated with expected
profits are desired over practices that have less certainty about
their returns. When human resource constraints or knowledge
of the practice prevent adoption, public education programmes
can improve the knowledge and skills of the work force and
managers to help advance adoption. Comprehensive national
and international programmes of research, education and tech-
nology transfer will be required to develop and diffuse knowl-
edge of improved technologies. Crop insurance or other 
programmes to share the risk of failure due to natural disaster
are needed to aid the adoption of improved practices.
6.2.1 Mitigation of Carbon Dioxide Emissions
(SAR II, 23.2)
Options to mitigate CO2 emissions from agriculture include
reducing emissions from present sources, and creating and
strengthening carbon sinks. Options for increasing the role of
agricultural land as a sink for CO2 include carbon storage in
managed soils and carbon sequestration after reversion of sur-
plus farm lands to natural ecosystems. However, soil carbon
sequestration has a finite capacity over a period of 50–100
years, as new equilibrium levels of soil organic matter are estab-
lished. Efforts to increase soil carbon levels have additional
benefits in terms of improving the productivity and sustainabil-
ity of agricultural production systems. Soils of croplands taken
6.  AGRICULTURE SECTOR17
17This section is based on SAR II, Chapter 23, Agricultural Options
for Mitigation of Greenhouse Gas Emissions (Lead Authors: V.
Cole, C. Cerri, K. Minami, A. Mosier, N. Rosenberg, D. Sauerbeck,
J. Dumanski, J. Duxbury, J. Freney, R. Gupta, O. Heinemeyer, T.
Kolchugina, J. Lee, K. Paustian, D. Powlson, N. Sampson, H.
Tiessen, M. van Noordwijk and Q. Zhao).
18Annex I countries’ share of emission reductions is based on pro-
duction data in the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) 1994
Production Yearbook, Vol. 48, FAO Statistics Series. Rome, Italy.
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Net Carbon Dioxide Emissions Mt C/yr
Reducing CO2 Emissions
– Reduction in fossil energy use by agriculture in industrialized countries 10–50
(reductions expected in expanded use of minimum and no tillage, irrigation
scheduling, solar drying of crops and improved fertilizer managementa)
Increasing C Sinks
– Increasing soil C through better management of existing agricultural soilsb 400–600
– Increasing soil C through permanent set-aside of surplus agricultural land in temperate regionsc 21–42
– Restoration of soil C on degraded landsd 24–240
Biomass Production as a C Offset
– Biofuel production from dedicated crops on existing croplandse
• Temperate regions 85–490
• Tropical regions 160–510
• Temperate shelter belts 10–60
• Tropical agroforestry 46–200
– Biofuel production from crop residuesf 100–200
TOTAL POTENTIAL CO2 MITIGATION 855–2 390
Reducing Methane Emissions Mt CH4/yr Mt C-Equivg
Improved Management of Ruminant Livestock
– Improved diet quality and nutrient balance 10–35 57–202
– Increased feed digestibility 1–3 6–18
– Improved animal genetics and reproduction 1–6 6–36
Improved Management of Livestock Manures
– Covered lagoons 2–6.8 12–39
– Digesters 0.6–1.9 3–12
Improved Rice Production Practices
– Irrigation managemente 3.3–9.9 19–52
– Nutrient management 2.5–15 14–87
– New cultivars and other practices 2.5–10 14–58
TOTAL POTENTIAL DECREASE IN METHANE EMISSIONS 23–88 131–504
Reducing Nitrous Oxide Emissions Mt N2O-N/yr Mt C-Equivh
Increase N Fertilizer Use Efficiency
– Reduce use of nitrogen fertilizers (apply improved technology for nitrogen application, 0.3–0.9 85–245
match N supply with crop demand, integrate production systems to maximize manure
reuse in plant production, conserve plant residue N on the production site, and
optimize tillage, irrigation and drainage)
– Decrease forest conversion 0.06–0.17 21–47
TOTAL POTENTIAL DECREASE IN NITROUS OXIDE EMISSIONS 0.4–1.1 106–292
a Based on current use of 3–4.5% of the total fossil C emission (2.8 Gt C/yr; OECD, 1991) by industrialized countries and an arbitrary reduction range of
10–50%.
b Assuming a recovery of one-half to two-thirds of the estimated historic loss (44 Gt) of C from currently cultivated soils (excluding wetland soils) over a 50-year
period.
c Based on an estimated C sequestration of 1.5–3 Gt over a 100-year period, from a 15% set-aside of cultivated soils (~640 Mha), in industrialized countries with
current or potential production surpluses; annual and cumulative rates given as 1 and 50%, respectively. Based on restoration of 10–20% of former wetland area
(8 Mha) now under cultivation in temperate regions.
d Assuming potential C sequestration of 1–2 kg C/m2 over a 50-year period, on an arbitrary 10-50% of moderately to highly degraded land (1.2x109 ha globally).
e Assuming about 10–15% of world cultivated lands to be available for biofuels.
f Based on 25% recovery of crop residues and assumptions on energy conversion and substitution.
g C-equivalent of CH4 emissions based on 100-year GWP (SAR I, Table 2.9).
h C-equivalent of N2O emissions based on 100-year GWP (SAR I, Table 2.9).
Table 12: Agricultural technologies for mitigation of GHG emissions and potential reductions of annual emissions of carbon
dioxide, methane and nitrous oxide (based on SAR II, Tables 23-4, 23-5, 23-6, 23-10 and 23-11).
out of production in permanent set-asides and allowed to revert
to native vegetation eventually could reach carbon levels com-
parable to their precultivation condition. Considering the 640
Mha of land currently under cultivation in the United States,
Canada, the former Soviet Union, Europe, Australia and
Argentina, and assuming recovery of the soil carbon originally
lost to cultivation, a permanent set-aside of 15% of the land area
could sequester 1.5–3 Gt C (over 50–100 years).
A large-scale reversion or afforestation of agricultural land is
only possible if adequate supplies of food, fibre and energy can
be obtained from the remaining area. This is currently possible
in the European Union and United States through intensive
farming systems. However, if farming intensity changes
because of environmental concerns or changes in policy, this
mitigation option may no longer be available.
Currently, only half of the conversion of tropical forests to agri-
culture contributes to an increase in productive cropland. The
only way to break out of this cycle is through more sustainable
use, improved productivity of existing farmland and better pro-
tection of native ecosystems. These practices could help reduce
agricultural expansion (hence deforestation) in humid zones,
especially in Latin America and Africa.
Management practices to increase soil carbon stocks include
reduced tillage, crop residue return, perennial crops (including
agroforestry), and reduced bare fallow frequency. However,
there are economic, educational and sociological constraints to
improved soil management in much of the tropics. Many trop-
ical farmers cannot afford or have limited access to purchased
inputs such as fertilizer and herbicides. Crop residues are often
needed for livestock feed, fuel or other household uses, which
reduces carbon inputs to soil. To the extent that improved 
management is based on significantly increased fossil fuel 
consumption, benefits for CO2 mitigation will be decreased.
Energy use by agriculture, per unit of farm production, has
decreased since the 1970s. Fossil fuel use by agriculture in
industrialized Annex I countries, constituting 3–4% of overall
consumption, can be reduced through the use of minimum
tillage, irrigation scheduling, solar drying of crops and
improved fertilizer management.
Both conventional food and fibre crops and dedicated biofuel
crops, such as short-rotation woody crops and perennial herba-
ceous energy crops, produce biomass that is valuable as a feed-
stock for energy supply. Dedicated biofuel crops require simi-
lar soils and management practices as conventional agricultural
crops, and would compete with food production for limited
resources (SAR II, 23.2.4). The extent to which their produc-
tion will be expanded depends on the development of new tech-
nologies, their economic competitiveness with traditional food
and fibre crops, and social and political pressures. Dedicated
energy plants, including short-rotation woody crops, perennial
herbaceous energy crops, and annuals such as whole-plant
cereal crops or kenaf, could be sustainably grown on 8–11% of
the marginal to good cropland in the temperate zone.  For
example, in the European Union it has been estimated that
15–20 Mha of good agricultural land will be surplus to food
production needs by the year 2010. This would be equivalent to
20–30% of the current cropland area.
Due to increasing agricultural demand in the tropics, a lower
percentage of land is likely to be dedicated to energy crops, so
a reasonable estimate may be 5–7%. In total, however, there
could be a significant amount of land available for biofuel pro-
duction, especially from marginal land and land in need of
rehabilitation. The CO2 mitigation potential of a large-scale
global agricultural biofuel programme could be significant.
Assuming that 10–15% of the world’s cropland area could be
made available, fossil fuel substitutions in the range of
300–1300 Mt C have been estimated. This does not include the
indirect effects of biofuel production through increasing car-
bon storage in standing woody biomass or through increasing
soil carbon sequestration. Recovery and conversion of 25% of
total crop residues (leaving 75% for return to the soil) could
substitute for an additional 100–200 Mt fossil fuel C/yr.
However, the possible offsets by increased N2O emissions need
to be considered. Generally, crops from which only the oil,
starch or sugar are used are of limited value in reducing CO2
emissions, due to the low net energy produced and the rela-
tively high fossil fuel inputs required. The burning of whole
plant biomass as an alternative to fossil fuel results in the most
significant CO2 mitigation.
Ranges in estimates of potential mitigation reflect uncertainty
about the effectiveness of management options and about the
degree of future implementation globally. A primary issue in
evaluating these options is whether the world can continue to
support an increasing population with its growing needs for
food and fibre and, at the same time, expand the amount of
land used for production of biomass for energy (SAR II,
23.2.5, 25.3.3).
6.2.2 Mitigation of Methane Emissions
(SAR II, 23.3.1.1)
The largest agricultural sources of CH4 are managed ruminant
animals and rice production. Rice cultivation will continue to
increase at its current rate to meet food requirements. Flooded
rice fields produce CH4 emissions, which can be reduced by
improved management measures. The ranges of potential
reductions shown indicate uncertainty about the effectiveness
of mitigation measures and the degree of additivity of effects
as, for example, in rice production. Successful implementation
of available mitigation technologies will depend on demonstra-
tion that: (i) grain yield will not decrease or may increase; (ii)
there will be savings in labour, water and other production
costs; and (iii) rice cultivars that produce lower CH4 emissions
are acceptable to local consumers.
Emissions of CH4 from domestic ruminant animals can be
reduced as producers use improved grazing systems with higher
quality forage, since animals grazing on poor-quality rangelands
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Table 13: Selected examples of technical options to mitigate GHG emissions in the agricultural sector.
Administrative,
Climate and Other Economic and Institutional and
Technical Options Measures Environmental Effects Social Effects Political Considerations
Reduce Fossil Energy Use
– Reduce tillage
– Reduce fertilizer use
– Irrigation scheduling
– Solar crop drying





– Restore productivity of
degraded soils
– Increase permanent set-
aside in temperate regions
Expand Biofuel









– Increase feed digestibility















– Better application methods
– Match N supply with
crop needs
– Maximize manure use
– Optimize tillage, irriga-
tion and drainage
Climate Benefits
– Reduced CO2 emis-
sions of 10–50 Mt C/yr
Climate Benefits
– Increased C storage of
440–880 Mt C/yr
Other Effects





– Fossil C offset of
400–1 460 Mt C/yr
– Increased soil C storage
Climate Benefits
– Reduced CH4 emis-
sions of 12–44 Mt
CH4/yr
Other Effects
– Less nutrient pollution
Climate Benefits
– Reduced CH4 emis-
sions of 3–9 Mt CH4/yr
Climate Benefits
– Reduced CH4 emis-







– Improved water quality
Market-based
Programmes













– Removal of market
barriers
Regulatory Measures








– Taxes on N fertilizer
use
Regulatory Measures
– Limits on N fertilizer
use
Macro-economic Issues
– Reduced costs for fuel
and fertilizers
Cost-effectiveness




– Reduced fuel costs
Macro-economic Issues
– Higher costs of
electricity
– Competition for limited
croplands will increase
land prices and poten-
tially food prices
Macro-economic Issues




– Costs reduced by local
energy availability
Equity Issues
– Seasonal water alloca-
tion difficult
Cost-effectiveness
















– Credit availability may
constrain
Political Factors
– Generally opposed by
traditional agricultural
interests
– Possible negative im-
pact on food production
politically sensitive
Political Factors
– Special concern in
areas of high animal














impact on food pro-
duction politically 
sensitive
produce more CH4 per unit of feed consumed. Confined feeding
operations utilizing balanced rations that properly manage diges-
tion of high-energy feeds also can reduce direct emissions, but
can increase indirect emissions from feed production and trans-
portation. CH4 produced in animal waste disposal systems can
provide an on-farm energy supply, and the CH4 utilized in this
manner is not emitted to the atmosphere. Overall, potential glo-
bal reduction of CH4 emissions amounts to about 35% (15–56%)
of emissions from agriculture.
6.2.3 Mitigation of Nitrous Oxide Emissions
(SAR II, 23.3.1.2)
Nitrogen is an essential plant nutrient; however, it is also a com-
ponent of some of the most mobile compounds in the soil-plant-
atmosphere system. Since nitrogen is the major component of
mineral fertilizer, there is mounting concern over the extent to
which high-input agriculture loads nitrogen compounds into the
environment. Nitrogen budgeting, or an input/output balance
approach, provides a basis for policies to improve nitrogen
management in farming and livestock systems, and for mitigat-
ing its environmental impact. Management systems can
decrease the amount of nitrogen lost to the environment through
gaseous losses of ammonia or N2O, or through leaching of
nitrate into the subsoil. In some cases, improved efficiency is
achieved by using less fertilizer; in other cases, it can be
achieved by increasing yields at the same nitrogen levels.
The primary sources of N2O from agriculture are mineral fertil-
izers, legume cropping, and animal waste. These losses often
are accelerated by poor soil physical conditions. Some N2O also
is emitted from biomass burning. Improvements in farm tech-
nology, such as use of controlled-release fertilizers, nitrification
inhibitors, the timing of nitrogen application and water man-
agement should lead to improvements in nitrogen use 
efficiency and further limit N2O formation. The underlying con-
cept in reducing N2O emissions is that if fertilizer nitrogen
(including manure nitrogen) is better used by the crop, less N2O
will be produced and less nitrogen will leak from the system. By
better matching nitrogen supply to crop demand and more
closely integrating animal waste and crop residue management
with crop production, N2O emissions could be decreased by
about 0.36 Mt N2O-N or about 17% (9–26%) of the current
emission rate in agriculture.
6.3 Measures for Reducing
GHG Emissions in the Agriculture Sector
Measures that can have significant effects on the mitigation 
of GHGs in the agriculture sector include the following (see
Table 13 for sample technical options):
• Market-based programmes (e.g., reduction and reform of
agricultural support policies; taxes on use of nitrogen 
fertilizers; subsidization of production and use of biomass
energy)
• Regulatory measures (e.g., limits on use of nitrogen fertil-
izers; cross-compliance of agricultural support to environ-
mental objectives)
• Voluntary agreements (e.g., soil management practices
that enhance carbon sequestration in agricultural soils)
• International programmes (e.g., support of technology
transfer in agriculture).
The primary objectives of many of these measures are usually
not related solely to climate change issues, but rather to such
aims as reducing environmental pollution and natural resource
degradation. Governments could promote more efficient fertil-
izer use by changing commodity programmes to allow more
flexibility and to encourage farmers to grow crops and adopt
practices that rely less on commercial fertilizers. Support and
encouragement of the best management practices to reduce soil
degradation and environmental pollution would be consistent
with mitigation measures for reduction of GHGs.
Measures to encourage improved land-use practices can increase
carbon storage. These could include permanent set-aside 
provisions for marginal and degraded lands. Incentives could be
provided for managing existing croplands in a sustainable and
environmentally sound manner. Government programmes can
support the development of practices that maintain or increase
crop yields and reduce emissions per unit of crop yield.
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7.1 Introduction
Forests constitute both a sink and a source of atmospheric CO2.
Forests absorb carbon through photosynthesis, but emit carbon
through decomposition and when trees are burned due to
anthropogenic and natural causes. Managing forests in order to
retain and increase their stored carbon will help to reduce the
rate of increase in atmospheric CO2 and stabilize atmospheric
concentrations. Even though some degraded lands are unsuit-
able for forestry, there is considerable potential for mitigation
through improved management of forest lands for carbon con-
servation, storage and substitution, in balance with other objec-
tives. This section describes national forest practices and mea-
sures and international projects and programmes that may be
successfully pursued to achieve this goal.20
Forests currently cover about 3.4 Gha worldwide, with 52%
of the forests in the low latitudes (approximately 0–25°N and
°S latitude), 30% in the high latitudes (approximately
50–75°N and °S latitude), and 18% in the mid-latitudes
(approximately 25–50°N and °S latitude) (SAR II, 24.2.1).
The world’s forests store large quantities of carbon, with an
estimated 330 Gt C in live and dead above- and below-ground
vegetation, and 660 Gt C in soil (mineral soil plus organic
horizon) (SAR II, 24.2.2). An unknown quantity of carbon
also is stored in products such as wood products, buildings,
furniture and paper.
High- and mid-latitude forests are currently estimated to be a
net carbon sink of about 0.7 ± 0.2 Gt C/yr. Low-latitude forests
are estimated to be a net carbon source of 1.6 ± 0.4 Gt C/yr,
caused mostly by clearing and degradation of forests (SAR II,
24.2.2). These sinks and sources may be compared with the
carbon release from fossil fuel combustion, which was esti-
mated to be 6 Gt C in 1990.
7.2 Technologies for Reducing
GHG Emissions in the Forest Sector
Forest management practices that can restrain the rate of
increase in atmospheric CO2 can be grouped into three cate-
gories: (i) management for carbon conservation; (ii) manage-
ment for carbon sequestration and storage; and (iii) manage-
ment for carbon substitution. Conservation practices include
options such as controlling deforestation, protecting forests in
reserves, changing harvesting regimes, and controlling other
anthropogenic disturbances, such as fire and pest outbreaks.
Sequestration and storage practices include expanding forest
ecosystems by increasing the area and/or biomass and soil
carbon density of natural and plantation forests, and increas-
ing storage in durable wood products. Substitution practices
aim at increasing the transfer of forest biomass carbon into
products rather than using fossil fuel-based energy and prod-
ucts, cement-based products and other non-wood building
materials.
The potential land area available for the implementation of for-
est management options for carbon conservation and seques-
tration is a function of the technical suitability of the land to
grow trees and the actual availability as constrained by socio-
economic circumstances. The literature reviewed for the SAR
(SAR II, 24.4.2.2) suggests that globally 700 Mha of land
might be available for carbon conservation and sequestration
(345 Mha for plantations and forestry, 138 Mha for slowed
tropical deforestation, and 217 Mha for natural and assisted
regeneration). Table 14 provides an estimate of global potential
to conserve and sequester carbon, based on the above studies.
The tropics have the potential to conserve and sequester the
largest quantity of carbon (80% of the total potential), followed
by the temperate (17%) and the boreal zones (3%). Natural and
assisted regeneration and slowing deforestation account for
more than half of the amount in the tropics. Forestation and
agroforestry contribute the remaining tropical sink, and with-
out these efforts regeneration and slowing deforestation would
be highly unlikely.
Scenarios show that annual rates of carbon conservation and
sequestration from all of the practices mentioned increase over
time (SAR II, 24.4.2.2). Carbon savings from slowed deforesta-
tion and regeneration initially are the highest, but from 2020
onwards plantations sequester practically identical amounts as
they reach maximum carbon accretion (see Figure 3). On a
global scale, forests turn from a global source to a sink by about
2010, as tropical deforestation is offset by carbon conserved and
sequestered in all zones.
Using the mean cost of establishment or first costs for individ-
ual options by latitudinal region, the cumulative cost (undis-
counted) for conserving and sequestering the quantity of carbon
shown in Table 14 ranges from about $250–300 billion at an
average unit cost ranging from $3.7–4.6/t C (SAR II, 24.5.4).
Average unit cost decreases with more carbon conserved by
slowing deforestation and assisting regeneration, as these are
the lowest cost options. Assuming an annual discount rate of
3%, these costs fall to $77–99 billion and the average unit cost
falls to $1.2–1.4/t C. Land costs and the costs of establishing
infrastructure, protective fencing, education and training are not
included in these cost estimates.
While the uncertainty in the above estimates is likely to be high,
the trends across options and latitudes appear to be sound. The
factors causing uncertainty are the estimated land availability
for forestation projects and regeneration programmes, the rate
at which tropical deforestation can actually be reduced, and the
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19This section is based on SAR II, Chapter 24, Management of
Forests for Mitigation of Greenhouse Gas Emissions (Lead
Authors: S. Brown, J. Sathaye, M. Cannell and P. Kauppi).
20Mitigation technologies, policies and measures to reduce GHG
emissions from grasslands, deserts and tundra are still in their
infancy, and mitigation options in these sectors have yet to be eval-
uated in depth; hence, these are not addressed in this report.
amount of carbon that can be conserved and sequestered in trop-
ical forests. In summary, policies aimed at promoting mitigation
efforts in the tropical zone are likely to have the largest payoff,
given the significant potential for carbon conservation and
sequestration in tropical forests. Those aimed at forestation in
the temperate zone also will be important.
7.3 Measures for Reducing
GHG Emissions in the Forest Sector
Forest management practices with the largest potential for car-
bon conservation and sequestration range (in declining order of
importance) from slowing deforestation and assisting regener-
ation in the tropics to forestation schemes and agroforestry in
tropical and temperate zones (Table 14). To the extent that
forestation schemes yield wood that can substitute for fossil
fuel-based material and energy, their carbon benefit will be
multiplied. The following subsections examine the measures
relevant to the implementation of each type of practice.
7.3.1 Slowing Deforestation and Assisting Regeneration
The causes of deforestation range from clearing of forest land
for agriculture, mineral extraction and hydro-reservoirs to
degradation of forests for fuel wood. Land cleared for agricul-
ture may eventually lose its fertility and become suitable only
as rangeland. Socio-economic and political pressures, often
brought about by the needs of growing populations living in
marginal areas at subsistence levels, are principal factors caus-
ing deforestation in much of the tropics (SAR II, 24.3.1.1). In
Brazil, on the other hand, wealthier investors are major agents
of deforestation, clearing land for cattle ranches that often
derive part of their financial attractiveness from land specula-
tion.
Both forest-related and non-forest measures and policies have
contributed to deforestation. These include short-duration con-
tracts that specify annually harvested amounts and poor har-
vesting methods, which encourage contractors to log without
considering the concession’s sustainability. Royalty structures
that provide the government with too little revenue to permit
reforestation adequate for arresting forest degradation after
harvesting also lead to deforestation. Non-forest policies that
lead to direct physical intrusion of natural forests are another
prime cause of deforestation. These include land tenure pol-
icies that assign property rights to private individuals on the
basis of “improvement” through deforestation, settlement pro-
grammes, investments promoting dams and mining, and tax
credits or deductions for cattle ranching.
Table 15 shows the measures whose successful implementation
would slow deforestation and assist regeneration of biomass.
Each of these measures will conserve biomass, which is likely
to have a high carbon density, and will maintain or improve the
current biodiversity, soil and watershed benefits. The capital
costs of these measures are low, except in the case of recycled
wood, where the capital cost depends on the product being recy-
cled. The first two measures are likely to reduce sectoral (agri-
cultural) employment as deforestation is curtailed. If the subsi-
dies are gainfully invested, they have the potential to create jobs









Table 14: Global carbon that could be sequestered and conserved, and related costs (1995–2050).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
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Source: SAR II, Tables 24-5, 24-8 and 24-9.
a Includes above- and below-ground vegetation, soil and litter C.
b Establishment or first cost (undiscounted). Average of estimates reported in the literature. Most estimates do not include land, infrastruc-
ture, protective fencing, education and training costs. Figures in parenthesis indicate the range of cost estimates.
c Cost figures in column 4 are per t of vegetation C. Total costs (column 5) are thus lower than the figure obtained by multiplying t C in column
3 by $/t C in column 4.
d For slowing deforestation and enhancing regeneration combined.
elsewhere in the economy to offset this loss. Sustainable forest
management has the potential to create economic activity and
employment on a long-term basis. The implementation of forest
conservation legislation requires strong political support and may
incur a high administrative burden. Removing subsidies may run
into strong opposition from vested interests. Jointly implemented
projects have been slow to take off as the perceived transaction
costs are high and financing is difficult to obtain when carbon
sequestration is the main benefit. Although sustainable forest
management is politically attractive, its implementation requires
local participation, the establishment of land tenure and rights,
addressing gender and equity issues, and the development of
institutional mechanisms to value scarcity; the combination of
these factors may incur high administrative costs.
Although reducing deforestation rates in the tropics may
appear to be difficult, the potential for significant reduction is
high, and there are countries, such as Brazil, India and
Thailand, where governments have adopted explicit measures
and policies to halt further deforestation (SAR II, 24.3.1.1). For
instance, in June 1991, the Brazilian government issued a
decree (No. 151) suspending the granting of fiscal incentives to
new ranching projects in Amazonian forest areas in order to
further decrease the annual rate of deforestation (which, as a
consequence of economic recession, had reduced to 1.1 Mha
for 1990–91 from 2 Mha/yr during 1978–88). The long-term
impact of this decree is not yet known, but additional measures
could be applied if necessary.
In addition to national measures, protection projects supported
by foreign governments, non-governmental organizations and
private companies are being formed to arrest deforestation and
conserve and/or sequester carbon. The Rio Bravo Preservation
and Forest Management Project in Belize, which has been












































































































Figure 3: Average annual rates of carbon conservation and sequestration per decade through implementation of forest management options
listed in Table 14: (a) by four countries or regions of the high- and mid-latitudes with the highest total sequestration rates, (b) for the three
tropical (Tr.) regions, (c) latitudinal region, and (d) forest management practice. Note that Defor = deforestation and Regen = natural and
assisted regeneration (SAR II, 24.4.2.2, Figures 24-1 and 24-2).
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Table 15: Selected examples of measures to mitigate GHG emissions through slowing deforestation and assisting regeneration.
Administrative,
Climate and Other Economic and Institutional and
Technical Options Measures Environmental Effects Social Effects Political Considerations
Forest Practices/Goals
– Reduce slash and burn
agriculture/ranching
– Increase field and satellite
monitoring









Use of Recycled and More
Efficient Wood Products
Climate Benefits
– Maintain C density, up






– Maintain C density, up
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– Potential to reduce non-
sustainably extracted
share of 1.27x109 m3 of
fuel wood
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– Maintain C density, up
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– Jointly implement pro-
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multilateral funding (also
applies to forestation and
susbtitution management
projects)
– Promote sustainable for-
est management
Regulatory Measures
– Enact forest conservation
legislation (including
bans on logging)
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– Concern regarding loss
of sovereignty on land
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– Loss of sectoral jobs, yet
sustained job creation
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– Reduces time and cost
of gathering fuel wood
Cost-effectiveness
– Cost of recycling and
more efficient use is
product specific
Macro-economic Issues
– Monetary benefit from
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– High potential for
replication
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approved under the U.S. Initiative on Joint Implementation
(US IJI), will purchase a 6 000 ha parcel of endangered forest
land to protect two adjacent tracts from conversion to farmland,
and is estimated to sequester 3 Mt C. The project participants
include Wisconsin Electric Power Company, The Nature
Conservancy, Programme for Belize, Detroit Edison Company,
Citienergy and PacfiCorp. The ECOLAND Project will pre-
serve tropical forest through purchase of 2 000–3 000 ha in the
Esquinas National Park, which is under threat of deforestation
in southwestern Costa Rica. The project partners include U.S.,
Costa Rican and Austrian institutions.
Sustaining the programmes, projects and measures that are
being implemented to slow deforestation will pose many chal-
lenges. In India, declining rural population growth rates have
helped policymakers sustain the slowed deforestation rate.
Elsewhere, however, the fundamental challenge will be to con-
tinue to find an alternative livelihood for forest dwellers or
deforesters, which may require integrating dwellers into the
urban social fabric of a nation. Deforesters may be drawn to
the forest for reasons other than land cultivation, and policy-
makers need to resort to largely non-forest policies in such 
situations. Another challenge in the protection of forests and
national parks is to increase government budgets allocated for
this purpose, which often are inadequate to provide enough
forest rangers, and fencing and other infrastructure to halt land
encroachment.
7.3.2 Forestation
Forestation means increasing the amount of carbon stored in
vegetation (living above- and below-ground), dead organic mat-
ter, and medium- and long-term wood products. This process
consists of reforestation, which means replanting trees in areas
that were recently deforested (less than 50 years), and afforesta-
tion, which means planting trees on areas which have been
without forest cover for a long time (for over 50 years). In tem-
perate regions, reforestation rates tend to be high: Canadian
reforestation during the 1980s was reported to be 720 000 ha/yr
(SAR II, 24.4.1) and U.S. rates have averaged 1 Mha/yr
between 1990 and 1995. There are significant afforestation
efforts in both tropical and temperate countries. China alone
boasts of having planted 30.7 Mha between 1949 and 1990,
while India had 17.1 Mha planted by 1989 (SAR II, 24.4; see
Box 4). The United States had 5 Mha of forest plantations by
1985, while France has more than doubled its forest area since
the beginning of the last century, from 7 to 15 Mha; by 1994,
New Zealand was managing 1.4 Mha of planted forest on sus-
tained yield principles.
Measures for forestation and agroforestry include: (i) govern-
ment investment programmes targeted towards these practices
on government-owned land; (ii) community forestry pro-
grammes that may be supported by government extension ser-
vices; and (iii) private plantations with financial and other
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Box 4.  India Example
Since 1980, the Indian government has pursued a series of policies and programmes that have stabilized its forested area
at about 64 Mha, and, as a consequence, forests are estimated to have sequestered 5 Mt C in 1990. Prior to 1980, the
government had a priority to increase food production by increasing area under food grains and to distribute land to the
landless poor. This had resulted in significant deforestation during the period 1950–1975, when about 4.3 Mha were 
converted largely to agriculture. The Indian policies and programmes to slow deforestation and assist regeneration
include:
Policies
1) Forest Conservation Act 1980: This powerful legislation has made it very difficult to convert forest land to other uses.
2) Ban on logging on state-owned primary forests in many states since the mid 1980s.
3) Significant reduction in concessions to forest-wood-based industry and promotion of a shift to farmland for wood
raw material.
Programmes
1) Conversion of 15 Mha of forests to protected areas (national parks and wildlife sanctuaries).
2) Joint Forest Management programme where degraded forest lands are revegetated jointly by the local communities
and forest department.
3) Reforestation of 18–20 Mha during 1980–95, yielding 58 Mt of industrial and fuel wood.
The policies have survived for nearly 15 years, despite a growing population and increasing demand for food and biomass.
The Indian government appears to have successfully relied on conservation legislation, reforestation programmes and
community awareness to achieve forest conservation.
Source: SAR II, Chapters 15 (Box 15.3) and 24 (Section 24.3.1.1).
incentives provided by the government (see Table 16). These
measures may be targeted towards production forests, agro-
forestry and conservation forests. Conservation forests include
those managed for soil erosion and watershed management.
Those managed primarily for carbon sequestration would have
to be located on lands with low opportunity costs, or else they
would be likely to be encroached upon for other uses.
Government subsidies may take the form of taxation arrange-
ments that do not discriminate against forestry, tax relief for
projects that meet specific objectives, and easy access to bank
financing at lower-than-market interest rates.
Government subsidies have been important for initiating and
sustaining private plantations. Since World War II, 3.15 Mha
have been afforested in France, and the 1995 French National
Programme for the mitigation of climate change calls for an
afforestation rate of 30 000 ha/yr from 1998 onward, which
will sequester 79–89 Mt C over 50 years at a cost of $70/t C.
An interesting development in India in the last few years has
been the planting of teak (Tectona grandis) by private entre-
preneurs, with capital raised in private capital markets (SAR II,
15.3.3). This programme, while occupying only a few thousand
ha at present, has the potential to expand to 4–6 Mha of India’s
66 Mha of degraded lands. The teak may be used in buildings
and furniture.
In addition to national programmes, other programmes are
being initiated and supported in some countries by foreign gov-
ernments, non-governmental organizations and private 
companies. One example is RUSAFOR, which is a US IJI-
approved afforestation project in the Saratov region of Russia
(SAR II, Box 24-2). The project proposes to plant seedlings on
500 ha of marginal agricultural land or burned forest stands.
Initial seedling survival rate is 65%. The project will serve as
an example for managing a Russian forest plantation as a 
carbon sink. Another example is the Reduced-Impact Logging
Project, for which funds were provided by New England Power
Company (SAR II, Box 24-2). This project aims to reduce by
half the damage to residual trees and soil during timber 
harvesting, thus producing less woody debris, decomposition
and release of carbon.
For government forestation and agroforestry policies to suc-
ceed, the formulation of a coordinated land-use strategy,
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Table 16: Selected examples of measures to mitigate GHG emissions via adoption of forestation and agroforestry.
Administrative,
Climate and Other Economic and Institutional and





– Up to 75 t C/ha in stand-
ing vegetation (addition-
al C conservation from
avoided harvesting of
primary forest)
– Agroforestry may have
lower C density
Other Effects
– Proper site and species




– High potential, up to




– Has soil conservation,
watershed, etc., benefits
– Proper site and species








– Provide extension ser-
vices for community or
private forestry











– Capital cost of $5–8/t C
– Other costs vary with
type of land, soil quality,
and level of government
intervention, including
infrastructure
– Benefit from timber and
non-timber product sales
– Creates jobs




– Capital cost of $5–8/t C
– High opportunity cost
of land
– Can create rural jobs 




– Requires assured mar-





ous land tenure rights
Political Factors
– Difficult to justify
politically and sustain
over the long term
a Policies and programmes for conservation forests will largely focus on government land, but also include provision of extension 
services for growing vegetation on non-government lands.
agreed-upon land tenure rights that are unambiguous and
not open to legal challenges, and markets developed enough
to ensure a sustained demand for forest products will be
essential.
7.3.3 Substitution Management
Substitution management has the greatest mitigation potential
in the long term. It views forests as renewable resources, and
focuses on the transfer of biomass carbon into products that
substitute for—or reduce the use of—fossil fuels, rather than
on increasing the carbon pool itself. Growing trees explicitly
for energy purposes has been attempted with mixed success in
Brazil, the Philippines, Ethiopia, Sweden and other countries,
but the potential for bioenergy is very large (see Section 5.2.5
for estimates of bioenergy supply potential; see also Box 5).
Over time, the displacement of fossil fuels for low energy-
intensive wood products is likely to be more effective in
reducing carbon emissions than sequestering carbon in plan-
tations on deforested and otherwise degraded lands in devel-
oping countries, and on excess cropland in OECD Annex I
countries. For example, substituting plantation wood for coal
in the generation of electricity can avoid carbon emissions by
an amount up to four times the carbon sequestered in the
plantation (see Table 17) (SAR II, 24.3.3). The generation of
biofuels and bioelectricity is far more complex, since com-
mercialization is not easy and energy pricing and marketing
barriers are yet to be overcome. Town and village biomass
energy systems have the advantage of providing employment,
reclaiming degraded land and providing associated benefits to
rural areas. Central heating systems could be converted to
biomass-based ones to supply heat and electricity in colder
climates.
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Table 17: Selected examples of measures to mitigate GHG emissions via adoption of substitution management.
Administrative,
Climate and Other Economic and Institutional and
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by an amount up to four
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– Provide tax incentives
– Institute wood industry
policy to make its prod-
ucts technically and eco-
nomically competitive
with substitutes like
steel, cement, coal, etc.







– Benefits may outweigh
costs
Macro-economic Issues
– Capital cost of planta-
tions is $5–8/t C
– Additional capital cost
of bioenergy equipment
– Low opportunity cost of
land
– Yields timber and non-
timber forest products
Equity Issues




– Benefits may outweigh
costs
Macro-economic Issues
– May reduce fuel imports
– Retooling and retraining
costs
– Loss of respective jobs
– Yields timber and non-
timber forest products
Equity Issues




– High potential for
replicability
– May need technology
R&D and transfer
Political Factors
– Energy pricing and
marketing barriers





In non-Annex I countries, the use of electricity in rural areas
is low. In many countries, such as in sub-Saharan Africa, less
than 5% of villages are electrified; in countries such as India,
even though over 80% of rural settlements are electrified, less
than a third of rural households have electricity. Appropriate
government policies are needed that will: (i) permit small-
scale independent power producers to generate and distribute
biomass electricity; (ii) transfer technologies within the coun-
try or from outside; (iii) set a remunerative price for elec-
tricity; and (iv) remove restrictions on the growing, harvesting,
transportation and processing of wood (except possibly restric-
tions on conversion of good agricultural land to an energy 
forest) (SAR II, 24.3.3).
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Box 5.  Potential for Bioenergy
for Rural Electrification
In non-Annex I countries, the majority of rural areas
(where over 70% of the population lives) is not electri-
fied, but the demand for electricity in these areas is likely
to grow. The electricity loads are low and dispersed, in
the range of 10–200 kW. Field demonstrations in south-
ern India have shown the technical and operational 
feasibility of meeting rural electricity needs through
decentralized woody biomass-based electricity systems
using producer gas generators and cattle dung-based
biogas systems. Bioenergy systems could also lead to
reclamation of degraded lands, promotion of biodiver-
sity with appropriate forestry practices and creation of
rural employment. Thus, given the low loads, dispersed
demand for electricity and local benefits, bioenergy 
systems could be considered as “no regrets” options for
meeting the growing rural electricity needs.
8.1 Introduction
Methane is emitted during the anaerobic decomposition of the
organic content of solid waste and wastewater. There are large
uncertainties in emissions estimates, due to the lack of infor-
mation about the waste management practices employed in dif-
ferent countries, the portion of organic wastes that decompose
anaerobically and the extent to which these wastes will ulti-
mately decompose.
About 20–40 Mt CH4 (110–230 Mt C), or about 10% of global
CH4 emissions from human-related sources, are emitted from
landfills and open dumps annually. Ten Annex I countries rep-
resent about two-thirds of global CH4 emissions from solid-
waste disposal, with the United States representing about 33%,
or around 10 Mt (SAR II, 22.4.4.1).
CH4 emissions from domestic and industrial wastewater dis-
posal are estimated to be 30–40 Mt (170–230 Mt C) annually,
again about 10% of total global emissions from human sources.
Industrial wastewater, principally from the food processing and
pulp and paper industries, is the major contributor, with domes-
tic and commercial wastewater making up 2 Mt CH4 annually.
Unlike solid-waste emissions, the majority of wastewater emis-
sions is believed to originate in non-Annex I countries, where
domestic sewage and industrial waste streams often are
unmanaged or maintained under anaerobic conditions without
CH4 control (SAR II, 22.4.4.1).
8.2 Technical Options for Controlling Methane Emissions
CH4 emissions may be reduced through source reduction or
through CH4 recovery and/or reduction from solid waste and
wastewater.
8.2.1 Source Reduction
The most important technical option for source reduction is
decreasing the use of materials that eventually turn up in the
waste stream. This section, however, focuses on solid waste
after it has been generated (consistent with SAR II, 22.4.4.2).
The amount of organic solid waste may be reduced by re-
cycling paper products, composting, and incineration. Paper
products make up a significant part of solid waste in Annex I
countries (e.g., 40% in the United States) and in urban centers
of upper-income non-Annex I countries (typically 5–20%). A
variety of recycling processes, differing in technical complexi-
ty, can often turn this waste into material indistinguishable
from virgin products. Composting—an aerobic process for
treating moist organic wastes that generates little or no CH4—
is most applicable to non-Annex I countries, where this type of
waste is a larger fraction of the total, although there is also
potential in Annex I countries (SAR II, 22.4.4.2). As a sec-
ondary benefit, the residue can be used as fertilizer. Reduced
land availability and the potential for energy recovery are
increasing use of waste incineration in many countries: 70% of
Japan’s solid waste is incinerated. Stack air pollutant emissions
and ash disposal are still issues, however, and characteristics
such as moisture content and composition may make incinera-
tion more difficult and costly in non-Annex I countries.
The technical complexity of these source reduction options can
vary significantly, although this does not greatly influence their
effectiveness. In non-Annex I countries, where labour is cheap
compared to equipment costs, labour-intensive recycling and
composting are common. Annex I countries typically use more
complicated, labour-saving machinery requiring higher operat-
ing skills.
Costs will depend on the type of system, the size of the facil-
ity, and local factors. Capital costs for solid-waste composting
facilities can range from $1.5 million for a 300 ton per day
(TPD) plant to $45 million for a more complex 550 TPD plant
that also composts sewage sludge; associated operating costs
can range from $10–90/t, but generally average $20–40. Yard
waste facilities are typically smaller and less complex; capital
costs range from $75 000–2 000 000 in the United States for
plants handling 2 000–60 000 t/yr of waste; operating costs are
roughly $20/t. Capital costs for incineration can be quite high,
ranging from $60–300 million for 10–80 MW facilities, or
approximately $125 000 per TPD capacity (SAR II, 22.4.4.2).
8.2.2 Methane Recovery from Solid-waste Disposal
Source reduction is applicable to future solid-waste generation.
CH4 may be recovered from existing as well as future landfills,
since organic materials in dumps and landfills continue to emit
CH4 (often called landfill gas) for 10–30 years or more.
Frequently, more than half of the CH4 can be recovered and
used for heat or electricity generation, a practice already com-
mon in many countries (SAR II, 22.4.4.2). Landfill gas also can
be purified and injected into a natural gas pipeline or distribu-
tion system; there are several such projects in the United States.
In Minas Gerais, Brazil, purified landfill gas has been used to
provide power for a fleet of garbage trucks and taxicabs.
Costs of recovering CH4 from solid-waste disposal facilities
are highly dependent on technology and site characteristics.
For a landfill with 1 million tons of waste (serving a population
8.  SOLID WASTE AND WASTEWATER DISPOSAL21
21This section is based on SAR II, Chapter 22, Mitigation Options for
Human Settlements (Lead Authors: M. Levine, H. Akbari, J. Busch,
G. Dutt, K. Hogan, P. Komor, S. Meyers, H. Tsuchiya, G. Henderson,
L. Price, K. Smith and Lang Siwei) and Chapter 23, Agricultural
Options for Mitigation of Greenhouse Gas Emissions (Lead Authors:
V. Cole, C. Cerri, K. Minami, A. Mosier, N. Rosenberg, D.
Sauerbeck, J. Dumanski, J. Duxbury, J. Freney, R. Gupta, O.
Heinemeyer, T. Kolchugina, J. Lee, K. Paustian, D. Powlson, N.
Sampson, H. Tiessen, M. van Noordwijk and Q. Zhao).
of about 50 000–100 000), collection and flare capital costs
will be approximately $630 000, increasing to $3.6 million for
a 10 million-ton landfill. Annual operating costs could range
from less than $100 000 to more than $200 000. Energy recov-
ery capital costs (including gas treatment) can range from
$1 000–1 300 per net kW. Direct use is typically less expen-
sive, with pipeline construction representing the principal cost.
Overall, typical electric generation costs for a complete system
(gas collection and energy recovery) range from 4–7¢/kWh.
These costs are based on equipment and labor costs in the
United States, and may vary over a wider range in other coun-
tries. Also, in many countries, some landfills and other solid-
waste disposal sites already collect their CH4 and either vent or
flare it (often for safety reasons). For these sites, the cost of
electric generation would be lower than stated above (SAR II,
22.4.4.2; SAR III, 9.4.1).
8.2.3 Methane Recovery and/or Reduction from Wastewater
CH4 emissions can be virtually eliminated if wastewater and
sludge are stored and treated under aerobic conditions. Options
for preventing CH4 production during wastewater treatment
and sludge disposal include aerobic primary and secondary
treatment and land treatment. Alternatively, wastewater can be
treated under anaerobic conditions and the generated CH4 can
be captured and used as an energy source to heat the waste-
water or sludge digestion tank. If additional CH4 is available, it
can be used as fuel or to generate electricity. As a last resort,
the gas may be flared, which converts the CH4 to CO2, with a
much lower global warming potential.
Wastewater treatment costs are highly dependent on the tech-
nological approach employed and site-specific conditions.
Capital costs of aerobic primary treatment can range from
$0.15–3 million for construction, assuming a range of 0.5–10
million gallons (2 000–40 000 m3) of wastewater flow per
day; annual operation and maintenance costs are estimated to
range from $20 000–500 000 for these volumes. Costs of aer-
obic secondary treatment can be moderately high because of
the energy and equipment requirements, and depend to a great
extent on the daily volume of wastewater flow into the facility.
Costs can range up to $10 million depending upon the tech-
nology selected and volume requirements, with the high-end
handling approximately 100 million gallons (0.4 x 106 m3) per
day. Finally, costs for anaerobic digestors of wastewater and
flaring or utilization can range from $0.1–3 million for con-
struction and $10 000–100 000 for operation and mainte-
nance, assuming wastewater flows of 0.1–100 million gallons
(400 to 0.4 x 106 m3) per day (SAR II, 22.4.4.2).
High-rate anaerobic processes for the treatment of liquid efflu-
ents with high organic content (e.g., sewage, food processing
wastes) can help reduce uncontrolled CH4 emissions and are
particularly suited to the warmer climates of most developing
countries. Both Brazil and India, for example, have developed
extensive and successful infrastructure for these technologies,
which have lower hydraulic retention times than aerobic
processes and therefore are much smaller and cheaper to build.
More importantly, unlike aerobic processes, no aeration is
involved and there is little electricity consumption.
For upflow anaerobic sludge blanket reactors of 4 000–10 000 m3
capacity (capable of handling a chemical oxygen demand of
20–30 kg/m3/day), capital costs have been estimated to be in
the range of $1–3.5 million, with annual operating costs in the
range of $1–2.7 million. At these costs, the total CH4 produc-
tion cost would fall in the range of $0.45–1.05/GJ, with values
at the upper end for Europe and at the lower end for Brazil.
Using these estimates, all of the costs would be recovered, as
CH4 would be produced at a price lower than that of natural gas
almost anywhere in the world (SAR II, 22.4.4.2).
8.3 Measures for Methane Reduction and Recovery
In many countries, future actions that reduce CH4 emissions
from solid-waste disposal sites and wastewater treatment facil-
ities are likely to be undertaken for environmental and public
health reasons; CH4 reductions will be seen as a secondary ben-
efit of these actions. In spite of the benefits, however, a number
of barriers prevents CH4 recovery and source reduction efforts
described above from tapping more than a small portion of the
potential, especially in non-Annex I countries. These barriers
include the following (SAR II, 22.5.3):
• There is a lack of awareness of relative costs and effec-
tiveness of alternative technical options.
• While recently developed anaerobic processes are less
expensive than traditional aerobic wastewater treatment,
there is less experience available.
• It is less economical to recover CH4 from smaller dumps
and landfills.
• Many countries and regions where natural gas is not used
extensively and equipment may not be readily available
[e.g., Mexico City, New Delhi, Port-au-Prince (Haiti), and
much of sub-Saharan Africa] have limited infrastructure
and experience for CH4 use.
• The existing waste disposal “system” may be an open
dump or an effluent stream with no treatment, therefore no
capital or operating expenses. The barriers previously
noted, combined with the unhygienic conditions of the
proposed site, may make it difficult to attract investment
capital for CH4 recovery and use.
• Different groups are generally responsible for energy gener-
ation, fertilizer supply and waste management, and CH4
recovery and use can introduce new actors into the waste
disposal process, potentially disturbing the current balance
of economic and political power in the community (e.g.,
failure to reach an agreement has delayed the start-up of a
landfill gas recovery demonstration project funded by the
Global Environment Facility in Lahore, Pakistan). This
problem applies to both Annex I and non-Annex I countries.
For the successful implementation of CH4 control projects, these
barriers need to be addressed through appropriate measures. In
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Table 18: Selected examples of measures to reduce GHG emissions from solid waste disposal and wastewater treatment facilities.
Administrative,
Climate and Other Economic and Institutional and











– Significant CH4 reduc-




– For CH4 recovery pro-jects and incineration,
associated CO2 reduc-
tions through fossil fuel
displacement
Other Effects








– May have smaller bene-






– Local air quality and
public health benefits as
above
Climate Benefits
– Can deliver large, definite




– Local air quality and
public health benefits as
above
Climate Benefits




– Local air quality and




– Focus on strengthening




















– Provision of market
incentives for desired
waste management prac-
tices or direct CH4
recovery activities
Cost-effectiveness




– Significant quality of
life improvements for
current and future 
generations
Cost-effectiveness
– Lower cost than regula-
tory measures
– Promotes profitable pro-
jects
Macro-economic Issues





– Higher cost,depending on
stringency of regulation
Macro-economic Issues
– Higher social costs
Equity Issues
– As above, but higher
social costs for larger
emission reductions
Cost-effectiveness
– Higher cost, depending
on incentive level
Macro-economic Issues






– Difficult to measure
results




– Opposition from some
institutions
















– Certainty in reductions
– Requires institutional
infrastructure









– Less certainty in 
reductions
– Requires inst. support
– Should be customized





general, the measures are not specific to technology options
(see Table 18). The following measures are arranged in the
sequence that they would need to be invoked in a country with
little or no current waste management infrastructure (more
advanced countries and regions would start at a later step):




8.3.1 Institution Building and Technical Assistance Policies
The prior existence of an adequate waste management infra-
structure, including a legal framework, is a prerequisite to any
measure to control CH4. Where such infrastructure is weak or
missing, it needs to be strengthened either within countries
(e.g., from more developed areas to less developed ones) or
internationally through multilateral or bilateral assistance. For
instance, the Interamerican Development Bank gives priority to
building waste management infrastructure as part of its devel-
opmental assistance programmes. Support for institution build-
ing may include both financial and technical assistance.
Technical assistance and financing are available from the U.S.
Country Studies Program, joint implementation initiatives22
and the Global Environment Facility.
8.3.2 Voluntary Agreements
Voluntary agreements also can be used to overcome the bar-
riers to waste management projects. In the United States, a
landfill outreach programme encourages state agencies (who
permit projects) and utilities (who frequently purchase landfill
energy) to voluntarily promote and participate in landfill pro-
jects. This type of programme can be quite low-cost and flexi-
ble in targeting key barriers and providing effective informa-
tion and assistance to overcome them. The U.S. programme,
for example, provides a variety of tools, including detailed
descriptions of candidate project sites, and software to assess
economic and technical potential.
8.3.3 Regulatory Measures
A major regulatory measure to reduce the quantity of solid
waste through recycling is requiring separation at source (e.g.,
into paper, glass, metal and plastics). Regulations also can
include setting standards for recycled paper use or recycled
material content. In the United States, for example, many states
have recycling goals, often included in mandatory pro-
grammes. For existing dumps and landfills, regulatory mea-
sures can range from the mandatory recovery and combustion
of CH4 to actions aimed at clarifying existing regulations and
ensuring that they are supportive of CH4 recovery. The United
States recently enacted a mandatory regulation to require CH4
recovery and combustion at the largest landfills, which will
result in annual CH4 reductions of about 60% (or ~6 Mt CH4 in
2000) (SAR II, 22.4.4.2).
8.3.4 Market-based Programmes
Once an appropriate infrastructure as well as technical aware-
ness exists, market-based programmes may be helpful to reduce
perceptions of risk or high up-front capital costs. Domestic
actions can include providing tax credits or low-cost financing.
In the United States, for example, landfill gas energy recovery
projects are eligible for an “unconventional gas” tax credit worth
approximately 1¢/kWh of electricity generated. International
financial support also may be provided through mechanisms
such as the Global Environment Facility or other similar funds.
The Global Environment Facility currently is funding a landfill
gas-to-energy project in Pakistan, which should demonstrate the
potential of this technology for CH4 reduction throughout the
region.
8.4 Comparison of Alternative Measures and Policies
Most of the technical options for CH4 emissions reduction are
independent of each other, and not mutually exclusive.
Recycling of some solid waste and composting of others can
occur simultaneously. The remainder may be placed in landfills
where land disposal costs are low, or incinerated. CH4 from
landfills may be used for energy where possible, and flared if
recovery costs are not competitive with alternative energy
sources. Overall, 30–50% reductions in CH4 emissions are eco-
nomically feasible (SAR II, 22.4.4.2; SAR III, 9.4.1). Using the
range of emissions estimates in the IS92 scenarios, this implies
equivalent carbon reductions of about 55–140 Mt in 2010,
85–170 Mt in 2020, and 110–230 Mt in 2050.
Wastewater CH4 removal options involve a choice between tra-
ditional aerobic treatment and recently improved anaerobic
processes. The latter appears to have a cost advantage (both
capital and operating costs).
The associated environmental impacts of CH4 reduction alter-
natives are generally positive. Indeed, CH4 reduction may be
a secondary benefit of processes that reduce water and air
pollution and improve health. Difficulties in quantifying
these primary economic benefits make it difficult to estimate
the cost-effectiveness of CH4 reduction. For solid wastes,
costs for recycling are expected to be low, for composting
medium (as a consequence of land disposal costs), and for
incineration relatively high (as a consequence of high invest-
ment and operational costs); the feasibility of specific appli-
cations depends on local circumstances. Costs for CH4 recov-
ery from landfills are expected to be low to medium. Aerobic
treatment of wastewater is expected to have medium to high
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costs, while anaerobic treatment costs will be in the low to
medium range.
Macro-economic consequences also are generally favourable.
The waste stream is a source of raw material for the production
of recycled products, compost or energy recovery—contribut-
ing to economic production and creating jobs, while providing
health and air pollution benefits that can make major contribu-
tions to development for lower-income countries. Acquiring
knowledge in some technologies may imply foreign exchange
costs for those non-Annex I countries that do not have them.
For this reason, technical assistance is an important measure
from a developmental and environmental perspective for
lower-income non-Annex I countries.
Equity considerations are also generally favourable, within and
across countries, as well as across generations. The poor suffer
more the consequences of improper waste management, and are
also more likely to benefit from the jobs created. Future genera-
tions will benefit insofar as today’s waste stream is a considered
a resource, reducing the consumption of primary raw materials.
As with the technical options, the measures are not mutually
exclusive. The choices involved depend on the circumstances
within a given region or country. Institution building and tech-
nical assistance may be starting points for non-Annex I coun-
tries, while voluntary and regulatory initiatives may be more
appropriate for Annex I countries. In countries with well-devel-
oped waste management infrastructures, opposition to regula-
tory measures could be expected from the affected industry,
although U.S. experience indicates that this opposition can be
surmounted. Regulatory programmes may be hardest to imple-
ment successfully in most countries, while market-based pro-
grammes will depend both on national priority given to waste
management and on international financing sources available.
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9.1 Introduction
This section describes measures to control GHG emissions from
more than one sector. The measures discussed include subsidies,
taxes, tradable quotas and permits, and joint implementation.24
Climate change policy must be considered in the context of
existing economies. In the real world, climate change is only
one of many externalities; competition is not perfect; informa-
tion and markets are not complete; and distorting taxes and
transfers are widespread. These observations are important
because many analyses of climate change policy assume that
the externality of climate change is the only distortion that
exists. The conclusions of such analyses may be misleading or
incorrect (SAR III, 11.3).
This section first discusses national-level economic instru-
ments, which are relevant when a country either acts unilater-
ally to reduce its GHG emissions or joins other countries in an
international agreement to do so. These instruments include
subsidies, taxes and tradable permits. Next, international-level
economic instruments—international tax agreements, tradable
emission quotas and joint implementation—are discussed.25
9.2 National-level Economic Instruments
9.2.1 Subsidies and Subsidy Elimination
An activity can be subsidized in many ways. A government may
transfer funds to an enterprise, provide preferential tax treat-
ment, supply commodities at below market prices, or restrict
competing products to assist a particular activity. Many coun-
tries currently subsidize some activities that emit GHGs (e.g.,
subsidies that reduce the prices of fossil fuels). Eliminating per-
manent subsidies that encourage fossil fuel use would reduce
GHG emissions and increase real incomes in the long run.
On the other hand, temporary subsidies could be offered for
particular activities aimed at limiting GHG emissions. Such
subsidies might be directed at fostering adoption of emission
abatement technologies, creating additional sinks, or stimulat-
ing development of improved GHG mitigation technologies.
Eliminating subsidies changes the incomes of affected groups.
Compensation for groups whose incomes are adversely affected
may need to be considered. In the case of financial subsidies,
the net effect depends on how the revenues are redistributed.
Raising distortionary taxes to finance the subsidies increases
the cost of this option (SAR III, 11.3.1.1).
9.2.2 Domestic Taxes26 (SAR III, 11.5.1)
Under an emission tax system, sources that produce GHG emis-
sions must pay a tax per unit of emissions.27 To ensure that the
cost of a given emission abatement is minimized, all emissions
should be taxed at the same rate per unit of contribution to climate
change. The tax rate needed to achieve a particular emission tar-
get must be found by trial and error over a number of years.
A tax on the carbon content of fossil fuels—a carbon tax—is
generally proposed in lieu of a tax on the CO2 emissions from
fossil fuel use, since it has a similar impact and is much sim-
pler to administer. A CO2 emissions tax would require every
source that uses fossil fuels to monitor its emissions and to pay
the corresponding taxes. A carbon tax would affect the same
emissions, but would involve only the fuel producers or dis-
tributors, most of which already are involved in the collection
of other energy-related taxes. In practice, existing excises on
energy products complicate the design of a carbon tax that
changes prices in proportion to CO2 emissions.
A carbon tax is a more efficient instrument for reducing energy-
related CO2 emissions than are taxes levied on some other
bases, such as the energy content of fuels or the value of 
energy products (ad valorem energy tax). Model simulations
for the United States indicate that for an equivalent reduction
in emissions, an energy tax would cost 20–40% more than a
carbon tax, and an ad valorem tax would be two to three times
more costly. This is because an energy tax raises the price of all
forms of energy, whether or not they contribute to CO2 emis-
sions, whereas a carbon tax changes relative costs, and so pro-
vides incentives for fuel switching.
Analysts agree that actions to respond to climate change should
include all GHGs (taking into consideration their heat-trapping
potentials and atmospheric lifetimes) and carbon sinks. A carbon
tax on fossil fuels (or a tax on fossil fuel CO2 emissions) could
therefore be complemented by emissions taxes on non-energy
sources of CO2, emissions taxes on other GHGs, and tax rebates
or subsidies for carbon sequestration. The administrative chal-
lenges and difficulties of monitoring emissions (sequestration)
by these diverse sources may make the use of taxes (rebates/sub-
sidies) impractical in some or all of these situations.
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23This section is based on SAR III, Chapter 11, An Economic
Assessment of Policy Instruments for Combatting Climate Change
(Lead Authors: B.S. Fisher, S. Barrett, P. Bohm, M. Kuroda, J.K.E.
Mubazi, A. Shah and R.N. Stavins).
24The term “tradable quota” is used to describe internationally traded
emission allowances, while “tradable permit” refers to domestic
trading schemes. Chapter 11 of SAR III uses the term “joint imple-
mentation” to include “activities implemented jointly” and that
usage is continued here.
25Technology transfer is not included since it is the subject of a
Special Report.
26In most economic systems, a tax will be shifted, at least in part, to
customers or to suppliers of capital, labour and other inputs in
unpredictable ways.
27Strictly speaking, the term “emission charge” or “fee” would be more
appropriate, because this is a payment for a right to emit; however,
the term “emission tax” is adopted because it is so widely used.
9.2.3 Tradable Permits28 (SAR III, 11.5.2)
A country committed to limiting its GHG emissions could
implement such a policy using tradable permits for energy-
related CO2 emissions, non-energy sources of CO2, emissions
of other GHGs, and carbon sequestration. Energy-related CO2
emissions could be controlled by a system of tradable permits
for the carbon content of fossil fuels consumed. Under such a
scheme, regulated sources are given (or must buy) permits for
the carbon content of the fossil fuel. Tradable permits could
also be applied to actual energy-related CO2 emissions.29
Participants are free to sell surplus permits or to buy permits to
achieve regulatory compliance. Downstream of the permit sys-
tem, the effect is comparable to that of a carbon tax.
In principle, tradable permit systems could also be used to reg-
ulate non-energy CO2 emissions, emissions of other GHGs, and
carbon sequestration. Permits earned for carbon sequestration
could be sold to sources that need permits for their emissions.
The difficulties of monitoring emissions (sequestration) may
make the use of tradable permits impractical in some or all of
these situations. Considerations such as the number of partici-
pants, the share of total emissions covered, industry structure,
and enforcement will influence the choice among alternative
trading system designs.
Regardless of the specific design, a number of factors can
adversely affect the performance of emissions trading sys-
tems, including situations where a few participants can influ-
ence the permit market or where a few firms can influence the
output market, transaction costs, non-profit maximizing
behavior, the pre-existing regulatory environment, and the
degree of monitoring and enforcement required. Some of
these factors also affect the performance of other policies and
measures.
A government may choose one of two main ways to distribute
permits to participating sources. Sources could be allocated
permits gratis based on an agreed allocation rule, such as emis-
sions during some historical period, or the government could
sell the permits at auction, although the latter approach has
never yet been adopted. Combinations of these two approaches
also may be feasible.
These approaches differ primarily in two respects. First, allo-
cating permits gratis transfers wealth to the regulated sources,
while selling permits at auction transfers this wealth to the gov-
ernment. Second, allocating permits gratis may increase the
wealth of existing sources, thus reducing the rate of entry of
new firms and slowing technological change, although mecha-
nisms can be designed to reduce such potential impacts.
Allowing permits to be banked for use at a later date is impor-
tant for both the efficiency and the political acceptability of a
tradable permit scheme. Without a banking option, permit-
liable sources would be confronted with greater end-of-period
permit price uncertainty. Banking also facilitates adjustments
to lower emission caps.
Both taxes and tradable permits tend to equate the marginal
cost of emissions abatement for all affected sources. The dif-
ference is that the tax is set by the government, and the level of
emissions is determined by the responses of the affected
sources; whereas in a tradable permit system, the government
determines the overall level of emissions, and permit prices are
determined by the market.
9.2.4 Revenue Recycling and Tax Substitution
(SAR III, 11.3.2)
Auctioned permits have the same distributional implications as a
carbon tax—leading to the same emissions level when auction
and tax revenues are not redistributed to permit buyers/taxpayers,
respectively. At the other extreme, permits distributed gratis
have the same distributional implications as a carbon tax, if the
tax revenue is redistributed according to the rule used for the
distribution of the permits. Parties other than regulated sources
may be affected by GHG limitation actions and may need to be
compensated. Revenue from a carbon tax or sale of permits
could be used for this purpose.
The effect of a carbon tax, or an equivalent tradable permit sys-
tem, on an economy will depend in part on what is done with
the net government revenue, if any. There is widespread agree-
ment that this revenue can be used to reduce pre-existing dis-
tortionary taxes, hence significantly lower the costs of emis-
sion reduction. Some researchers have suggested that it may be
possible to increase national income by using the revenue to
replace or reduce more distortionary existing taxes. However,
others argue that this is an argument for general reform of the
tax system rather than for the introduction of a carbon tax (or a
corresponding tradable permit system) per se.
9.3 International-level Economic Instruments
International cooperation will be required to meet a global
emission target at least cost. Economic instruments such as
international taxes, harmonized domestic taxes, tradable quotas
and joint implementation can help achieve a global target, but
require—or would benefit from—international cooperation.
9.3.1 International Taxes and Harmonized Domestic Taxes
(SAR III, 11.5.3)
At the international level, a GHG emissions tax could be imple-
mented in one of two ways. Countries could agree to create an
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29As in the case of a carbon tax, it is impractical to include mobile
and other small sources in a trading system based on actual emis-
sions. This trading system (or tax) based on the carbon content of
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international agency that would impose a GHG emissions tax
on participating countries. Alternatively, countries could agree
that each would levy comparable GHG emissions taxes domes-
tically. The agreement to create an international GHG emissions
tax agency would need to specify both the tax rate(s) and a for-
mula for distributing the revenues from the tax.30
A harmonized tax requires that each country impose the same
tax rate. Due to differences in resource endowments, consump-
tion patterns, climate change impacts and other factors, this tax
rate may not be the most appropriate from a national perspec-
tive, thus side-payments are likely to be required to secure
broad participation. Under a harmonized tax system, the reallo-
cation of tax revenues could involve lump-sum payments;
whereas under the international tax system, the agreement could
specify what shares of the international tax revenues would go
to each participating country. In principle, international trans-
fers could be negotiated to yield the same international distrib-
ution of the tax in either case. A GHG emissions tax imposed by
an international agency would impinge on national sovereignty
and would therefore be difficult to negotiate.
A uniform tax rate for all countries is required for reasons of
cost-effectiveness but, given different existing energy tax
regimes in participating countries, this could become very
complex.
9.3.2 Tradable Quotas31 (SAR III, 11.5.4)
Countries could negotiate national limits on emissions of
GHGs—either voluntary or legally binding targets/quotas—to
be achieved by specific dates. These could be negotiated for a
single gas, for a group of gases, or as an aggregate CO2 equiv-
alent. A more comprehensive approach allows more flexibility
and larger cost savings.
Given differences in marginal emission control costs among
countries, allowing international trade of emission quota would
reduce the cost of achieving compliance with national emission
limits regardless of the initial allocation. Each country would
be expected either to reduce its emissions, or to purchase quota
from other countries so that the sum of these two was not more
than its national emission limit.
The national quota allocations can be used to address distribu-
tional issues and to draw countries into the agreement. Most
proposals for allocating emission quota among countries envis-
age proportionately higher reductions in national emissions by
industrialized countries and slower rates of emission growth by
developing countries. Thus, international negotiations will seek
quota allocations that do not harm Annex I countries with
economies in transition and non-Annex I countries, and that
distribute the burden equitably among Annex I countries.
An international tradable quota system presupposes the exis-
tence of one or more markets where quota can be traded. For a
trading scheme to be effective in controlling emissions, it is
clear that there must be a reasonable probability of detecting and
penalizing those responsible for unauthorized emissions. This,
however, does not distinguish a tradable quota system from any
other international agreement on emissions reductions.
Under an international tradable quota system, participating
countries could use whatever domestic policies they preferred to
achieve compliance. For example, a country might employ trad-
able permits, a domestic tax or regulations. Where a domestic
tradable permit system exists, the government could allow per-
mit holders to trade directly on the international market. If a
domestic carbon tax is used, the efficient tax rate for the coming
period would be the (unknown) quota price for that period.
There is some experience with the use of tradable permit
schemes within countries, whereas international tradable quota
systems so far have been applied only on a small scale (e.g., the
international CFC production quota trade and the CFC con-
sumption quota trade within the European Union).
Under an international tax agreement, the tax rate is known but
the effect on emissions is uncertain and the international trans-
fer payments may or may not be known, depending on how they
are defined in the agreement. Except for the effects of carbon
leakage, a tradable quota system has a known effect on emis-
sions, but quota prices and the distributional effects of the quota
trade are uncertain, so protection against unfavorable price
movements may need to be provided.32 This means that the ben-
efits of known effects on emissions in a tradable quota system
must be bought at the price of some distributional uncertainty.
9.3.3 Joint Implementation (SAR III, 11.5.5)
Joint implementation, provided for by Article 4.2(a) of the
FCCC, involves cooperation between countries to meet the
goals of the Convention. One country (or firm in that country)
funds emission reduction actions in a second country that are
additional to the reductions that would otherwise occur.
Following the Berlin meeting (COP 1, March–April 1995),
pilot projects now are being undertaken on activities imple-
mented jointly by a number of countries.
The potential economic merits and demerits of joint imple-
mentation proposals have been widely discussed. In essence,
there are three possible roles for joint implementation: (i) as a
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subsidized) at the same rate in all countries. As discussed earlier, it
may not be practical to design a tax (rebate) that covers all of the
sources (sinks).
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32If only a limited set of countries is involved, carbon leakage must
be taken into account in both the tax and tradable quota cases.
cost-effective option for developed countries to fund GHG
emission reduction projects in other countries, while meeting
local development needs; (ii) as the first step toward estab-
lishing an international tradable quota system for GHGs
among parties that have made a firm commitment to limit their
emissions; and (iii) as a means for exploring when it is cost-
effective to bring new emission sources or sinks into an exist-
ing international GHG management system.
The potential driving force behind joint implementation is that
both buyer and seller countries benefit from the trade.
However, for case (i) in particular, monitoring and high trans-
actions costs could become problems in using joint implemen-
tation as a means of achieving significant cost-effective reduc-
tions of GHG emissions. In addition, according to present
international agreements, investors in joint implementation
projects cannot credit the emission reductions from these pro-
jects against national commitments.
9.3.4 Policies to Reduce Free Riding
and Emission Leakage
Can a unilateral policy by one country alone or by a group of
countries prove effective in abating global GHG emissions?
The answer depends on how the other countries respond to the
policies adopted by the cooperating countries. These responses
in turn reflect two phenomena: “leakage” and “free riding.”
Free riding arises when countries that benefit from global
abatement do not bear their share of the costs of its provision.
Leakage arises when abatement actions by the cooperating
countries cause emissions in other countries to increase.
9.3.4.1 Policies to Reduce Free Riding
As long as participation in an international greenhouse man-
agement policy is voluntary, countries will have incentives to
free ride. None of the existing empirical models has been used
to estimate the magnitude of potential free riding; however,
some insights into the gains from full cooperation have been
explored.
The stability of the group of countries acting to control GHGs
will depend on the ability of the cooperating countries to 
punish countries that might withdraw and to reward countries
that might join. To be effective, such punishments and rewards
must be both substantial and credible. One example of such a
punishment is the threat of a ban on trade of carbon-based fuels
and products with non-cooperating countries, once a threshold
number of countries agrees to participate (SAR III, 11.6.4.1).
9.3.4.2 Policies to Reduce Leakage
Emission leakage is the net result of a number of effects, some
of which counteract each other. First, the implementation of a
carbon abatement policy by a country or group of cooperating
countries could shift production of carbon-intensive goods
toward other countries, thus increasing their emissions.
Second, the mitigation actions would lower world demand for
carbon-intensive fuels and reduce the world price for such
fuels—hence increase the use of (thus the emissions from)
these fuels in non-participating countries. Third, the abatement
actions could affect incomes in cooperating countries and so
reduce imports from other countries which could, in turn,
lower their income and emissions. Fourth, investment flows
and exchange rates also could be affected, with unpredictable
impacts on emissions.
Leakage is measured in terms of net GHG emissions relative to
the emissions reduction in cooperating countries; estimates
vary widely (SAR III, 11.6.4.2).
What can be done to reduce emission leakage? Basic trade 
theory suggests that (treating the cooperating countries as a
single entity and the rest of the world as another single entity)
a tariff should be imposed on imports of carbon-intensive prod-
ucts, or their exports should be subsidized, depending on
whether the cooperating countries are net importers or net
exporters before the mitigation actions are implemented.
Alternatively, a production subsidy (tax) and consumption tax
(subsidy) could be implemented in the cooperating countries
instead of the import tariff (export subsidy).33
Application of border tax adjustments, such as import tariffs or
export subsidies, while theoretically appropriate for reducing
leakage, pose a number of practical problems. Determining the
emissions associated with the manufacture of a particular prod-
uct, hence the border tax adjustment, is likely to be very complex
because of differences in the fuel mix and production techniques
used in different regions. Furthermore, the appropriate border
tax adjustments may not be compatible with current multilateral
trading rules. Likewise, implementing production and consump-
tion subsidies and taxes at the appropriate level in all cooperat-
ing countries, given the differences in their existing tax systems,
is likely to prove practically impossible (SAR III, 11.6.4.3).
9.4 Assessment of Economic Instruments
This section evaluates economic instruments against the crite-
ria discussed in the Introduction (see Table 19). This evaluation
focuses on taxes and tradable permits/quotas in both the domes-
tic and international context. First, it is important to recognize
that countries differ in their institutional structures, economic
structures, and existing policy structures and that the choice of
policy instruments will be made in a political environment. As
a result, the ability to enforce the different instruments is likely
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33World Trade Organization rules allow for border tax adjustments
where the taxed or controlled inputs are physically incorporated in
the final product. However, it is not clear if this rule applies to
GHG emissions associated with the manufacture of a good, or
whether it would be feasible in practice to implement such a system
of border tax adjustments.
to vary across nations. Second, adoption of any international
instruments will have some impact on the distribution of
wealth among countries, as will domestic instruments on the
distribution of wealth within them. All instruments can, and
probably will have to, be connected with compensatory mea-
sures such as side-payments or specific permit/quota alloca-
tions; no differences arise among instruments in this regard.
9.4.1 Environmental Results
Tradable permit/quota systems can be designed to achieve
national/international GHG emission targets. Achieving a spec-
ified emission target with a carbon/emissions tax requires trial
and error adjustment of the tax rate. Both tax and tradable per-
mit/quota systems assume effective monitoring and enforce-
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Table 19: Selected examples of economic instruments to mitigate GHG emissions.
Administrative,
Climate and Other Economic and Institutional and







– Depends on extent of existing
subsidies and degree of subsidy
reduction
– Can be designed to achieve a
specified national/international
emission target
– Can be designed to achieve a
specified national/international
emission target
– Can be designed to achieve a
specified national/international
emission target
– Can be designed to achieve a
specified national/international
emission target
– Can reduce emissions from levels
that would otherwise occur
– Increases real incomes in the long
run
– Changes distribution of income;
effect depends on how revenues
are redistributed
– Encourages implementation of
most cost-effective mitigation
measures
– Tax rate determined through trial
and error
– Carbon tax regressive, but effect
depends on how the tax revenue is
recycled
– Encourages implementation of the
most cost-effective mitigation
measures
– Market price for permits and cost
of measures implemented is
uncertain
– Distributional effects depend on
how permits are allocated and the
disposition of revenue, if any,
from the sale of permits
– Encourages implementation of
most cost-effective mitigation
measures
– Tax rate determined through trial
and error
– Equity across countries depends on
the transfer payments negotiated
– Encourages implementation of
most cost-effective mitigation
measures
– Market price for quotas and cost
of measures implemented is
uncertain
– Equity across countries depends
on the quota allocations
– Transfers resources and technolo-
gies to host countries
– Could be linked to existing 
energy tax collection systems
– Requires a competitive permit
market
– Administrative costs depend on
the design of the system
– Futures contracts for permits can
spread the risks of price fluctua-
tions
– Little information on implemen-
tation available
– Domestic policies could reduce
the effectiveness of the tax
– Requires a competitive quota
market
– Little information on implemen-
tation available
– Allows flexibility in the choice
of domestic policy
– Administrative costs can be rela-
tively high
– Projects can be launched rela-
tively quickly
ment and, if the international agreement is non-global, insignif-
icant carbon leakage.
9.4.2 Economic and Social Effects (SAR III, 11.5.6)
Conceptually, both taxes and tradable permit/quota systems
encourage implementation of the most cost-effective reduction
measures. To achieve a given emissions target, the tax and the
market price for permits/quotas should be the same, assuming
that both apply to the same sources; that transactions costs are
comparable; and that trades are not arbitrarily restricted.
Tradable permits can be allocated free of charge or sold at auc-
tion. Similarly, tax revenue can be redistributed to sources that
would otherwise receive permits gratis, or can remain with the
government. The way in which the net revenue from a carbon
tax or the sale of permits is recycled can have significant
macro-economic effects.
There is an extensive literature on the distributional impacts of
carbon taxes, emission taxes, gasoline taxes and energy taxes
in Annex I countries. These taxes are usually portrayed as
regressive, because expenditures on fossil fuel consumption as
a proportion of current annual personal income tend to fall as
incomes rise. However, recent studies using U.S. and European
data show that carbon taxes are considerably less regressive
relative to lifetime income or annual consumption expenditures
than to annual income.
Very few studies of the distributional effects of tradable permit
systems are available. If the permits are sold, then the distribu-
tional implications are similar to those of an equivalent tax. If
permits are allocated gratis, the initial allocation determines
the distributional impacts.
Equity across countries is determined by the quota allocations
in the case of a tradable quota system, the revenue sharing
agreement negotiated for an international tax, or the transfer
payments negotiated as part of a harmonized domestic carbon
tax system. Reaching agreement on equitable quota allocations
or revenue sharing arrangements should take account of the
fact that mitigation actions by any country have economic
impacts on other countries.
9.4.3 Administrative, Institutional and Political Issues
(SAR III, 11.6.2, 11.6.3)
Administrative and transaction costs can vary widely for both
taxes and tradable permits. Proper design can reduce these costs
significantly. In some countries, it has proven to be possible to
implement a carbon tax at relatively low cost by relying heavily on
existing energy tax collection systems; in other countries, it has
proven to be politically difficult to introduce any energy-related
taxes. Trading systems that use government-issued permits (such
as the sulfur dioxide allowance trading system in the U.S.) have
lower transactions costs than do systems that use self-defined
credits. Permits appear to have a distinct advantage in creating the
basis for a futures market that could enable more efficient spread-
ing of the risks associated with changing emissions targets. For a
tradable permit system to work effectively, relatively competitive
conditions must exist in the permit (and product) market. Should
a firm control a significant share of the total number of permits, it
might attempt to manipulate permit prices to improve its position
in the permit or product market (e.g., by withholding permits, thus
forcing others to cut production or keeping new entrants out).
These risks can be reduced by government auctioning of permits
and other mechanisms. Little information is available on the
administrative costs for monitoring, enforcement and manage-
ment of an international tax system, internationally harmonized
taxes or a tradable quota system.
9.5 Comparing Tradable Permit/Quota and Tax Systems
(SAR III, 11.7.2, 11.7.3)
Both taxes and tradable permits impose costs on industry and
consumers. Sources will experience financial outlays, either
through expenditures on emission controls or through cash
payments to buy permits or pay taxes.34 In either case, they will
seek to minimize these costs through investment in new facili-
ties and equipment.
Under a GHG tax, the tax rate is known but the effect on emis-
sions is uncertain, and the distributional effects may or may not
be known. A tradable permit system has a known effect on
emissions, but permit prices and the distributional effects
through trade are uncertain. A system of harmonized domestic
taxes could involve an agreement about compensatory interna-
tional financial transfers, as well as about adjustments required
to compensate for differences in pre-existing tax structures. To
be effective, a system of harmonized domestic taxes also
requires that participants not be allowed to implement policies
that indirectly increase GHG emissions.
A tradable quota scheme allows each participant to decide what
domestic policy to use. The initial allocation of quota among
countries addresses distributional considerations, but the exact
distributional implications cannot be known beforehand, since
the quota price will only be known after trading begins. Under
a tradable quota scheme, the resulting global emissions will be
known with certainty for a global agreement and, net of carbon
leakage, for a non-global agreement.
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34An exception, of course, is when a source has received enough
permits gratis to cover its emissions. Even in this case, however, it
will be subjected to an implicit marginal cost of emissions, since
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1990 2010 2020 2050
Energy CO2 Energy CO2 Energy CO2 Energy CO2
Used Emitted Used Emitted Used Emitted Used Emitted
SCENARIO all all a c e a c e a c e a c e a c e a c e
Supply Side
Energy Supply/Transformation
Electric Generation 96 1.3 141 120 153 1.9 1.4 2.4 165 135 183 2.2 1.4 2.9 187 135 234 1.9 1.0 3.1
Synfuels Production 0 0.0 0 1 1 0.0 0.0 0.0 2 4 5 –0.1 –0.2 –0.2 38 18 61 0.2 –0.4 0.7
Direct Use of Fuels by Sector
Resid./Comm./Inst. 47 0.9 59 49 65 1.1 0.9 1.2 64 52 73 1.2 0.9 1.3 73 48 87 1.3 0.9 1.6
Industryc 68 1.4 74 63 81 1.4 0.0 0.0 74 61 86 1.4 1.2 1.6 61 42 69 1.2 0.8 1.4
Transportation 51 0.9 64 53 74 1.2 0.0 0.0 65 52 78 1.2 1.0 1.4 69 45 85 1.3 0.8 1.6
TOTAL 262 4.5 338 286 375 5.6 2.3 3.6 370 304 425 5.9 4.4 7.1 427 288 535 5.9 3.1 8.3
Demand Side
Resid./Comm./Inst. 86 1.4 108 91 119 1.7 1.4 2.0 116 95 132 1.8 1.3 2.2 134 92 166 2.0 1.1 2.7
Industryc 122 2.1 165 141 181 2.7 2.1 3.1 186 154 211 2.9 2.1 3.5 196 140 242 2.6 1.4 3.7
Transportation 53 1.0 65 0 76 1.2 1.0 1.4 68 55 82 1.2 0.9 1.4 98 56 127 1.4 0.6 1.9
TOTAL 262 4.5 338 232 375 5.6 4.5 6.5 370 304 425 5.9 4.4 7.1 427 288 535 5.9 3.1 8.3
By Source
Solids 77 1.9 99 79 115 2.5 2.0 2.9 113 84 140 2.9 2.1 3.5 163 76 256 4.1 1.9 6.5
Liquids 91 1.7 100 79 122 1.8 1.4 2.3 92 71 119 1.7 1.3 2.2 46 41 49 0.9 0.8 0.9
Gases 61 0.9 85 68 93 1.3 1.0 1.4 88 62 94 1.3 0.9 1.4 63 31 60 0.9 0.5 0.9
Other 34 0.0 54 60 45 0.0 0.0 0.0 77 87 72 0.0 0.0 0.0 155 140 170 0.0 0.0 0.0
TOTAL 262 4.5 338 286 375 5.6 4.5 6.5 370 304 425 5.9 4.4 7.1 427 288 535 5.9 3.1 8.3
aEnergy expressed in EJ.
bCarbon expressed as Gt C.
cIn the IS92 scenarios, the industrial sector includes industrial activities related to manufacturing, agriculture,mining and forestry.
Table A3: Annex I—primary energy consumeda and carbon emittedb in the IS92 scenarios, subdivided into the elements of the
fuel cycle where the primary fuel is consumed.
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1990 2010 2020 2050
Energy CO2 Energy CO2 Energy CO2 Energy CO2
Used Emitted Used Emitted Used Emitted Used Emitted
SCENARIO all all a c e a c e a c e a c e a c e a c e
Residential/Commercial/Institutional
Electric Generation 40 0.6 49 41 53 0.7 0.5 0.8 51 42 57 0.7 0.4 0.9 55 40 69 0.6 0.3 0.9
Synfuels Production 0 0.0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 0.0 –0.1 –0.1 6 4 11 0 –0.1 0.2
Direct Use of Fuels 47 0.9 59 49 65 1.1 0.9 1.2 64 52 73 1.2 0.9 1.3 73 48 87 1.3 0.9 1.6
TOTAL 86 1.4 108 91 119 1.7 1.4 2.0 116 95 132 1.8 1.3 2.2 134 92 166 2.0 1.1 2.7
Industryc
Electric Generation 54 0.8 91 77 99 1.2 0.9 1.5 111 91 124 1.5 1.0 1.9 129 93 162 1.3 0.6 2.1
Synfuels Production 0 0.0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 0.0 –0.1 –0.1 6 4 11 0 –0.1 0.2
Direct Use of Fuels 68 1.4 74 63 81 1.4 1.2 1.6 74 61 86 1.4 1.2 1.6 61 42 69 1.2 0.8 1.4
TOTAL 122 2.1 165 141 181 2.7 2.1 3.1 186 154 211 2.9 2.1 3.5 196 140 242 2.6 1.4 3.7
Transportation
Electric Generation 2 0.0 1 1 1 0.0 0.0 0.0 2 2 2 0.0 0.0 0.0 3 2 3 0.0 0.0 0.0
Synfuels Production 0 0.0 0 1 1 0.0 0.0 0.0 1 1 1 –0.1 –0.1 –0.1 27 9 39 0.1 –0.2 0.3
Direct Use of Fuels 51 0.9 64 53 74 1.2 1.0 1.4 65 52 78 1.2 1.0 1.4 69 45 85 1.3 0.8 1.6
TOTAL 53 1.0 65 54 76 1.2 1.0 1.4 68 55 82 1.2 0.9 1.4 98 56 127 1.4 0.6 1.9
All End-Use Sectors
Electric Generation 96 1.4 141 120 153 1.9 1.4 2.4 165 135 183 2.2 1.4 2.8 187 135 234 1.9 0.9 3.0
Synfuels Production 0 0.0 0 1 1 0.0 0.0 0.0 2 4 5 –0.1 –0.2 –0.2 38 18 61 0.2 –0.4 0.7
Direct Use of Fuels 166 3.2 198 165 221 3.7 3.1 4.1 203 164 236 3.8 3.1 4.4 202 136 241 3.8 2.5 4.5
TOTAL 262 4.5 338 286 375 5.6 4.5 6.5 370 304 425 5.9 4.4 7.1 427 288 535 5.9 3.1 8.3
aEnergy expressed in EJ.
bCarbon expressed as Gt C.
cIn the IS92 scenarios, the industrial sector includes industrial activities related to manufacturing, agriculture,mining  and forestry.
Table A4: Annex I—energy useda and carbon emittedb by end-use sector in the IS92 scenarios, subdivided into the elements of
the fuel cycle where the primary fuel is consumed.
Technologies, Policies and Measures for Mitigating Climate Change
Appendix B
SAR I
IPCC, 1996: Climate Change 1995: The Science of Climate Change. Contribution of Working Group I to the Second
Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Houghton, J.J., L.G. Meiro Filho, B.A. Callander,
N. Harris, A. Kattenberg and K. Maskell (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge and New York, 584 pp.
SAR II
IPCC, 1996: Climate Change 1995: Impacts, Adaptations, and Mitigation of Climate Change: Scientific-Technical Analyses.
Contribution of Working Group II to the Second Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
[Watson, R.T., M.C. Zinyowera and R.H. Moss (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge and New York, 880 pp.
SAR III
IPCC, 1996: Climate Change 1995: Economic and Social Dimensions of Climate Change. Contribution of Working Group III
to the Second Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Bruce, J., Hoesung Lee and E. Haites
(eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge and New York, 464 pp.
SAR Syn.Rpt.
IPCC, 1996: IPCC Second Assessment Synthesis of Scientific-Technical Information Relevant to Interpreting Article 2 of the
UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. World Meteorological Organization, Geneva, 17 pp.
IPCC 1994
IPCC, 1994. Climate Change 1994: Radiative Forcing of Climate Change and an Evaluation of the IPCC IS92 Emission
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Appendix C
AGBM Ad Hoc Group on the Berlin Mandate
CHP combined heat and power
CNG compressed natural gas
COP Conference of the Parties
FAO UN Food and Agriculture Organization
FCCC UN Framework Convention on Climate Change
GDP gross domestic product
GEF Global Environment Facility
GHG greenhouse gas
GWP global warming potential
HDV heavy duty vehicle
ICAO UN International Civil Aviation Organization
IEA International Energy Agency
IGCC integrated gasification combined cycle
IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
ISO International Standards Organization
LDV light duty vehicle
LESS Low CO2-Emitting Energy Supply System
LNG liquid natural gas
LPG liquefied petroleum gas
NGO non-governmental organization
OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
PPP purchasing power parity
PURPA Public Utilities Regulatory Policy Act
R&D research and development
RD&D research, development and demonstration
SAR Second Assessment Report
SPM Summary for Policymakers
TPD tons per day
UNITAR UN Institute for Training and Research
US IJI U.S. Initiative on Joint Implementation
Chemical Symbols
CFC chlorofluorocarbon
CFC-14 carbon tetrafluoride (CF4)
CFC-116 hexafluoroethylene (C2F6)
C2F6 hexafluoroethylene (CFC-116)













SI (Système Internationale) Units










Special Names and Symbols for Certain SI-derived Units
Physical Quantity Name of SI Unit Symbol for SI Unit Definition of Unit
energy joule J kg m2 s-2
power watt W kg m2 s-3 (= Js-1)
Decimal Fractions and Multiples of SI Units Having Special Names
Physical Quantity Name of Unit Symbol for Unit Definition of Unit
area hectare ha 104 m2
weight ton t 103 kg
Non-SI Units
°C degrees Celsius (0°C = ~273K); temperature
differences are also given in °C rather than the more correct form of “Celsius degrees”
kWh kilowatt-hour
MWe megawatts of electricity
ppmv parts per million (106) by volume
ppbv parts per billion (109) by volume
pptv parts per trillion (1012) by volume
tce tons of coal equivalent





Annex I of the FCCC lists the countries who were members of
the OECD in 1992, 11 countries undergoing the process of
transition to a market economy, and the European Economic
Community. Annex I parties are committed to adopt national
policies and take measures to mitigate climate change.
Capital Costs
Costs associated with the capital or investment expenditures on
land, plant, equipment and inventories. Unlike labour and oper-
ating costs, capital costs are independent of the level of output.
Commercialization
Sequence of actions necessary to achieve market entry and
general market competitiveness of new innovative technolo-
gies, processes and products.
Cost-effective
A criterion that specifies that a technology or measure deliver a
good or service at equal or lower cost than current practice. In this
paper, environmental externalities are not internalized; payback
periods vary, depending on the particular sector and market.
Economic Potential
The portion of the technical potential for GHG emissions
reductions or energy-efficiency improvements that could be
achieved cost-effectively in the absence of market barriers. The
achievement of the economic potential requires additional poli-
cies and measures to break down market barriers.
Emission Permit
A non-transferable or tradable allocation of entitlements by a
government to an individual firm to emit a specified amount of
a substance.
Emission Quota
The portion or share of total allowable emissions assigned to a
country or group of countries within a framework of maximum
total emissions and mandatory allocations of resources or
assessments.
Emission Standard
A level of emission that under law may not be exceeded.
Energy Intensity
Ratio of energy consumption and economic or physical output.
At the national level, energy intensity is the ratio of total
domestic primary energy consumption or final energy con-
sumption to gross domestic product or physical output.
Externalities
By-products of activities that affect the well-being of people or
damage the environment, where those impacts are not reflected
in market prices. The costs (or benefits) associated with 
externalities do not enter standard cost accounting schemes.
Final Energy
Energy supplied that is available to the consumer to be con-
verted into useful energy (e.g., electricity at the wall outlet).
Full-cost Pricing
The pricing of commercial goods—such as electric power—
that would include in the final prices faced by the end user not
only the private costs of inputs, but also the costs of the exter-
nalities created by their production and use.
GHG Reduction Potential
Possible reductions in emissions of greenhouse gases (quantified in
terms of absolute reductions or in percentages of baseline emissions)
that can be achieved through the use of technologies and measures.
Information and Education Measures
Actions that provide information, training or encouragement,
or help to develop understanding. Such measures may provide
information about the availability, performance and other char-
acteristics of technologies, practices and measures.
Marginal Cost Pricing
The pricing of commercial goods and services such that the
price equals the additional cost that arises from the expansion
of production by one additional unit.
Market Barriers
Conditions that prevent or impede the diffusion of cost-effective
technologies or practices that could mitigate GHG emissions.
Market-based Incentives
Measures intended to directly change relative prices of energy
services and overcome market barriers.
Market Penetration
The share of a given market that is provided by a particular
good or service at a given time.
Market Potential (or Currently Realizable Potential)
The portion of the economic potential for GHG emissions
reductions or energy-efficiency improvements that could be




Actions that can be taken by a government or a group of gov-
ernments, often in conjunction with the private sector, to accel-
erate the use of technologies or other practices that reduce
GHG emissions.
No Regrets
Measures whose benefits—such as improved performance or
reduced emissions of local/regional pollutants, but excluding
the benefits of climate change mitigation—equal or exceed
their costs. They are sometimes known as “measures worth
doing anyway.”
Opportunity Cost
The cost of an economic activity foregone by the choice of
another activity.
Policies
Procedures developed and implemented by government(s)
regarding the goal of mitigating climate change through the use
of technologies and measures.
Primary Energy
Energy embodied in natural resources (e.g., coal, crude oil,
sunlight, uranium) that has not undergone any anthropogenic
conversion or transformation.
Project Costs
All financial costs of a project such as capital, labour and 
operating costs.
Regulatory Measures
Rules or codes enacted by governments that mandate product
specifications or process performance characteristics.
Research, Development and Demonstration
Scientific/technical research and development of new produc-
tion processes or products, coupled with analysis and measures
that provide information to potential users regarding the 
application of the new product or process; demonstration tests
the feasibility of applying these products or processes via pilot
plants and other pre-commercial applications.
Scenario
A plausible description of how the future may develop, based
on a coherent and internally consistent set of assumptions
about key relationships and driving forces (e.g., rate of tech-
nology changes, prices). Note that scenarios are neither predic-
tions nor forecasts.
Standards/Performance Criteria
Set of rules or codes mandating or defining product perfor-
mance (e.g., grades, dimensions, characteristics, test methods,
rules for use).
Structural Changes
Changes, for example, in the relative share of GDP produced 
by the industrial, agricultural or services sectors of an economy;
or, more generally, systems transformations whereby some 
components are either replaced or partially substituted by other
ones.
Technical Potential
The amount by which it is possible to reduce GHG emissions
or improve energy efficiency by using a technology or practice
in all applications in which it could technically be adopted,
without consideration of its costs or practical feasibility.
Technology
A piece of equipment or a technique for performing a particular
activity.
Voluntary Measures
Measures to reduce GHG emissions that are adopted by firms
or other actors in the absence of government mandates.
Voluntary measures help make climate-friendly products or
processes more readily available or encourage consumers to
incorporate environmental values in their market choices.
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I. IPCC FIRST ASSESSMENT REPORT (1990)
a) CLIMATE CHANGE — The IPCC Scientific Assessment. The
1990 report of the IPCC Scientific Assessment Working
Group (also in Chinese, French, Russian and Spanish).
b) CLIMATE CHANGE — The  IPCC Impacts Assessment. The
1990 report of the IPCC Impacts Assessment Working Group
(also in Chinese, French, Russian and Spanish).
c) CLIMATE CHANGE — The IPCC Response Strategies. The
1990 report of the IPCC Response Strategies Working Group
(also in Chinese, French, Russian and Spanish).
d) Overview and Policymaker Summaries, 1990.
Emissions Scenarios (prepared by the IPCC Response Strategies
Working Group), 1990.
Assessment of the Vulnerability of Coastal Areas to Sea Level Rise —
A Common Methodology, 1991.
II. IPCC SUPPLEMENT (1992)
a) CLIMATE CHANGE 1992 — The Supplementary Report to the
IPCC Scientific Assessment. The 1992 report of the IPCC
Scientific Assessment Working Group.
b) CLIMATE CHANGE 1992 — The Supplementary Report to the
IPCC Impacts Assessment. The 1990 report of the  IPCC
Impacts Assessment Working Group.
CLIMATE CHANGE: The IPCC 1990 and 1992 Assessments — IPCC
First Assessment Report Overview and Policymaker Summaries,
and 1992 IPCC Supplement (also in Chinese, French, Russian and
Spanish).
Global Climate Change and the Rising Challenge of the Sea. Coastal
Zone Management Subgroup of the IPCC Response Strategies
Working Group, 1992.
Report of the IPCC Country Study Workshop, 1992.
Preliminary Guidelines for Assessing Impacts of Climate Change,
1992.
III. IPCC SPECIAL REPORT, 1994
a) IPCC Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas Inventories
(3 volumes), 1994 (also in French, Russian and Spanish).
b) IPCC Technical Guidelines for Assessing Climate Change Impacts
and Adaptations, 1994 (also in Arabic, Chinese, French, Russian and
Spanish).
c) CLIMATE CHANGE 1994 — Radiative Forcing of Climate
Change and An Evaluation of the IPCC IS92 Emission Scenarios.
IV. IPCC SECOND ASSESSMENT REPORT, 1995
a) CLIMATE CHANGE 1995 — The Science of Climate Change.
(including Summary for Policymakers). Report of IPCC
Working Group I, 1995.
b) CLIMATE CHANGE 1995 — Scientific-Technical Analyses of
Impacts, Adaptations and Mitigation of Climate Change. (includ-
ing Summary for Policymakers). Report of IPCC Working
Group II, 1995.
c) CLIMATE CHANGE 1995 — The Economic and Social
Dimensions of Climate Change. (including Summary for
Policymakers). Report of IPCC Working Group III, 1995.
d) The IPCC Second Assessment Synthesis of Scientific-Technical
Information Relevant to Interpreting Article 2 of the UN
Framework Convention on Climate Change, 1995.
(Please note: the IPCC Synthesis and the three Summaries for
Policymakers have been published in a single volume and are also avail-
able in Arabic, Chinese, French, Russian and Spanish).
List of IPCC outputs
At its Eleventh Session (Rome, 11-15 December 1995), the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change adopted by
consensus the following procedures for the preparation of
Technical Papers.
IPCC Technical Papers are prepared on topics for which an
independent, international scientific/technical perspective is
deemed essential. They:
a) are based on the material already in the IPCC assess-
ment reports and special reports;
b) are initiated: (i) in response to a formal request from the
Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework
Convention on Climate Change or its subsidiary bodies
and agreed by the IPCC Bureau; or (ii) as decided by
the Panel;
c) are prepared by a team of authors, including a conven-
ing lead author, selected by the IPCC Bureau, in accor-
dance with the guidelines of the selection of lead
authors contained in the IPCC Procedures;*
d) are submitted in draft form for simultaneous expert and
government review at least four weeks before the com-
ments are due;
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